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Abstract 
The starting point of the paper is the spatial characteristics of slums 
when it seeks to explain why rulers tend to neglect the welfare of their 
dwellers: they don’t have to. Their economies are fairly closed. While 
located close to the centers of power, their high population density 
implies that they cover small space and are easy to cordon off in case 
of danger. The ease of control from the outside allows rulers to spend 
less attention to the control of their complex inside. Particularly when 
a slum is based on shack architecture, the high degree of mutual 
monitoring among dwellers may cause sharp shifts in the control 
regime of crime. The emphasis on spatial configurations motivates the 
focus on one specific slum: Mathare Valley. Paths back to colonial 
rule are outlined. The paper is stylistically unkempt. 
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 Part I: General aspects of 
slum control 
 
1. Introduction1 
Rapid urbanization takes place in most countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Kenya is no exception. Population growth in Nairobi has stayed 
above four percent for decades, according to common estimates, 
although slightly declining (UN Habitat, 2014: 149). Missing ability or 
willingness to prioritize the development of urban infrastructure has 
resulted in a massive increase in urban slum populations. In a few 
countries, such as Senegal, the share of urban population who resides 
in slums has substantially decreased, however; but not so in Kenya. 
More than half of the population in Nairobi has been living in a slum 
for decades.2 Moreover, both the building standards and public 
infrastructures connected to them are worse than most.3  
                                                          
1  We would like to thank Research Council Norway, NORGLOBAL for economic 
support and to NUPI and Stein Sundstøl Eriksen heading the project ‘Slums, states 
and citizens’ in particular for allowing Andvig to spend more than the assigned time 
on it. We will also like to thank our research assistants Marrion Mackani Injete, 
Peter Kimani, Linda Obuya, Jack Okello, Mwiti Taa Robinson and Muema Wambua 
who in addition to perform the assigned interviewing with care, shared with us 
their observations from the field in separate field reports. Without the research 
coordinator, Fridah Kinya Kithinji, the research and observations reported here, 
would never have taken place.  
2  According to UN-Habitat (2013: 148) around seventy percent of the urban 
population lived in slums in Senegal in 1990 while only forty percent did so in 
2009, a substantial decline. In Kenya on the other hand the share had stayed 
around fifty five percent during the two decades. This does not mean that the share 
of slum population is exceptionally high. The sub-Saharan Africa average was 
above sixty percent in 2010, but the share in Kenya appears exceptionally stable 
with no signs of decline. The numbers referred to above are the ones codified in 
most UN publications, but are quite uncertain and rely on somewhat arbitrary 
definitions that lead, for example, slum population shares in small towns tending 
to become higher than in large cities, although it is the waste number of people 
congregated in densely packed neighborhoods in large cities most have in mind as 
slums. In the case of Nairobi the estimates vary and estimates as high as seventy 
percent are often in use. 
3  In a number of studies Gulyani et al (2008, 2010, 2012) have compared slums in 
Nairobi and Dakar trying to explain the puzzle of the low quality housing of slum 
housing in Nairobi. 
Jens C. Andvig and Tiberius Barasa 
 
6 
Slums are perceived as dangerous places. Not only are they lacking 
public infrastructure, which combined with their high population 
densities make them dangerous to health. In Kenya the high area 
density of crime and violence adds to the insecurity of their residents. 
In slums dominated by shack architecture, as the ones studied in this 
paper, the flimsiness of their housing combined with high poverty rates 
add to the feeling of vulnerability. 
We have chosen to focus on only one large slum area, Mathare and 
within that area mainly a set of villages, Mathare Valley,4 that all are 
within walking distance to each other. An understanding of slum 
governance relies on specific interacting spatial mechanisms that we 
could more efficiently uncover by the study of a specific geographical 
area. Mathare is a populous slum area a few kilometers north east of 
Nairobi’s central business district. Its core, Mathare Valley, has been 
recognized as a slum for more than forty years (Etherton, 1971). Its 
recent population growth rates appear to have been modest.  
1.1 Visual impressions and some naïve question 
 Throughout its history Mathare Valley has held a reputation for 
lawlessness where economic and politically motivated violence 
frequently occurred. Most of its inhabitants have remained poor and its 
public infrastructure remains appalling. The visual impact of visible 
poverty, the labyrinths of densely packed shacks, the smell of partly 
open sewage and warnings about the dangers of being exposed to 
violent crime when entering the area, make strong impressions of any 
outsider. An urge to change this kind of the social space from the 
bottom arises spontaneously in any visitor as it has done at least the 
last forty years. 
While changes have occurred, a key question that arises is how can 
this pocket of Nairobi remain so stable in terms of its poverty and many 
of its modes of social and economic interactions? Does its shack 
architecture have any consequences for the kind of interactions taking 
place and for how the slum is ruled?  
1.2  Sequence and characteristics of the paper 
The sequence of the paper is as follows: After a brief presentation of 
some of the theoretical aspects of slum ruling or policing issues and 
how they may contribute to lasting poverty of most residents, we 
present a descriptive and fairly broad overview of the Mathare Valley 
slum, with its major villages indicating the characteristics of their 
geographical and population features 
                                                          
4  The use of the geographical names ‘Mathare’ and ‘Mathare Valley’ varies. 
Sometimes ‘Mathare Valley’ designates the larger area that embraces areas like 
Mlango Kubwa, Huruma, Mathare North, etc. that we here denote as ‘Mathare’.  
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This will be followed by an outline of the history of the valley the 
last eighty years or so. We focus on salient points for the evolution of 
the political economy of slums that can explain present mechanisms of 
governance and spatial control. While we as far as possible will focus 
on information from Mathare Valley, we will also visit other slum or 
housing developments at times. Nairobi has more than hundred slum 
areas. Glimpses of the relevant political and bureaucratic mechanisms 
are rare since the major actors have motives for keeping them secret so 
they can sometimes only be discoverable outside Mathare. 
In the final part we focus on the specifics of crime victimization and 
policing processes in Mathare Valley where we present the procedures 
and results from our own investigations into crime and crime 
prevention processes with observations from a number of secondary 
sources.  
The form of this paper is less structured and organized then a 
regular working paper. It is not a paper destined to become journal 
article(s), but it reports on observations, drafts of explanations sought 
at different times and in different contexts, so it will contain perhaps 
annoying repetitions. And more annoying: it will contain more stylistic 
defects than usual. We hope, nevertheless, that it will prove readable 
because it tries to penetrate an empirical reality that we hope soon may 
become history.  
 2. Ruling from outside and within 
2.1 Definitions, extension and policy instruments 
The term ‘ruling’ is here understood in a wide sense and embraces 
situation where the state dictates the outcomes and where it or parts of 
the government apparatus are involved in various forms of monitoring 
of or ruling contests with slum dwellers or other non-state actors about 
the control of different aspects of slum space. Different parts of the 
government may then be engaged in different factions of the contests. 
From the outside point of view of political elites the slums in Nairobi 
are sites of potential political instability and have frightening 
capacities for violent collective actions. They contain a large number of 
poor citizens densely packed in the neighborhood of political power 
centers. Their residents have every reason to hold a grudge against 
political and economic elites, and more so in Kenya than many other 
African countries since most of the houses, even the shacks are owned 
by members of the same elites through absentee ownership with 
contested legitimacy. The security of these ownership rights often vary 
with the political strength of varying tribal coalitions. Hence, the ruling 
of slums as a whole may become closely connected to large scale 
eviction or squatting processes triggered by political shifts. All these 
become part of the ruling of the slums from the outside. Mathare Valley 
is a definite economic, political and social space with fairly clear 
borders embedded in the wider urban area of Nairobi. As such it has an 
‘outside’ and a space within.  
To analyze how it is ruled by the state5, the state’s supply of order, 
its application of instruments to control of residents’ violations of state 
sanctioned laws (including protection of elite accepted property rights, 
lawful or not) and predation, we have found it useful to distinguish 
between instruments working mainly from the outside and the 
government engagements that mainly seek to influence it through the 
slum’s internal mechanisms. The state’s ruling the outside embraces 
management of access to the slums, the allocation of ownership rights 
to housing , the determination of the geographical areas where 
informal settlements are allowed, which building requirements that 
may be dispensed with, and so on. Important instruments are evictions, 
whether protected by open by use of public force such as the police or 
implemented in more secretive ways such as through arson where the 
instigator is not public. Other large scale police interventions may also 
                                                          
5  For our purposes we use the state as a synonym for ‘public government’ and it 
includes both central government, Nairobi municipality and the new forms of local 
government that may be the outcome of the new 2010 constitution. 
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be considered part of the external ruling process. The construction or 
non-construction of public infrastructure such as electricity, street-
lighting, water and sanitation has also an external ruling aspect; for 
example, may the state allow local gangs to control access to public 
toilet, electricity and water or not?  
The state inside ruling embraces the instruments the state apply to 
influence the internal policing of the slum which is quite extensive and 
complicated due to the large number of activities located in the same 
area: informal and illegal market transactions, family life and 
recreation, schooling and idling. The activities of local predators such 
as local burglars are also quite prevalent and to contain them is in 
principle an important ruling task of the state. The state instruments for 
inside ruling are closely related to the area chief institution, which will 
elucidated later on. The possibility that both state rulers of the slum 
insides as well as their outside rulers may turn predators, at least in the 
eyes of the slum dwellers, is always open. 
Looking at the order from the other side, the side of the residents, 
the order- relevant engagements of the residents may also be directed 
inside or outside. In both cases the engagements demand some form of 
collective actions, but the scope and forms will differ. While the 
internal engagements or collective actions represent residents’ demand 
for security against other slum dwellers’ predation, their externally 
directed actions are often directed against state predation or what 
residents consider illegitimate aspects of outsiders’ property rights. 
Naturally, then larger and more difficult forms of collective actions are 
necessary. An original feature of our analysis is that we relate both the 
organizational capabilities for collective actions as well as their 
switches between the ruling forms from welfare-enhancing to predatory 
in the scope of mutual monitoring between slum dwellers allowed by 
slum architecture and the character of the social space. 
2.2  Ruling issues and slum space characteristics: high 
population density 
A major assumption for the following is that while it is fairly easy for 
the state to rule a slum from the outside, to control its internal 
workings is a different matter. That is extremely difficult and often not 
done. It is the latter fact that has made some political scientists to 
consider urban slums in Kenya as ‘pockets of statelessness’ (Joireman, 
2011: 129). Nevertheless, one of the reasons why some lawlessness or 
residential self-rule – these possibilities are both real – has been 
allowed to evolve is because the Nairobi slums are easy to rule from the 
outside. 
Both set of mechanisms were exposed during the 2007 electoral 
violence: While it was difficult for the police to break eruption of 
violence inside the slums of Kibera and Mathare, it was not equally 
Jens C. Andvig and Tiberius Barasa 
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difficult to stop it from moving outside. The police simply shut them off 
from the rest of the city. The high population density of the slums 
makes slum areas small and easy to close in.  
2.3 Ruling issues and slum space characteristics: poverty6  
While we are not concerned here with the economic welfare of the 
residents as such, the high incidence of poverty among residents 
influences both the inside and outside ruling of the slum and is 
influenced by them. Most of the economic activities taking place in 
Mathare Valley are informal and a substantial number of them are 
illegal. Their illegality and the lack of feasible alternatives may have 
important consequences for the role and forms of inside ruling system, 
as well as perpetuating poverty. The prevailing poverty in its turn will 
have important consequences for the kind of ruling systems and 
infrastructure supplied by government as well as the kind of local 
contests likely to evolve. A further analysis will rely on a closer analysis 
of the major causes of the prevailing poverty:  
We may at the one hand explain the long lasting poverty of the slum 
by looking at Mathare Valley as an open system where new cohorts of 
the poor rural people or people exiting even poorer urban slums enter 
Mathare Valley which forces average poverty in the community to stay 
at low stationary levels. Mathare may then act as a sorting place where 
some entrants exit to areas with less poverty and better houses and 
public infrastructure while some remains locked in. If this flow into the 
area would somehow shrink – for example through land reforms or 
                                                          
6  We did not have any questions about household incomes in our own questionnaire 
from Mathare since we believed that it was not possible to get close to any realistic 
estimates without extensive follow-up questions that would be out of our focus. 
There are few studies of income levels in Mathare Valley. In order to get panel data 
most research of that kind is directed to Viwandani and Korogocho and done 
through the African Population and Health Research Center that follows these two 
slums closely. Gulyani and al. (2012: 254) present household income estimates for 
the whole Nairobi slum population. They found an average income of 105 US$ and 
a median of 93 US$ that translated to individual incomes became 49 and 40 US$; 
that is, half of the slum population had to live on 1.3 US$ dollar per day or less. 
While focusing on possible improvements of the infrastructure, a research 
cooperation between UC Berkeley and University of Nairobi( Muungano Support 
Trust, 2012: 20–23) also presents some income data from Mathare Valley in their 
questionnaire study that confirms high poverty levels also for Mathare Valley: 
8 500 Ksh per month per household- (approximately US$ 100). With 3 adult 
equivalents per household this would be about US$ 1 per day per person, and 
close to extreme poverty levels, with 2.5 adult equivalents it would be 1.3 US$ per 
day. As expected this income estimate is quite uncertain and liable to measurement 
errors. For example, the average household expenditures are significantly about 
reported income. Moreover, looking at the village distribution of data, average 
income of 3B is a third of Kosovo (5 000Ksh vs. 15 000 Ksh) while average 
household expenditures in 3B is 16 112 while in Kosovo it is 11 933! It is obviously 
difficult to make any precise estimate of poverty levels on the basis of such data.  
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reduced population growth – the conditions would improve through 
the automatic workings of market mechanisms and the like. In this case 
prevailing forms of illegality will just represent a side show. 
Alternatively, we can look at Mathare Valley as a semi-closed system 
where new entrants stay long and where it is mainly the social and 
economic interactions taking place within this space that reproduce 
poverty and dilapidation and are likely to continue doing so in the 
absence of major outside interventions or large scale economic 
changes. In this case the various forms of internally generated illegality 
may become important mechanisms in reproducing poverty. Slums 
have a comparative advantage in creating conditions for persistence of 
informal and illegal economic transactions as well as agglomeration of 
poor residents. Both illegality and concentration of the poor give little 
scope for scale economies, although the concentration as such may 
give some.7 A large fraction of residents are also victimized through 
local predatory crime that prevent saving as do the absentee ownership 
of housing that somehow has evolved in the slums of Kenya. 
In addition to absentee ownership of housing other outside social, 
political and economic forces and structures impinging on the slum 
contributed to its semi-closure. Here missing outside formal 
                                                          
7  Scale economies are also difficult to develop due to the surrounding poverty: 
Shops may only buy in a couple of eggs at the time since customers buy only one at 
the time. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) present a lively analysis of the role of missing 
scale economies for perpetuating poverty. Moreover, they present an economic 
analysis of a theft that made a family enterprise slide into poverty (ibid.:139–140). 
In Andvig and Barasa (2011: 85) several theft cases reported from a Nairobi slum 
had similar consequences. A lucky escape from Mathare Valley that illustrate both 
the limited scale economies when customers are poor, but the possibilities when 
they are many is illustrated in the following story i Huffington Post (March 30, 
2009): ‘How, I wonder, did Mama Rose not only survive but manage to put her 
children through school? I met Jamii Bora, and they told me I could lift myself out of 
this mess. I started selling vegetables on the street and then used my savings to 
take a loan to start a water point (a place for selling water) just outside my house. 
Then I sold little bit of soap – you know people here like buying things in small bits. 
I look for an example of the soap. She points to what looked like lye. I buy the bar 
for 37 shillings, and then I cut it into six pieces that I sell for 10 shillings each. If a 
person has very little money, I will agree to cut one of the pieces into two to sell 
each for 5 shillings. And you see, in other areas nearby, people sell the pieces for 
15 shillings, so I get some of their customers because my prices are better. I sell 
tomatoes and eggs, too, and all the time I am saving, saving.’  
 The tiny store, about three by six feet and protected with chicken wire, is attached 
to her house. The water tap is set up right outside so that the kiosk worker can sell 
water as well. Thirty-two years in this place, and Mama Rose and her family are 
finally moving to a home in Kaputei, where she will have space and clean air, her 
own kitchen garden, an indoor shower and toilet, and a priceless feeling of 
security.’ Kaputei is a housing project area with low cost, but decent houses. Mama 
Rose received some support to go there, but had also to fairly successful in order to 
pay her share of costs.  
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employment possibilities are of course most important making up till 
sixty percent of the population turned inwards to the local informal 
economy. Supporting the abstraction of semi-closure and local poverty 
trap is the fact that the population growth in the slum appears modest 
at present. No new villages have ‘developed’ since the establishment of 
the Kosovo settlement in 2001.8  
2.4  Ruling issues and slum space characteristics: the 
shack architecture 
Most of Mathare Valley is dominated by shack architecture. This has a 
number of consequences for any ruling of the area. For the ruling of the 
outside it means that it is easy to demolish the basic housing units, and 
it is compatible with contestable ownership rights. For the ruling of the 
inside it is a significant consequence of shack architecture that most 
economic activities will take place at the ground level, and in the 
public and therefor visible to actors outside the transaction. Mutual 
monitoring by dwellers is thereby eased as is various forms of behavior 
replications. Another consequence of the shack architecture in the case 
of Mathare Valley is that the grant process for creating new shack has 
created narrow and non-symmetric paths inaccessible by cars and 
where the labyrinthine patterns make it difficult to find the way to or 
exit from any given house without prior knowledge of the path; 
obviously of relevance, for example, when considering a crime in one 
of the narrow pathways. 
2.5  Slum characteristics and theoretical perspectives 
The semi-closed neighborhood that characterize the informal 
settlement of Mathare Valley (in our conception) with its multi-
stranded relationships and high mutual visibility between its dwellers 
lead us to expect strong mutual spill-overs between neighbors’ actions 
in the separate action arenas as well as interactions between the action 
arenas. It seems reasonable here then to borrow theories from the so 
called ‘social interaction’ perspective in economics.9 While not 
developing any precise mathematical model we apply the perspective 
                                                          
8  Pamoja Trust (2009: 38). Here many of the residents had been moved away from 
Village 2 in Mathare Valley by force and ‘granted’ government land in Kosovo. 
Hence, this did not open for much net migration to the area. The average length of 
stay in their village of our 151 respondents with an average age of 36.6 years was 
13.4 years, indicates a fairly stationary population. In the oldest settlement in our 
sample, 3C, the average age was 41.5 years who had stayed there in 23.5 years. (A 
description of our questionnaire study will be given in …). |The evidence is not 
conclusive, however. Ndungu (2010: 76–77) found Mathare dwellers to have stayed 
there shorter than people in the Mukuru, Korogocho and Kibera slums and Gulyani 
et al. (2012: 258) found the average community stay for slum dwellers in Nairobi to 
be 8.8 years and much lower than for slum dwellers in Dakar, Senegal. 
9  A general overview of the perspective may be found in Durlauf (2001) and the 
subsequent discussion. 
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in somewhat detail when analyzing the local Mathare Valley crime 
patterns. It rationalizes the multiple equilibrium characteristics that 
seem to appear from our data.  
Another source of theoretical inspiration is borrowed from the large 
scale sociology study of Chicago neighborhoods led by Roger J. 
Sampson and summarized in Sampson (2011). While we in no way 
could copy the scale and many sidedness of their empirical 
investigations, their study of collective neighborhood effects on the 
prevalence of local income and crime levels over and above what may 
follow from the average behavior of individuals with certain income 
and psychological characteristics that happens to populate this 
neighborhoods are of clear relevance. In in the explanation of inside 
village variation in crime and crime prevention behavior, these two 
theoretical perspectives will both prove helpful.  
In a paper on the political economy of the slums Dafe (2009) raises 
the question of why the miserable conditions of slums are politically 
sustainable given the fact that they contain such high concentrations of 
voters? She explores whether the major direction for searching the 
answer should be looked for in Kenyan economic inequality or in its 
tribal structure, and she votes for inequality. This is in one sense trivial: 
the infrastructure conditions in all Nairobi slums are poor irrespective 
their tribal compositions so there are obviously no direct way to convert 
tribal agglomeration into infrastructure investment. Particularly for 
political democracies the economic explanation of population dense 
economic poverty traps needs to be supplemented by an explanation of 
how their existence may become politically sustainable.  
Here again there are to major directions to explore: the ease or 
difficulty of straddling political and economic circuits of decisions, and 
the ease or difficulty of organizing collective actions among slum 
dwellers. It is clear that easy straddling, as Kenya is characterized with, 
will tend to freeze or increase any existing inequalities: in particular, 
when poor, you have no economic means of your own to influence 
‘buyable’ political and bureaucratic decisions. If rich, you may. As 
poor, you may only gain economic means for influence through 
collective action. And here tribalism may prove particularly relevant. 
The combination of poverty, the necessity, but perennial difficulty, of 
organizing collective action to achieve influence, combined with the 
tribally heterogeneity of most slums,10 may constitute part of the 
political-economic equilibrating mechanisms of low income-poor-
infrastructure of the Nairobi slums. There are counter-working forces 
special to the slums. Their densely populated character with high 
                                                          
10  Note that in the late 1960s when Mathare Valley was more tribally homogeneous a 
large sub-group among its dwellers were capable of raising enough money to 
finance collective–land-buying cooperatives or companies. We return to that 
incident in our historical sketch of the village. 
Jens C. Andvig and Tiberius Barasa 
 
14 
degree of mutual visibility among their inhabitants should make the 
dwellers more capable of organizing collective actions than people in 
other settings. Moreover, a larger fraction of the population is 
unemployed and thus time to spare for collective actions. There are 
also a numerous examples from the slums that they indeed supply 
more collective neighborhood actions in many fields than are 
performed in regular residential areas. 
Note that all these considerations are based on the assumption that 
all the relevant actions are voluntary and performed against a 
democratic political background. Here we will explore more of the 
consequences for force-making that follows from the spatial and social 
characteristics of slums and against a political background where the 
instruments for political survival are not limited to the democratic 
ones. 
2.6 Role of history and the conception of local poverty traps  
One of the phenomena Sampson sought explained for Chicago by his 
neighborhood effect models was the persistence of relative poverty 
rankings of diverse neighborhoods particularly that the high poverty 
ones seem unable to move upwards. Somehow, history mattered. That 
follows from our Mathare approach too. An implication of the 
presumption of a long run internal equilibrating mechanism that may 
reproduce relative poverty and disorder is that a considerable part of 
the explanation may then be allocated to some initial state(s) that set 
this equilibrium into existence and that from then on by its own forces 
would reproduce itself. Initial states may then have long run effects. 
Hence history of the major initial state actions, in the case of Kenya, 
colonial as well as the ones made at the early independence years 
becomes possibly very relevant for the present situation and should be 
explored. 
There are at least four components in the historical origins of the 
Mathare Valley slum that continue to shape present forms of social and 
economic interactions: 1) the rise of absentee ownership of the shacks, 
2) the size of the slum, 3) the origin of its high population density and 
poverty level, and 4) it’s perceived origin as a center of political 
opposition as well as a site of irregular economic transactions and 
regular crime. The focus in this paper will be on the last component – 
the direct and indirect roles of illegality – including its potential as a 
site of rebellion – in the governance of the slum.11 
While the focus is on the fourth component, the components are 
interlinked. For example, one of the instruments of violence in the 
                                                          
11  In a context where he is referring to a youth gang/political organization that arose 
in Nairobi in the 1940s (2006: 19) cites with approval from John Iliffe’s history on 
Tanganyika that ‘it was in the towns that Europeans first lost control of Africa’. 
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hands of the state is an ability to demolish slums by force. This 
instrument is difficult to apply fully when the slum is too large and 
populous. One has to grasp particular political opportunities. The 
prevalence of absentee ownership is not only important for the dismal 
quality of the housing in the Nairobi slums compared to other African 
cities (Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008) but also for the distribution of 
wealth and the possession and use of instruments of violence among 
the agents who fight for the spatial control of the slum areas. 
Throughout the paper is a concern with the Kenyan state as an 
apparatus of force. In a companion paper we will study it as an 
apparatus for supplying public welfare in Mathare. 
 
 3. Mathare Valley area – a 
description12 
3.1 Mathare Valley: Definitions 
Since the geographical extensions of ‘Mathare’ and ‘Mathare Valley’ as 
well as the designations of several of the sub-spaces (villages) vary, we 
will have to define our understanding and use of the terms as well as 
possible. This variation in defined extensions has important 
consequences for how to interpret the estimated population sizes as 
well as for other aspects of the analyses of the area.13 Sometimes 
Mathare and Mathare Valley are used as synonyms for the area that is 
bounded by Thika road in the north and Juja Road in the south, 
beginning in the southwest Muratina Street and ending up at the Outer 
Ring Road. This is the wide definition and as mentioned we will 
sometimes designate this area as ‘Mathare’.14 The Mathare ‘slums’ are 
sometimes used to designate roughly the southern half of this area 
which contains most of its slums and will then embrace Huruma and 
                                                          
12  As underlined in Sen (1980) description implies selection and choice. It is an 
intellectually underrated activity. Here our aim when describing Mathare Valley is 
to convey an understanding of how it is ruled. Since we believe its ruling is linked 
to its spatial features, we have supplied a few pictures and maps in addition to the 
verbal analysis. 
13  This variation may in itself be partly explained by the large share of informal 
settlements in the area, where the defined extensions of villages are not only 
determined by the government but may also depend on the use of the terms by the 
dwellers themselves that may vary over time and among the persons asked. 
Recently the mapping of the informal areas have become more precise partly 
thanks to a cooperation between the international Open Street Maps and local 
community organizations, particularly Map Kibera that also have activated local 
geographical knowledge through young activists using mobiles with GPS systems. 
We have also have had good use of the maps published in Muungano Support Trust 
et al. (2012) where local activists have cooperated with students from UC Berkeley 
and University of Nairobi under the direction of the professors Jason Corburn and 
Peter Ngau. It is somewhat paradoxical that local activists appear to be able to give 
more realistic assessment of local geographic and population data than both the 
Kenyan state and the international NGOS, or so we believe. Regarding population 
figures, the state may have incentives to underestimate and the International NGOs 
may have incentives to overestimate them.  
14  This definition follows largely the description of ‘Mathare Valley’ in Etherthon 
(1971). In this report was outlined a description of the various villages as they had 
developed till 1970, villages that then was geographically distinct , but that now to 
a large extent have grown together so their demarcations are not easily visible for 
an external observer. To a surprising extent they have remained distinct as social 
spaces. The original village names have also had influence on the present naming, 
but with modifications that sometimes are confusing – at least for non-locals. 
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Ngei. Mathare Valley slums are then the western part of this area 
bounded in the east by Mathare North Road. 
Recently ‘Mathare’ also designates a separate constituency with the 
right to elect a member of the parliament.15 One has to be very careful 
when looking at population figure and area estimates that one has the 
same areas in mind.  
In the following we will use ‘Mathare Valley’ in the narrow sense as 
the area bounded by Juja road in the south, Pangani Estate/Muratini 
Street in the west and Mathare North Road in the east and otherwise 
defined by the set of villages we will include. Although it has a different 
political representation and in parts a better public infrastructure we 
will consider village 4A as part of Mathare Valley. ‘In particular 
Mathare North – where we have sampled some respondents – will be 
considered part of Mathare, but not as part of Mathare Valley. 
In an influential ‘Zonal Plan’ for Mathare Valley research groups of 
UC Berkeley and University of Nairobi have included Kiamutisya in 
Mathare Valley,16 but not Mlango Kubwa that is located to the south of 
Kiamutisya and to the west of St. Theresa’s Secondary school This 
school that has acted as a kind of geographical boundary (now 
extended by Baitul Mal mosque built to the east of it) between these 
two areas (Village I in Etherthon) and the rest of the of the slum area of 
Mathare Valley.17 To the north of Mathare river, a fairly new slum 
village, Kosovo, has moved to the west , but also here any further 
sprawl has met a barrier of public buildings18 (see our map 2), that 
seems to block further expansion to the west. In our map 2 ‘Village 2’ 
                                                          
15  Since parts of Mathare North and 4A (see map 1) are not included in this 
constituency, but has been transferred to the new Ruarka constituency, the 
extension of this political area does not coincide with the widest geographical 
extension of Mathare. Mathare became a separate constituency before the 2013 
elections when the number of constituencies in Nairobi increased from 8 to 17. Till 
then and since 1997 Mathare designated a ward and a location within the Starehe 
constituency. Also then did 4A belong to a different constituency, Kasarani. A ward 
elected a local politician to the Nairobi City council and also was the area of 
responsibility for a chief appointed by the central government before the new 
constitution which is (in theory) operational from the 2013 elections. This was the 
system ruling when we made our questionnaire based study, November 2012. 
Adding to the confusion is that the name of one of the smaller villages, ‘Mabatini’, 
is now also designating a ward that embraces a large part of what most the time 
(and also by us) is designated ‘Mathare Valley’. Another possible source of 
confusion is that some of the villages in Mathare Valley have the same name as 
some villages in Kibera. 
16  Village 1 on the Appendix 1 map.  
17  ‘Village 1’ may today mean either the whole area of Kiamutisya and Mlangwo 
Kubwa or Kiamutisiya only. 
18  These situations are documented by air photographs as late as 2009 in Diang’a 
(2011: 178 -181). The authors here have not walked through this area ourselves. 
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embraces the areas of ‘2A’ and ‘2B’ in our map 1. 19 Inside village 2 
behind Al Badir petrol station is an area called ‘Nigeria’ that is 
considered exceptionally crime infected.20 In some discussions the area 
term ‘Bondeni’ is also of some significance.21 Since a large part of the 
economic activities of the slum is taking place along the Juja road 
significant economic transactions are taking place between both 
Kiamutisya and Mlango Kubwa and the rest of the Mathare Valley 
slums. While we did not have any respondents from this former Village 
1 in our own small study, the area is significant for the spatial control 
and crime developments for the Mathare Valley area. Given the 
importance we ascribe to the shack structure we expect the ruling 
issues of Mlango Kubwa (unlike Kiamutisya) to be somewhat different 
since it is dominated by high rise buildings. Observations from Mathare 
slums to the east of Mathare North Road will be drawn upon only 
occasionally. Here the populous Huruma villages are also dominated 
by high rise buildings. 
3.2 Natural and man-made boundaries  
The geography of Mathare Valley is influenced by a few natural and a 
few manmade factors. At its southern end the Juja road is an important 
boundary and at the same time the most important area of access to the 
southern clustering of slum villages. At its south-west end at Mlango 
Kubwa it is about 5 kilometer to the city center. Along this road most of 
the traffic in and out of Mathare Valley is taking place. Here are most of 
its bus and minibus (mathatu) stops located. Most of the multi-floor 
and permanent buildings are also located fairly close to Juja Road. At 
the same time it acts as a kind of physical and partly social barrier. The 
road is dangerous and sometimes time-consuming to cross. A large 
section of its eastern intersection with Mathare Valley (from about the 
middle of 3A) is partly blocked at the south, at the Eastleigh side, by 
Moi air base. The western part of the Juja Road is important for many 
                                                          
19  In the following we will sometimes use Village 2 for this area since it is closer to its 
historical origins in Etherthon (1971) and apparently is the one used in Muungano 
and Pamoja ((2009). Since we have sampled respondents from 2A (but not 2B), we 
also have to use the definitions as described in Map 1. 
20  In the blog Voice of Mathare [Report from July 15, 2013 
http://ushahidi.voiceofmathare.org/index.php/reports/view/606] a map of this 
area within Village 2 plotting an incident when the police killed a local woman. We 
will return to this incident later in this paper. 
21  See for example the important field work by van Stapele (2007). As far as we could 
discover, the meaning seems to vary. In Corburn (2010) Bondeni embraces 1A 
(?),3A, 3C, Mabatini and Thayu – roughly the area of Mathare Valley to the south of 
Mathare River ( and Gitahuru river east of its intersection with Mathare River)., but 
seems more often to be used in a narrow sense as the part of 3B that borders 3C or 
in a looser sense as designating the whole Kikuyu-dominate parts of Matare Valley 
that are located south of Mathare river, i.e. as embracing the 2 and 3 villages. The 
name Bondeni (in Mathare) is derived from a land purchasing company that built 
some fixed structures in the upper part of village 3.  
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Mathare Valley dwellers through daily labor migration, since the major 
access to Eastleigh is a the western end. Eastleigh has larger set of 
wage-paying activities going than Mathare Valley and is somewhat 
more prosperous. Partly due to the separation between Eastleigh and 
Mathare Valley by Moi airbase and partly due to their different ethnic 
compositions, with a large Somali group of dwellers in Eastleigh, the 
social interactions between the dwellers in Eastleigh and Mathare 
Valley are otherwise somewhat limited. 
The upper bound of the Mathare Valley area to the north is also 
man-made – Thika Road. It mainly acts as a kind of brake on potential 
economic and social interactions in that direction, being a multilane 
motorway that is extremely difficult and risky for pedestrians to cross, 
except at the new pedestrian bridge and there is only one local road 
that is crossing it from the underside. In practice, the Mathare Valley 
slums don’t reach the Thika upper bound, however but is fenced from 
the north by a number of public and private institutions mainly 
addressing the needs to higher income classes than the ones 
populating the Mathare Valley slums – such as the five stars Utalii 
hotel. Through an open space belonging to the police a dirt road from 
Thika reaches the upper part of Village 4B. Residents of Mathare Valley 
have several times tried to encroach on this open space, but the 
attempts have always been crushed, so although seemingly open this 
area is practically closed except for some small temporary economic 
activities like car washing that are allowed. The police property is 
prime value real estate. 
3.3  Shack architecture, multi-story housing described  
While most of the residential space in Mathare Valley is occupied by 
shacks, isolated or collected in larger structures, we will also find a 
number of multi-story solid houses spread out in the area, more 
densely so in the neighborhood of Juja road. A dense shack structure 
will not only have important consequences for the health and welfare 
of the dwellers, as we discuss in the companion paper, but for the 
instruments the state may use to control or fight for control over such 
neighborhoods as we indicated in the introductory chapter. Increased 
density based on packing with new shacks is also a different economic 
process than a packing based on the conversion of existing shacks into 
multi-story blocks. The latter presupposes more control of property 
rights on the part of investors that again often demands more of the 
state in terms of spatial control. A visual impression of the effects of the 
packing process in Mathare Valley may be gained from a picture taken 
of Village 4B in the Valley by one of the authors: 
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Fig.1.  A shack structure from Mathare Valley seen from above 
 
 
(Photo, Tiberius Barasa) 
 
How does the housing look like below this iron sheet cover? A glimpse 
of a typical space from the shack structure seen from below with a path 
may be gained through inspection of the following picture: 
Figure 2. Path through a shack structure (multistory block in background) 
 
 
(Photo, Tiberius Barasa) 
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In this case the path is surrounded by shacks and structures while in 
other cases the path may go straight through a structure and may be 
possibly be blocked or closed by dwellers who live in that structure at 
nighttime. When inside the mostly connected, non-symmetrical paths, 
half or wholly below corrugated iron sheet roofs, the feeling of moving 
inside a labyrinth is irresistible. 
A stylized view of how the structures may look like and vary may be 
gathered from some architectural drawings of a small section of village 
4 B:  
Figure 3. Architectural drawings of a section of Village 4B  
(Source: Diang’a, 2011: 229)  
Only one of the structures in this drawing is a single shack. The ones in 
the middle are rather typical. Two units are facing each other. One 
consists of eight dwelling units of which four front the other structure. 
This consists of six dwelling units of which three fronts the other 
structure. In this case the passage between the unit structures appears 
to be open at all times, but in many case both ends between the 
structures may be closed at night time. Each dwelling unit is drawn 
with a door turning inwards. The dwelling unit is around 9-12 sq. m. 
each and without windows.  
According to Diang’a (ibid. 189) the 4B village consists of about 
2310 dwelling units. Looking at Figure 3 writ large one may imagine 
the labyrinthine properties of such a shack village. To move confidently 
around it takes time to learn. To know it is, of course, a great advantage 
under eventual conflicts of control of the inside spaces of the slum. 
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Insiders know their own paths and neighbors rather too well. Mutual 
monitoring is practically impossible to avoid in such dense ground 
level structures, at least at daytime. In village 4B, half of the population 
found life in them to give too little privacy (Diang’a 2011: 218). This 
structure has also other consequences – for contests of the internal 
space of the slum space and for its crime and policing. It is for example 
obvious that the likely effects of the use of firearms may be strongly 
influenced by whether it is performed inside or close to a shack cluster 
or not.22  
For these and a number of other reasons eventual sites of conflicts 
as well as most economic activities (Dianga, 2011: 226) will tend to 
take place either along the broader paths and the remaining larger 
public spaces internal to or outside the housing clusters. Most men and 
larger children are attracted to those areas outside the dark labyrinths 
of the narrow paths crossing the shack clusters. In the following photo 
one may regard a typical larger open space:23 
Figure 4. Open space with a light mast  
 
 
(Photo, Tiberius Barasa) 
                                                          
22  In July 15 2013. For example, the police made an armed drug raid into the so called 
Nigeria area (Village 2) in Mathare and a gun fight evolved. One of the outcomes 
was that a young woman was by accident shot by a stray bullet than went through 
her shack and killed as she took care of her baby (Nairobi Star, July 16, 2013). Local 
youth then made a protest in public by temporarily blocking Juja Road and blocking 
access to Mathare Valley 
23  At daytime this particular space is open used as playground for school-children 
living in 4B. 
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The mast in the foreground is one of the tall light masts that have been 
built recently in Mathare Valley and in other slum areas. They cannot 
easily be destroyed by stone throwing, as the old, lower one, but they 
may be climbed, and parts such as light bulbs, stolen. The light mast at 
the top of Village 4B on the picture has been out of order for several 
years. Their presence, when working, constitutes a significant part of 
the man-made architecture relevant for the ruling of the area at night 
time. In particular by shedding strong lights at wide areas, they have 
important consequences for the control of crime and violent contests at 
night and are overall popularly accepted although they may give the 
whole slum a jail-like impression. Even so, the iron sheet cover of 
densely packed shacks, make many of the labyrinthine paths between 
them to remain quite dark. The open spaces, however, are shed in light 
when a working light mast is installed in their neighborhood. Given 
their role as sites of public conflicts, they will impact the overall ruling 
processes of the area. 
While village 4B is dominated by shacks, other parts of the Mathare 
Valley have somewhat higher incidence of taller buildings. One of the 
maps made from the eastern part of Mathare Valley have it registered:  
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Map 1. Type of buildings in some Mathare Valley villages24 
 
 
 (Source: http://mappingnobigdeal.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/type.jpg, 
accessed October 30, 2013.) 
 
An interesting difficulty of classification reflecting the population 
pressure and the desire of income by the house owners in the area is 
that several of the brick structures carry shacks on their roofs.  
3.4 The rivers and river beds in Mathare Valley 
The most important geographical feature shaping the Mathare Valley 
slums is the Mathare and Gitahuru rivers that are flowing together in 
the middle of the slum area and then called Githahuru river until it 
joins Nairobi and then Athi river outside our area of study. Mathare 
Valley like many other larger slums in Nairobi are located along rivers, 
as pointed out in KIPRA (2008). The rivers run into the Mathare Valley 
from the higher parts of Nairobi (about 1800 m.o.s) and have become 
                                                          
24  The villages portrayed in Map 1 are No. 10, Mabatini, Mashimoni and Thayu. (Thayu 
is probably part of what in the Muunganu maps is Mashimoni. The original ‘Thayu’ 
was village 5 in Etherthon and located further east-northeast). See Diang’a (2011: 
164). Shacks based on wattle and mud have become rare, a few still exist, but are 
not drawn in this map. Many of the shacks located at the Juja Road (at the bottom of 
the map) are business stalls.  
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incredibly polluted on the way reinforced by open sewage from the 
valley. The resulting stench that characterizes larger part of these 
slums (as well as the slums along the lower parts of the Nairobi River, 
such as Lunga Lunga) makes a deep mark on the way the slum is 
experienced and the resulting water- connected illnesses make heavy 
impact on the local dwellers: While Nairobi in general is considered to 
be a malaria free zone, malaria may be indigenous in the Mathare 
slums.25  
Mathare River runs west-east and a present southern or northern 
border for the different villages in the slum since it is difficult to cross 
on foot. Githahuru river runs north- south until it flows into Mathare 
River and turn east with it. Inside the slum a few foot bridges exist, but 
none usable for cars so one part of the slum is only (barely) accessible 
for heavier goods from the Thika Road end and the other part is 
accessible from the Juja and Mathare North roads. Across the middle of 
the southern villages runs a road from the Mathare North Road, 
however, the Mau Mau Road, but this is barely passable for cars 
although it is, inter alia, used by the police for patrolling.  
Some parts of the river beds that go through the valley are steep. 
Here the houses (together with the houses sited close to the sides of the 
former quarries) are exposed to landslides.26 Other river beds are more 
flat and exposed to flooding.27  
An impression of the effects of the latter may be gained from the 
following: 
                                                          
25  More than 20% of the children (6 -59 months of age) sampled in a study on child 
illnesses from Mathare (ACF International Network, 2009) had shown some malaria-
like symptoms the last two weeks in advance of the survey. While many could be 
wrongly diagnosed or contracted malaria before staying in the area, it is unlikely to 
be case for all. A statistical analysis of self-reported malaria in two other slums (Ye 
et al. 2007) shows that most cases are likely to be imported, but the authors still 
believe some are contracted in the slum. Moreover, experienced health personal 
consider missing mosquito nets (only 50% of the ACF sample ) an important cause. 
This would hardly become an issue if malaria was not indigenous to the area. Our 
own small survey where respondents also were asked to report their illnesses, 
confirms this impression. In an academic study combining an historical overview 
with data and interviews from health clinics Mudhune et al. (2011) similarly 
conclude that some indigenous malaria transmissions to be likely, but still 
unproved. 
26  In beginning of April, 2012, 8 people were killed by stones falling down through the 
sides of a former quarry in 4A. 
27  For example, May 13, 2012 Red Cross Kenya reports about an extensive flooding of 
parts of Mathare where 1 person was killed, 40 houses destroyed and 600 
individuals had to run. mo 
(https://www.kenyaredcross.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=305&Itemid=124). 
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Figure 5. Flooding in Mathare Valley28 
 
 
According to Karisa (2010) about 30% of the informal settlements in 
Mathare Valley are located within the 30 meter riparian reserve of the 
rivers and accordingly exposed to greater risks for at least one of the 
two dangers of floods and landslides or both.  
As observed by Diang’a (2011: 182I, the riparian reserve is the most 
densely populated pars of the slum villages despite the exceptionally 
bad housing conditions. We ill later seek to explain why. The causes 
are deeply rooted in the political economy of the slum. 
 3.5 Population size and extension of the Mathare Valley 
villages  
The Mathare Valley is composed of a number of villages. They may be 
difficult to distinguish from the outside, but the local dwellers do and 
they have some official existence. Each will have some known elders 
with a head, and official population estimates for them are available. 
That said, and as we have pointed out already, the exact boundaries 
between the villages may not be determined exactly alike by various 
experts. Moreover, parts of the area may also be denoted ‘village’, but 
consist only of a section of an official village or may intersect several 
villages. The number of villages for our area listed in our sources range 
from 13 to 8. When we find different population estimates for a village, 
                                                          
28  Se description of the flood in Mathare 4A and 4B, Nairobi Star, May 14, 2012.  
A Political Economy of Slum Spaces: Mathare Valley 27 
this may either be due to different estimates of a given population or 
estimates for different populations living in areas with the same name. 
It is notoriously difficult to estimate population sizes in a slum even for 
a known definition of an area. The estimates for the whole Mathare 
Valley range between about 100 000 and 500 000. The Pajuma Trust 
(2012) team estimate of 183,183 people in 2011-12 is the one based 
on the most extensive field observations we are aware of, however, and 
likely to be more realistic for the 13 villages defined by them as 
Mathare Valley than the official 2009 census number of 80,309 or any 
of the different NGO numbers circulating.29  
Table 1. Population and area estimates: Villages in Mathare Valley 
 
Village  # N Census 2009 Sq. Km Pamoja# N30 Density31 
3A  4059 0,0536 2500 75727 
3B  7433 0,0497 10000? 149557 
3C  5316 0,0761 2800 69855 
4A  18776 0,2151 20000 87290 
4B  5681 0,0610 12000 93131 
Gitahuru  3737 0,0464 986 80539 
Kiamutisya  5825 0,0540 1700 107870 
Kosovo  8085 0,0835 25000 96826 
Kwa Kariuki 5290 0,0545 7000 97064 
Mabatini  1160 0,0380 1200 3052632 
Mashimoni 4478 0,0526 4000 85133 
No. 10  2594 0,0272 4000 95367 
Village 2  7875 0,0720 20000 109375 
Total Population 80309 O,8837 111186 90878 
                                                          
29  From both historical and geographical points of view, ‘Mathare Valley’ should also 
embrace Mlango Kubwa, which according to the 2009 census should have 38 374 
inhabitants (UN-HABITAT, 2010: 151), but we are not including it here. It is 
dominated by high rise tenement blocks that gives its social and economic space a 
somewhat different texture, and make any planning option for it rather different, 
which may be the reason why it is not included in the Muunganu Trust et al. (2012) 
zonal plan for the area.  
30  This column is Pamoja Trust (2009) estimates. These are based on interviews by 
elders and long-time residents. They show wide discrepancies for some villages 
between these and the Muungano/Nairobi Census estimates that we organize this 
table by. They indicate substantial differences in the definition of areas.  
31  The estimates of density are based on the Muungano/Nairobi census numbers. It is 
population per sq. km. A separate study for Kibera showed a variation between 
48 000 to 129 000 per sq. km with an average of about 87 500, about the same or a 
little lower density than in Mathare Valley (Desgroppes and Taupin, 2011: 27). 
32  The Low density of Mabatini is due to the location of both the Chief’s camp and the 
Mathare Special Training center in the village. 
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The structure of Table 1 is based on Muungano Support Trust et al. 
(2012: 16) as are the first column of population numbers and the area 
estimates. We indicate the uncertainty of the village composition m and 
the population numbers by adding the population figures of the slum 
inventory of the Pamoja trust that is also based on serious empirical 
investigations although of more impressionistic kind. Diang'a’s Ph. D. 
thesis brings also forward some serious village estimates of both 
population and areas that show the fluid conception of the villages. His 
estimate for 4B is between the official one and the one by Pomoja Trust: 
5,5 hectares and a population between 8000 to 9200)  
The area density of the population varies somewhat between the 
villages. When measured in persons per hectare – which is frequently 
done, the average density in Mathare Valley is 908 persons per hectare. 
All villages are rather densely packed, but potential for increased 
density without any building of high-rise blocks is still there. 33  
 
                                                          
33  Let us take village 4B as an example. Here there are few high rise buildings and 
assuming the average size of a shack to be 10 sq. m. with 4 residents. The area is 
around 6 hectare with 6000 slum dwellers. If there were no open space at all or no 
public buildings there could here be room for 6100 shacks. We see that 1/4th of the 
total area will be filled with shacks according to our assumption of 4 residents in 
each. With the same assumptions 3B could contain 5000 shacks and the actual 
area covered by 4-resident shacks would be around 37% of the total. These are of 
course only hypothetical measures of the share of shack-covered areas. 
 4.  Country-wide history shaping 
Mathare 
When investigating present conditions in Mathare Valley it is difficult 
to avoid history. Mathare itself as a Nairobi slum area is among the 
oldest that has stayed continuously as an informal settlement, but this 
is not what makes its historical formation impressing. It is rather how 
young Nairobi is as a large city. Many of its forming features are partly 
for that reason at work today: whether it is the ruling building and 
zonal regulation or corruption (Anderson, 2002); the resulting uneven 
spatial density of its population; the formation of land-holding and 
house owner groups, and even the potential ties (real or rumored) 
between crime groups and politicians have clear traceable historical 
links (Throup, 1987: 171- 173). The same applies to the localization of 
crime as well as the frequently violent and corrupt behavior of the 
police (Andvig and Barasa, 2011). 
4.1 Forms of control and varieties of historical impacts 
Regarding the history of the contests of control and the origins of 
fractionalized or missing public control of the economic and social 
spaces of Mathare Valley, we may again distinguish between the 
macro, overall control of the whole area, the outer control, and the 
daily contests of control of the inner spaces. It is mainly through 
actions and events that impinge on and condition the macro space that 
are recorded as having historical significance, but to a large degree 
those conditions are kept alive through the daily struggle for control of 
the inner space – a case in point is land- or structure ownership.34 
Moreover, it is likely that there are properties of the inner space that 
may shape the actions performed by the slum dwellers to the wider 
political economy of Kenya such as the 2007-2008 post-election 
violence that may in its turn have feedbacks on present shaping of the 
outer space of the slums like Mathare Valley: Why was the only 
                                                          
34  An important feature of the slums in Nairobi – including Mathare Valley – is that 
while the actual ownership rights to land are often fuzzy, the actual ownership to a 
shack or set of shacks (structure(s)) as such will be clear, but its location will be 
conditional on a bureaucratic or political decision that may be revoked. In most 
cases the key decision-maker here is the chief, but several and contradictory 
permissions given by different public agencies are common, which give wide scope 
for fraud. In many cases will their tenants not know whether their structure owners 
are landowners or not. For example, among our respondents from village 4B, 11 out 
of 25 believed the house owner owned the land while only 1 believed it was owned 
by the government, although at least formally the land was public. 
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significant violence in Nairobi then only taking place in and around the 
slums? 
Most major changes in the outer space of Mathare Valley will need 
some form of collective action either by the slum dwellers themselves, 
by some other groups with significant interests in the slums such as the 
land or structure owners or by some public authorities. Regarding the 
latter, it is often not realized the degree to which a state (or a 
municipality) is also a machinery for collective actions 35not only a 
supplier of public goods and services. Many of those goods will have 
local or club goods and bads character simultaneously. Some state 
collective actions such as the larger police actions into the slums or 
evictions will be oppressive towards some groups, and supportive of 
other. Naturally, this will make the different groups seek to influence 
operations in different directions. The incentives for doing so are 
stronger when the state apparatus is fragmented – often along tribal 
lines or may be influenced by bribing. 
Collective actions initiated by slum dwellers whereupon they may 
influence their surroundings are likewise influenced by their tribal 
compositions. Tribal composition may influence both the prospects for 
realization of collective actions at all as well as the composition of the 
ones realized.  
We may for our purposes distinguish between historical influences 
through 
1) conditioning factors that may impact present circumstances like a 
stock ‘variable’ that originates at time t and has a continuous impact 
on the subsequent development without being changed 
substantially itself (like an unchanged building rule) by the process 
it impacts,  
ii) a trigger variable at time t that initiates a process that continuous to 
work and through that process has lasting effects (like Kenya’s 
switch from colony to independence)  
iii) a conditioning factor that first occurs at time t, but then will be tied 
to subsequent developments through its continuous or intermittent 
presence that is related to the process it influences. Without those 
forms of presence it will fade in influence. A relevant example may 
be large scale eviction and demolition processes as policy 
instruments for shaping slum spaces. Historical use of that 
instrument will both influence the slum situation at the time they 
were used and the resulting building structure, but also the present 
behavior and the likelihood of their present use in contests between 
                                                          
35  One reason to regard it this way is the leeway public employees have for non- 
action (Andvig, 2010). 
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dweller groups themselves and between dwellers and external 
actors such as the state and absentee structure owners. It will 
thereby act more like an endogenous flow variable, but brought first 
into existence by a historical event or process now passed. 
iv) A process observed at time t with a capability to reproduce itself 
endogenously over the long haul. The agglomeration of poor 
residents to a definite geographical area, the prevalence of local 
poverty traps, as suggested by Sampson (2011) for Chicago may also 
apply to Mathare Valley.  
We will first look at historical stock and trigger variables that have 
shaped the external contours and the mayor plays of the game of the 
slum spaces in Nairobi including Mathare Valley. 
4.2. Colonial area regulation and planning  
Nairobi was built as a center for the Uganda railway administration and 
as a center for British colonial administration. As such it received a 
considerable number of Indian workers and European settlers. Being 
located in a foreign area, surrounded by a majority of African locals, 
both groups were in a precarious security situation, but the white 
Europeans were the masters and settled to acquire and control large 
areas of agricultural lands for which Nairobi did urban services. The 
exposed security position stimulated both more planning and harsher 
control measures than would have otherwise been the case for most 
European cities at the time. This was also the case in the urban 
planning that could start from scratch as late as the turn of the century. 
Health protection for the European (and South African whites) was an 
important part of the security concerns that drove the zonal regulation.  
The first plan for Nairobi was made in 1905 and the last master plan 
sought implemented was made in 1948 –all under colonial rule. Even 
the latter condoned a spatial plan that condoned the city to be 
systematically racially zoned and legitimized unequal division of land 
over and above what market forces would do. The only post-colonial 
master plan was made in 1973, but according to Obala (2011: 2) never 
implemented. Hence, the 1948 plan is to some extent still the ruling 
one, with the European parts of the city becoming the home of rich 
Kenyans. While not officially in favor of racial segregation in practice 
its proposals continued it (ibid. 103). One formal expression of this 
zoning is that the legal minimum sizes of new parcels in the city are 
larger in the former European zones.36 Despite a number of violations 
this rationing of access to high income areas has some effects since the 
                                                          
36  In Karen it is, for example not allowed to sell parcels less than half an acre (Hass 
Consult Real Estate.). Needless to add such rules may be violated, but it implies 
that it is impossible for small investors or builders to build new housing there, 
which reduce the pressure on this land. No such rules apply to Mathare Valley. 
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price of a plot of land in low income areas may be up to three times 
higher than the price of a plot of the same size in high income areas 
(Obala, 2011: 105). 
As just mentioned, the residential areas of the town were divided 
after racial (and class) principles so that the different races would live 
in different geographical sections of the town. Each European should 
have access to much larger and better space, the Asians (mostly of 
Indian or today’s Pakistani origins) get smaller and medium quality 
space while the Africans were to be located in the areas least fit for 
residential occupation. As has been the case in many other African 
cities, particularly the Anglophone ones, too strict and expensive 
building codes have been decided upon that combined with missing 
infrastructure investments have contributed to slum developments,37 
but their selective application in Nairobi have contributed to keep away 
large chunks of land to any potential use for the poor (except some 
small and short-lived slums). – An often referred to result by Matrix 
(1993) is that by 1989 55% of Nairobi’s then 1.35 million lived in 
slums occupying about 5% of Nairobi’s area.38 Moreover, the slums 
that did  
Area regulation and town planning represent only rules and plans. 
In order to have only the slightest impact on the ground, policy 
instruments are needed. One such instrument is housing permits that 
could be used to prevent the building of affordable formal housing in 
some areas, and making it to compete for space with informal 
settlements instead of buying the less expensive land in the richer 
neighborhoods. Racist town planning allocated only small areas to 
African housing where Africans could legally reside and even partially 
‘own’ houses.39 Combined with building codes only appropriate for 
high income residents, expensive building materials and the poverty of 
the African population (once partly deliberately planned through 
colonial wage policies), new housing had continuously to rise in non-
designated (and designated areas) that would not have received any 
                                                          
37  Here the 1947 British Town and Country Planning Act were important (Collier and 
Venables, 2013:5). For Nairobi the minimum size of a plot allowed to sell was 1/16 
of an acre, i.e. about 253 sq. m. When we keep in mind that a regular shack in 
Mathare Valley is about 10 sq. m. or less, it is obvious that even if a structure owner 
owned the land, it could not legally be his unless he owned the land of many 
housing units.  
38  This result appears in a number of contexts and is often presented as if it is valid 
today. The population of Nairobi today may be around three times the size of the 
1989 population and to our knowledge no new estimate based a systematic 
empirical research has been performed since then. Regarding Mathare they found a 
density of 200 dwelling units per hectare while Muungano /2009 Census (2012) 
found a density of around 280 units per hectare, a modest increase in density if the 
two definitions of Mathare coincide 
39  Inside these areas they could own houses and transit the property to designated 
inheritors, but they could not buy or sell existing property (White, 1990: 47). 
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housing permits nor follow any building codes. Hence, all housing in 
some settlements would become informal and thereby whole areas of 
residential housing became illegal, a fact that that have strong impacts 
on almost all aspects of slum life. 
Initially the major ostensible reason for the racial zoning was public 
health related: to protect the Europeans against infectious diseases that 
could arise in the densely packed Asian and African quarters by 
keeping a geographical distance to them. – Several historical 
transmission mechanisms from the colonial racial zoning to the present 
housing agglomerations have been at work, but with similar effects. 
One was working through the initial clustering into rich and poor areas 
which then stayed that way through the workings of spontaneous 
processes that have been present almost whatever policies that later 
would be applied. That is the pure inheritance effect of colonial zoning 
policy: dead but still influential. In addition the once colonial zonal 
policies have to a surprising degree been kept alive (cf. the different 
minimum sizes for plot sales in the different neighborhoods). Hence 
both through pure historical inheritance and through recent and 
present more or less informal zonal policies, the original colonial 
policies have contributed to a clustering of slums into specific areas. 
Although the areas set aside to Africans were relatively small, the fact 
that whole areas were set aside, conditions were led for some of them 
growing into large size slums. Together with an exceptionally high 
rural-urban migration rate at the time of the independence we could 
see the rise of large and densely populated slums such as Kibera and 
Mathare Valley where a large share of Nairobi’s population would live. 
Not least their sizes have made them difficult to dismantle.  
4.3  Colonial labor market controls 
Another even more important part of colonial state planning was its 
labor market control measures. They were quite extensive embracing 
tax rules, gender specific prohibitions and direct wage controls. For our 
study of the state instruments and policies for shaping urban spaces, in 
particular the slum spaces such as the Mathare Valley, the most 
important ones dealt with the aftereffects of the kipande system40that 
acted inter alia as a severe restraint on male migration to Nairobi while 
                                                          
40  The kipande was an extended ID registration document to be carried in a tin 
canister that all male Africans above 15 had to carry when outside their native 
reserves. It registered name, fingerprints (!), father’s name, tribal and geographical 
information. More importantly, it contained information about work experience: 
wage rates received and whether the last employer permitted the last sign-off. If 
not, or if not carrying the document the African labor migrant could be fined or 
arrested. The system became enacted in 1920 and was in practice. Particularly at 
times of excess demand for labor the law on kipande acted as a kind of sequential 
villeinage for a worker and made it easier for employers to keep the wage rate 
down. The system in developed administrative form existed from 1920 to about 
1950. A useful description of it is Clayton and Savage (1974: 131 – 134). 
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the colonial tax rules and rural land policies stimulated it. In addition 
to the kipande separate papers were needed for private servants to 
control their movements and even more important for controlling 
slums in the case of Nairobi: hawking licenses. On the one hand these 
measures clearly limited the growth rates of the settlements and in that 
sense eased their control under colonial rule compared to the 
counterfactual of larger African settlements, but on the other hand, by 
being governed under so many regulations they demanded much in 
terms of controls – in case the regulations were to be followed, often 
too much and some slum areas then could develop as areas where the 
colonial authorities had no control. 
Naturally, the labor migration rules for African economic 
independents and some corresponding rules for domestic servants 
were also frequently violated. This implied that at any given time a 
significant number of males was staying in Nairobi illegally and could 
at any time risk to be fined, sent back to his reserve or in prison, 
possibly without any prospects of getting a job legally. The combined 
effect was to direct the stream of migrants into slum-like living 
quarters, and ensuring that a significant sub-flow of them were illegal, 
making the incentives to engage in illegal economic activities stronger 
and the settlements more difficult to rule. A side effect of illegal 
housing and illegal urban migration and the agglomeration of 
potentially illegal economic and social environments into specific areas 
was that they opened up for extensive police controls of Nairobi where 
the police without possessing warrants could arrest Africans at any 
time just on the suspicion of missing papers – and frequently did. 
While the kipande is gone, remnants of police behavior from this 
time are present today including rights to inspect ID papers at any time 
with active threats of arrest occur in certain situations (Andvig and 
Barasa: 21-22), and for certain groups (Lochery, 2012).41  
The combination of colonial labor market and building controls 
combined with extensive and partly regulated poverty ( in most of the 
colonial period to ensure single person) flows of migration of Africans 
to Nairobi created large pockets of informal or illegal settlements with a 
high share of illegal residents. Residents were partly, but to a varying 
                                                          
41  After 1990 ethnic Somali citizens needed to carry a pink ID card in addition to the 
regular one. The risks of police harassment in slums are exceptionally high (ibid.) 
reflecting that in the gradation of citizenship that Lochery discusses, not only 
Somali origin but also slum dwelling as such counts in the negative. Eastleigh 
which at present contains the largest agglomeration of ethnic Somali in Nairobi, is 
bordering Mathare Valley. While they have voting rights, when it comes to rights to 
access to public infrastructure of all kinds, slum residents have been considered 
second rank citizens.  
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degree cut off from family-based controls that the colonial state tried to 
harness for its purposes when ruling the countryside.42 
The outcome was an endogenous propensity to African slum 
creation with internal spaces difficult and potentially costly to control 
by the state – if not the necessary information was voluntarily supplied 
by the residents. The ease of mutual monitoring among residents 
suggested a switching strategy: either most residents were willing to 
supply information about rebellious or illegal activities to the colonial 
authorities or most were not; either because they didn’t dare to do so or 
because they expected only harmful or no action from the relevant state 
agencies.43 The consequences of the choice were pushed to the 
extremes during the Mau Mau rebellion, but the same switching 
possibilities are forcefully present today. As long as the internal 
activities going on in the illegal settlements are of little economic value 
and not politically threatening the state seeks only seeks to control the 
inside of the slums intermittently.  
In the periods of low state control alternative, indigenous centers of 
control tend to arise. They may be of very different kinds. During the 
colonial rule the soft control of fairly well-off and house-owning 
African Malaya (in house, full night) prostitutes were significant, White 
(1983: 178) asserts.44 At late colonial times tribal welfare associations 
as well as criminal gangs were also influential – as they are at present. 
In connection with the Mau Mau rebellion Throup (1987: 171-176 ) 
claimed both to have been extremely important; gangs for making the 
state losing control of the African settlements in the period before the 
rebellion and the tribal associations through their neglect as peace 
makers by the state to prevent the rebellion. 
 Prostitutes have become declassed and are not likely to be as 
influential as peace makers any longer, nor are African house-
                                                          
42  As suggested by Iliffe (1987) the Luo appears to have had stronger family 
structures, something which had made the migration to Nairobi less costly for Luo 
newcomers (but more difficult for them to become rich given their stronger sharing 
rules). The colonial rulers of Kenya were considering applying rural family-based 
controls also for ruling the internal urban spaces against crime as well as for 
preventing rebellious urban collective actions. (Throup, 1987: 176).  
43  We return to this hypothesis when discussing the responses to the crime and 
security questions in our brief exploration of the situation in Mathare in November 
2012. 
44  She wrote: ‘For all the peace-keeping reasons that made Malaya women such ideal 
landlords, they were also the most dangerous: They actively formed relationships, 
and they enforced rules by which their community lived. Doing this, they usurped 
some of the peace-keeping powers of the state.’ Malaya prostitutes were 
prostitutes who operated discretely from their own homes, and to be distinguished 
from watembezi – streetwalking prostitutes – and the wazi-wasi form where the sex 
sellers cried their wares outside their residences (White, 1990: 13–20). It was 
particularly the ‘paying-after’ Malayans who had the strongest incentives to keep 
their surroundings peaceful.  
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owners,45 but gangs and tribal associations are still important although 
– both with a Janus face as potential peace and trouble makers.46  
4.3 Colonial shaping of African informal settlements ex 
post 
So far we have looked at policy instruments that directly or indirectly 
sought ex ante to influence African housing and migration to Nairobi 
and thereby as a negative side effect contributed to the growth of 
slums. Here we will look at some of the ex post policy instruments used 
by the colonial authorities to shape and restrain the growth of slums ex 
post through controlling their external boundaries as well as the 
number of housing units. The major direct policy instruments were 
collective evictions, demolitions, in fencing for control and arson; all 
first introduced during colonial rule. With the partial exception of 
arson they all rely on the use of public force, the police and eventually 
the military. While we are not looking at their welfare effects here, 
public infrastructure investments and services such as roads, electricity 
and sanitation and water also shape urban spaces and had (and have) 
also a control aspect. If not before, this point is made evident if they 
become controlled by local gangs. Their relative absence is part of the 
definition of slums as well as a major reason why the state in normal 
times has little control of the slum insides. 
While evictions could allow the housing structure to stay intact the 
difference between evictions and demolitions with a shanty housing 
structure will often not be large. The use of the two policy instruments 
went often together under the colonial rule, but allowed in principle 
the achieving of two different targets: If the colonial authorities would 
only shift the racial or tribal composition of a settlement evictions 
without demolition would be relevant and could be achieved without 
any short run effects on total number of available housing units. 
Eventual state participation on the side of the owners in conflicts 
between owners and tenants, for example, opens up for collective 
evictions without demolitions and thereby not touching the 
landowners rent income and property. On the other hand, demolition 
could be used for health improvements too without touching any 
ethnic composition, illustrating the different capabilities of the two 
instruments.  
                                                          
45  They tend to have become even more influential in setting marks on both the 
governance of the internal space of the slum as well as the shaping of their external 
spatial frames, but more as conflict makers. Again this is matter to which we return, 
but it is clearly related to the large share of absentee owners. 
46  The present role of tribal associations is probably underestimated due to a 
persistent unwillingness to discuss frankly tribalism in Kenyan public debates. In 
addition religious organizations and local community and outside non-
governmental organizations of various kinds are involved in peace making, 
although most in indirect ways. The one directly involved in dealing with security 
inside the slums are few. To some (and the gangs) we will return.  
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With shanti structures arson might have the advantage of 
completely destroying the building material and thereby delay a fast 
rebuilding that shanti structures otherwise would allow. More 
importantly, it may to some extent hide the political and economic 
powers behind the wielder of this instrument since fires frequently 
occur by accidents and is in fact the most serious threat in slum 
dwellers daily life. Moreover a number of potential perpetrators of 
arson will often be possible in any given situation. All the three 
instruments for shaping slum spaces ex post were in fact in use during 
the colonial rule. While all these instruments may also be applied in 
the daily contests around the control of the internal space of slums, 
and by all involved contestants, we are here mainly looking at their role 
of the shaping of the external boundaries and overall control of slums 
by some public authorities in the longer run. It was mainly for these; 
mostly political purposes the colonial rulers put them into use in ways 
that in several respects became paradigmatic also after Independence, 
although economic motives became more important with the growth of 
the present extensive absentee ownership of shanty structures and as 
the eventual political powers involved became shadier. 
The legal basis for the use of all the three instruments was in any 
case the lack of secure dwelling rights for large groups of the residents 
and traders in the African settlements and/or the illegality of the given 
housing structure and the economic activities taken place. The use of 
arson was naturally more political risky in case the dwellers could not 
get out in time, however, and the death toll might become too large. 
Hence, it has been more frequently used on illegal markets where fewer 
would risk to be killed.47 
Almost from the establishment of Nairobi as a town did the colonial 
authorities demolish shack clusters in order to control the development 
of the city. Hake (1977: 36) mentions that almost the first thing the 
township council did when established (in 1902) was to order the 
demolition of a number of shacks. In this case they were Indian, but 
several African slums were later demolished. The major expressed 
reason for the early demolitions was health security (mainly for the 
Europeans), but later reasons of social controls become more 
prominent. Different political motivations for colonial social and 
political control and reshaping of African informal settlements once at 
work have been suggested:  
                                                          
47  In 1952 the Home Guards (mainly voluntary settler police) were suspected to have 
burned down the Burma market, and the Duke Street market in 1954. While most 
market stalls in 1990 were bulldozed around, demolishment (through arson) 
dominated the state’s reshaping of illegal markets around 2000 as the illustrious 
ones at Gikomba market (Robertson, 2007). This does not imply that all authority 
initiated arsons have been directed towards markets. Several have been directed 
towards the dwelling areas in the slums too.  
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i) To control the tribal or ethnic composition of an informal settlement. 
Since the basis of British indirect rule was to use (and develop) tribal 
rules of control and attach them to specific geographical areas, the 
complications due to their likely weakening in urban settings were 
compounded when several tribes were living closely in the same 
settlement (Throup, 1987). Should there be several chiefs in the 
settlement or one for several tribes? The experience of the 2007-8 
election violence indicates the present relevance of this control 
issue.  
ii) More time specific historically delimited, racist motive was to 
control African land and house owning to prevent the build-up of a 
strong African landowning class among whom Malaya prostitutes 
were important in the 1930s as argued by Luise White ( 1990: 133) 
when Pangani was sought demolished.48  
iii) Somewhat artificially this motive [ii]] may also be related to what is 
likely to have been a major motive for achieving social control of 
African settlements, the fear that the African subjects might rebel 
where their mass of concentration in densely populated settlements 
may potentially constitute a major threat,49 key flashpoints for the 
overturning the colonial – as they in fact did become as part of the 
Mau Mau rebellion. While this motive, if it is at work today, is 
unlikely to be articulated as a fear of wholesale rebellion, only as 
                                                          
48  In 1938 36 % of the Pangani householders were women, mostly Muslim and former 
prostitutes or daughters of prostitutes. (By becoming Muslim African women could 
increase their individual property rights at the time compared to the traditional 
alternative.) Since Pangani was a relatively well-off African settlement with less 
obvious health risks than the other African settlements and with a considerable 
number of well-established landowners, it was paradoxically for more than a 
decade the chief target for being demolished. Many of its residents moved to 
Pumwani where the landlords kept similar use-rights including some selling rights 
to the new and often more solid structures, but losing the rights to transfer their 
property through inheritance. The latter fact was what led White to interpret the 
demolition as mainly directed against African landowner class. Incidentally, 
Pangani is neighbouring Mathare Valley and a number of Pangani landowners 
established ownership rights to squatting structures there. The Pangani 
demolishment was important in the initial growth of what became the Mathare 
Valley slum and the high, relatively well-off female component among its dwellers.  
49  A congregation of the poor may not be enough. As pointed out by Esteban and Ray 
in a number of papers (for example . Esteban and Ray, 2008), fighting conflicts 
need resources so when potential ethnic based rebel coalitions may contain 
substantial number of resource rich members while class based are not, the ethnic 
–based ones may be more likely to fight. Thinking along these lines it could be a 
reason for the colonialists not only to fear the poor, but also to worry about well-off 
African landowners. White’s suggestion that the reason for the colonial masters to 
worry about prostitution from a moral point of view, but was rather due to a concern 
about undesirable local social power of prostitute landowners appears not wholly 
convincing, but should not be wholly dismissed. 
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fear of social unrest with harmful political and economic 
consequences –as illustrated in the 2007-8 election violence. 
iv) Another motive for demolishing a slum or initiate large scale 
evictions was to root out gangs if they have become entrenched and 
had driven out the state’s control of a slum space. Again this was 
part of the colonial authorities’ original motivation for the initial 
eviction of Kikuyus from the African settlements in Nairobi. The 
motive became first manifest when their activities spilled out into 
the European areas, however: ‘The Council and its European 
electorate only became interested in the locations when African 
discontent or crime threatened to spill over into the European 
business area or suburb’, Throup (ibid. 174) writes. Similar 
motivations and considerations apply today. Like then it is not clear 
how much of the crime is actually exported by gangs rooted in slums 
like Mathare Valley and how the crime may be perceived as gang 
made and based on social fears.  
While motivation ii) is clearly historical, and iii) weaker today, the rest 
persists. It is not only the persistency of motives, however, that makes 
this part of colonial history so relevant, but rather the paradigmatic 
way it demolished whole informal settlements and/or evicted a large 
number of its dwellers and more or less by force either located them 
elsewhere or made them fend for themselves. Since then it has become 
a key instrument to use or not use by the authorities to shape slum 
geographical and social spaces and in fighting or not fighting various 
forms of collective action by the dwellers. It has become instrument in 
the various contest around the shaping the macro spaces of slums 
including the contests for the control of Mathare Valley. 
Before the times of the Mau Mau rebellion the most significant 
demolishing event for Mathare Valley was when the neighboring 
Pangani settlement was eroded as an African settlement and handed 
over (partly unsuccessfully) to Asian groups while its African residents 
were sought moved partly by force to the already crowded and more 
centrally located Pumwani. Some Africans then preferred to move to 
the still unregulated Mathare Valley and some Pangani house owners 
bought structures in Mathare, both because they were less regulated, 
but also because they were more affordable than eventual new houses 
in Pumwani (White, 1990).  
At present the motivation for engineering evictions and to fight 
against it are driven by either pure prospects of profit for new potential 
owners or developers of slum land and for the public officials they may 
bribe, or by some public interest such as the present plan for 
developing riparian land that intend to reshape Mathare Valley and 
several other Nairobi slums in major ways. 
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4.5 The Mau Mau rebellion50 – a period of institutional 
‘putty’ 
Some periods are times of putty: new institutions, action- and norm 
sets are experimented with and some then formed, new distribution of 
political and economic forces realigned and carried by new coalitions 
among major actors. Then the whole new set-up coalesces into clay and 
stays rather unperturbed for longer periods. The times of the Mau Mau 
rebellion (1952 -1960) with the following Independence year (1963) 
were in many ways such a period which may seem paradoxical since 
the colonial rulers left before its closure. The key formations here were 
a) The rulers considered to activate rural forms of controls focused on 
the separate tribes over potentially rebelling urban settlements 
along the lines Mamdani (1996) later rationalized (and criticized) as 
‘decentralized despotism’. To do so they considered using tribal 
welfare associations and local chiefs belonging to the dominating 
tribe in controlling any urban settlement, but in the end they gave 
up this idea.51 
b) Instead the areas became controlled by local ‘gangs’52 or local 
‘elders’ in contests or cooperation with external police combined 
with regular provincial administration (ibid. : 177). This persists as 
a major system in most informal settlements in Nairobi.  
c) A coalition between criminal gangs operating in the informal 
settlements and radical political groups appear to have been 
established (or rumored) during the build-up to the rebellion led by 
the so called ‘Forty Group’ who also built support among the 
landless or poor Kikuyu peasants (and thereby potential urban 
migrants). Since then cooperation between violent and sometimes 
                                                          
50  The Mau Mau rebellion was a violent rebellion against the colonial authorities in 
Kenya taking place in the 1950s. Most of rural rebels were recruited among tenants 
working on European farms in the White Highlands and landless and poor Kikuyus 
located in their ‘native reserves’ while most urban recruits and supporters were 
located in the African settlements in Nairobi, most with slum-like characteristics. 
The rebellion has received much attention among historians for a number of 
reasons ranging from its effects on local prostitution to the fall of the British 
Empire. Histories that give some systematic analyses n of the roles of Nairobi slums 
and that has formed our discussion are Anderson (2005), Throup (1987) and White 
(1990). 
51  Throup (1987: 175–176) claims it was a major mistake: ‘Only a few administrators, 
such as Askwith, recognized that most Nairobi Africans were still enmeshed in 
ethnic rivalries and were not yet ready to enter the democratic multi-tribal future… 
Askwith had correctly perceived that control could only be achieved by appealing to 
the same forces.’ 
52  According to the colonial administrators up till 1954 these gangs were Kikuyu-
dominated and also roaming about in the streets, armed and often more than 30 in 
strength and often in that ‘terrorizing’ the Luo and Abaluhya inhabitants of the city 
(ibid.: 171). Throup’s sources here were colonial officers who may have written 
down their perceptions as well as experiences. 
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criminal youth gangs and leading politicians has repeatedly been 
rumored and have sometimes also been factual. The nature of the 
cooperation would of course very according to whether the gangs 
support the opposition or the ruling political coalitions.  
d) While a general strike in 1950 was fairly successful it proved 
impossible to base collective political action such as a violent 
rebellion on any general, cross-tribal class basis, but it fragmented 
into separate tribe actions within the Kikuyu tribe with some 
support from other smaller closely affiliated tribes while workers 
from the remaining tribes were mostly antagonistic. 
e) The early stages of the Emergency (October 1952–January 1960) 
showed how difficult it was for external public policing agencies to 
control the inner spaces of the informal African settlements when 
their densely packed residents were unwilling to supply information 
about gangs and rebels. Potential snitching would be difficult to 
hide from the gangs/rebels when they were still in control. On the 
other hand precisely by being densely packed, the informal 
settlements proved easy to control from the outside in the final 
analysis when sufficient means of violence was allowed since not 
much police and military force was needed to encircle and fence in a 
settlement and control all traffic in and out. The first time this 
instrument was applied on a large scale was when Pangani was 
fenced in as part of the police efforts to contain he first and only 
cross-tribal general strike in connection with the arrest of Harry 
Thuku (Furedi, 1973: 279).53 The major and remembered 
experience with the use of the fencing in instrument stems from the 
brutal ‘Operation Anvil’ (24 April -21 May, 1954) where colonial 
troops ringed in all African suburbs and settlements and closed all 
roads in Nairobi. While nothing as systematic and brutal has been 
tried in Kenya since then, this historical experience with in fencing 
of slums has been kept in present stock of police knowledge and is 
applied when large civil order problems are expected.54 
                                                          
53  Note that unlike in Europe at the time workers in Nairobi were not – with the 
exception of the railway workers – congregated in large factories, but where spread 
out as servants among European families and at small work sites. The place where 
they were congregated and could interact and make a political mass, was inside the 
slums, such as Pangani. 
54  It was applied in Mathare Valley during the 2007-2008 election violence. As we 
have already noted, the Mathare Valley slum with about 100 to 180 000 residents 
covers less than a square kilometer and has only two motorized access roads. The 
daily control force today is much smaller than was the case in the African parts of 
Nairobi in 1954. With about the same population in the whole Eastlands as there is 
now in Mathare Valley, it then had its own District commissioner, 2 district officers 
and 4 European Home Guard Commanders, 11 chiefs, 30 headman and 300 tribal 
police working through the chiefs in addition to the regular police and the police 
reserve (Anderson, 2005: 220). In Mathare Valley at present there is only one chief 
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Given the specific historical and geographical circumstances which 
made the Kikuyu to go through the fastest urbanization, they also filled 
in the slums and constituted the largest section of the urban poor at the 
same time as their middle class was better educated. The land scarcity 
in the Kikuyu native reserve made their larger landowners 
exceptionally powerful and rich and their landless plentiful and poor. 
Among the poor Kikuyu socialist class ideology, somewhat modified, 
played an important role among the rebels and later the Mau Mau 
rebellion that has had important consequences for the contests of space 
control in Mathare Valley through explicit identity construction of 
some of the involved gangs (van Stapele, 2007: 73 – 87). 
Another important institutional heritage carried over from the 
colonial rule in Kenya (and other colonized areas) with severe 
consequences for the handling of the informal urban settlements was 
the bureaucratic centralism when combined with and causing 
economic inequality. In the final analysis any colonial administration 
had to be centralised with the heads of administration being employed 
by and therefore accountable to principals residing abroad. This 
applied to some degree both to the directly ruled and the indirectly 
ruled parts of the system. When Kenya moved away from a colonial rule 
to become independent, the ‘natural’ change, the one that minimised 
the institutional shifts necessary, was to locate the right to appoint and 
to dismiss public employees in a single individual, a president. The 
president form of rule has according to most experts on present-day 
African political systems been of exceptional importance on the 
continent.55 Given the scarcity of the local educated group, the role of 
the state with their new rulers and their income expectations, the 
outcome had to generate extreme inequalities56 by which in Kenya’s 
case was compounded by the exodus of large sections of the land-
holding European settler group. Naturally, the concentration of 
political state power made it also possible for the power holders to grab 
a large share of that land, under the constraint of non-rebellion.  
Once historically made, this concentration of power and wealth 
persists and is a major factor in forming the character of the slum 
spaces in Nairobi including Mathare Valley. In many ways the wealthy 
elite in Kenya could fill and play the roles of the former colonial rulers 
regarding landholding and the spatial order of Nairobi. That said, the 
lobbying structure would be quite different since the final political 
                                                          
(with responsibility also outside the valley narrowly defined, 2 sub-chiefs and 2 
police stations, but with wide responsibilities outside the Valley.  
55  At the outset, multiparty democratic systems were initiated at the outset of the 
transition to independence, but in most cases proved not to yield a political 
equilibrium, at least not in the first decades of the transition. An overview of major 
quantitative aspects of the political systems on the continent is Bates (2008). 
56  This was predicted early on (in 1962) by researchers like Rene Dumont (1969) and 
connected to the corrupt handling of the new state powers as described by 
novelists like Achebe (1966) and Armah (1968). 
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‘selectorate’ (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003) was not residing in a 
foreign country. The subjects and their rulers belong to the same 
constituency.  
So far we have only described and Kenya-specific historical 
mechanisms. As pointed out in our introduction, the slum generation 
in Kenya has not been so exceptional in an African context. This does 
not imply that colonial history has not been important. In a rather brief, 
quantitative exploration of African slum generation Sean Fox (2013) 
also emphasizes the role of colonial history. Like what we have done 
for Kenya, Fox emphasizes the fact that the colonial powers 
deliberately restricted entry of the local population to the cities for 
security reasons through a combination of direct regulation of labor 
markets, zonal regulation and through regulating housing standards 
and ownership combined with deliberate low infrastructure 
investments.  
Except for the latter the aim was to ensure the Europeans’ health 
and security standards. Important part of the colonial impact – and not 
analysed by us – was the general improvement of public health 
conditions. This made for considerable population growth that 
continues today. One important general consequence of urban entry 
regulations, particularly under conditions of population growth, was 
that large pockets of illegal population clusters were created in the 
cities. Regulations, particularly when illegitimate, will frequently be 
violated. When the direct entry regulations were lifted sometime after 
Independence, the cities experienced a rapid population growth, but 
many housing regulations remained, and the agglomerations of illegal 
occupancy of people and activities in slum pockets experienced a rapid 
growth, a consequence we have emphasized. 
 5. Aspects of the history of 
Mathare Valley57 
In the former chapter we looked mainly at nation-wide historical forces 
that have contributed in shaping the Mathare Valley. Here we will look 
at the specific, local history, events, specific institutions and processes 
that have formed its present. 
5.1 Developments in Mathare Valley before independence 
Compared to the neighboring Pangani, which developments have had 
important consequences for it, Mathare Valley itself was sparsely 
populated till about World War II. Pangani had developed into a 
significant population cluster for Africans already late 19th hundred 
being a resting place on the old pre-railway caravan route between 
Mombasa and the Victoria Sea. The first major boost to the population 
of Mathare Valley came when the African population in Pangani was 
evicted and many Pangani houses were demolished as part of the racial 
zoning policy for Nairobi and in fact was implemented on a large scale 
in 1938. Pangani was set aside for Indians. A major motivation for the 
colonial power was political: Pangani was considered to be a site of 
African nationalism (Hake, 1977: 48).  
In the interwar period Mathare Valley consisted mainly of 
agricultural villages and a few quarries developed by Indian owners 
who had received leasing rights from colonial authorities after World 
War I. The Indian owners rented out some land to their workers 
(Etherton, 1971: 10) that added to the housing in the area. Some of the 
quarries were in operation as late as in the 1940s (Hake, 1977: 147). 58 
While also the existing housing in Mathare had been considered for 
                                                          
57  As far as we know, there exists no systematic history of Mathare Valley and we have 
not been in a position to make one on our own. The following outline is based on a 
critical reading of a number of present and old field studies that present 
observations or report on older informants recollections. 
58  The precise nature and roles of these quarries appear quite unclear. The most 
important issue today is the nature of the property rights the Indian owners 
received. In Pamoja Trust (2009: 36) the elders interviewed indicated that they 
were quite extensive and could be rightfully transferred. The old informant 
interviewed in Flemister (2012: 95) indicated, however, that the landowning rights 
went back to the state and then was later given to private landowners through a 
murky process. Etherton (1971: 9) writes that in 1971 34% was owned by the state, 
8% by the Nairobi City council while the rest (58%) was owned privately by 
individuals, companies and cooperatives, but illegally held till the cooperatives got 
some legal rights in 1969. 
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demolition as an African settlement together with Pangani from its very 
beginning (1921), Mathare was more out of the way, possessing fewer 
inhabitants and mostly invisible from the major roads, so it was left in 
peace. Since Mathare was even less controlled by the police than the 
other African settlements during the critical years of the late 1940s 
early 1950s before the Emergency in 1952, the number of squatters 
increased rapidly. Given the colonial regulations Mathare had a 
comparative advantage as a site of their avoidance, a property 
appreciated by both the regulators and the avoiders at the time. The 
Kikuyu share in its tribal composition was high, which was to be 
expected given its location close to the most populated parts of the 
Kikuyu native rural settlements. Already then Mathare Valley’s 
closeness to rivers and its invisibility made the area exceptionally 
attractive as a location for beer brewing, moonshine distillation, and at 
that time also Mau Mau organization building. While the first activities 
made a considerable scope for female contributions the latter was 
skewed towards males, as was the internal alcohol accompanied 
violence. The settlement received an early reputation for being a nest of 
crime and poverty- inspired rebellions, a reputation that is still alive 
(van Stapele, 2007).  
It is not quite clear how many residents actually were involved by 
the Mau Mau conflict in Mathare Valley in the initial stages, as its 
population was not well known. Given the much larger size of the 
Kikuyu populations nearer the city center such as in the high density 
Pumwani, population in the latter was both more visible and also more 
significant and difficult to control by the colonial authorities in the 
final analysis. The evidence reported appears somewhat conflicting 
regarding the degree of initial Mathare involvement.59 What is clear is 
that in the end all the Mathare Valley residents became involved 
against their will when the British discovered that the important urban 
leaders in the movement were located there and the settlement was 
demolished in 1953 and 7 000 was left without homes (Furedi, 1973:) . 
All the houses were demolished and most of the population was later 
detained in prison camps. The Mau Mau leadership’s initial retreatment 
location was wiped out. 60  
                                                          
59  The evidence is indirect and based on assessments of how much damage the 
colonial authorities did to the valley during the Emergency. The colonial 
government declared a state of emergency October 20, 1952 (Anderson, 2005: 
390) . Etherthon (1971: 10) mentions that only 150 huts were bulldozed in Village I 
in 1954, but that most of the people were moved into detention. Hake( 1977: 148) 
on the other hand reports that all the houses were destroyed and Furedi (1973: 
285) refers to documents that claims that all shanties in Mathare Valley was 
destroyed already 19 April 1953 ( a year before the so called ‘Anvil’ operation 
began) and 7 000 Africans made homeless. Late 1956 and after Kimathi was 
caught, the emergency policy loosened somewhat till its end early 1960. 
60  It was the duty of the Mau Mau strategists in Nairobi to acquire arms for the forest 
forces. The leader of the present Mau Mau veteran organization, Gitu wa Kahengeri 
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At the end of the Emergency(January 1960) only a few squatters 
(mainly women?) had moved into Mathare Valley , but already by 
Independence (1963) they could be counted in the thousands, 
although the Kenyatta government made no secret of that it intended to 
erase the slum.61 Nevertheless, in the end no demolition was ever 
seriously tried. Jomo Kenyatta had at several occasions expressed 
negative opinions about the poor and rebellious, as the majority of the 
Mathare slum dwellers were perceived to be, but the majority of the 
residents in Mathare valley were also perceived to be Kikuyu who 
constituted the major tribal basis for Jomo Kenyatta’s rule.62 Moreover, 
the Member of the Parliament representing Mathare, Dr. Munya 
Waiyaki, was an important patron for the Valley, belonging slightly to 
the left side of the then ruling party, KANU.63 Another important 
feature of the historical development and unique to Mathare is its large 
shifts in likely gender compositions. Some are clear. Given the status of 
Mathare under the Emergency, it was easier for women to establish 
themselves there before the Emergency was formally lifted in 1960. 
Early fieldworks by Nelson and Ross indicate an overwhelming 
majority of adult females as late as 1968. In Ross’s samples 66% of the 
adults were females in Mathare while only 34% were females in his 
joint sample from Shauri Moyo and Kariokor (Ross, 1974: 117). This 
situation has changed. According to the 2009 census (as reported in 
Muunganu Support Trust, 2012: 16) about 45% then were female, but 
                                                          
recalls from his Mathare days: ‘We had a big camp at Number 10 (an area close the 
Mathare chief’s office today), which to us was equivalent to Camp David in 
America.’ – Nairobi Star, 09-08-2013. Mathare was also used as a site for secret 
Mau Mau court cases. 
61  In June 1963 (after Kenyatta was invested as prime minister but before 
independence (in December) the District Officer toured the valley and announced 
through a loudspeaker that all had to leave their houses within a month (Hake, 
1977: 148).  
62  Immediately after the death of Tom Mboya in 1969, violence erupted in Nairobi and 
Kisumu cities that made late Mzee Jomo Kenyatta declare a dawn to dusk curfew 
due to civil unrest and destruction of property. In his interview with the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the senior Kenyatta had apparently claimed that 
the Luo nation was full of lazy people who only know how to shout in the streets. 
Kenyatta said it will take another 50 years for the Luo nation to understand that 
making noise in the streets only increases levels of poverty, rather than eradicating 
it (The Kenyan Daily Post, 19-07-2013). Most observers underline the Kikuyu-ness 
of Mathare Valley, but here again the basis for this may be uncertain. Ross’ 
samples (Ross, 1974: 117) find for example that only 42% in Mathare to be Kikuyu 
while 86% of the average in his other Nairobi samples (from Shauri Moyo and 
Koriokor) was Kikuyu. The latter is probably not representative. Etherton’s sample 
from Mathare from a couple of years before find 49% of residents to be Kikuyu, 
19% Luo, 15% Kamba and 11% Luhya – probably not very far from the Nairobi 
average at the time of Etherton remarks. Hence, the public perception of Mathare at 
the time as a Kikuyu stronghold appears to be incorrect when it comes to the tribal 
composition of its dwellers, but may be true for the more invisible political power 
distribution.  
63  A short evaluation of Wayaki’s role as a patron of Mathare Valley is presented in 
Chege (1981: 78 – 79). 
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adults were not singled out. We have no reason to believe that this has 
changed much since then.64 
5.2 Developments after independence – mainly the 1960s 
Already in the 1960s the Mathare Valley had a reputation for being 
exceptionally poor and crime ridden. Nevertheless, compared to 
present conditions aspects of the situation in at least some of the 
villages appeared to be quite idyllic despite a rapid population growth. 
First of all it was less crowded, and the rivers not quite so dirty. If we 
may trust Hake’s description, Mathare Valley appears to have been 
more integrated into the country’s polity and its youth was under more 
social and political control. The latter was perhaps the most striking 
difference regarding the control of the inner space of the slum. 
Potential local youth gangs were engaged as the youth wing of the local 
branch of the ruling KANU party, which also did policing jobs.65 The 
policing members of the youth wing would receive a small salary from 
local taxes. Rather engage in violent confrontations with the police, 
they cooperated with it to some extent.  
The key leaders were then a member of the Parliament, the younger 
Wayaki, who unlike the recent MPs engaged actively with local leaders 
and KANU had an office in the settlement. From the description of 
Hake, the key leaders of the villages were not state-appointed chiefs, 
but rather the village headmen. Unlike recent practices they were not 
appointed by chiefs, but elected at local meetings. Through the local 
KANU branch several headmen had strong ties to both the MP and the 
City Council representatives from Mathare (Ross, 1974: 117), and they 
were actively used in lobbying for public services to the area. The 
threats of general bulldozing of the area, the lack of economic 
                                                          
64  Among our (adult) respondents from 2012, 72% (109 of 151) were females, 
however, but we arrived at daytime that may explain this abnormality. 97 (of 149) 
the respondents claimed they were married and 9 widowed, that weakly implies 
that male headed households dominate according to our sample too. We believe, 
however, that female-headed households are more frequent than reported from 
informal settlements, but we are not able to determine the extent of misreporting. 
Lengthy stays in the field would then be necessary.  
65  (Hake, 1977: 153). In the brief period where KADU existed, the youth wings of KANU 
and KADU appears to be in conflict. For both organizations there were no difficulties 
in recruiting unemployed youth volunteers, however, who could act as 
‘cheerleaders, strong-arm men, and whippers-up of enthusiasm’ (ibid.: 152). The 
KADU youth had been trained in militancy, which could create problem for the KANU 
rule, but soon the arena was left to the KANU youth wing only. In addition to assist 
in arranging meetings they would exist as a red-shirt informal police in the Mathare 
shanty towns. They could even arrest misbehaving off duty police officers. These 
organizations had some of the features of some of the recent gangs that have some 
form of political motivation, such as Mungiki and Taliban, but were under much 
more direct adult control. They received some payment paid through local charges. 
Not all was idyll, however: one had pure bandit gangs then as now, but seems to 
have operated more outside the community. 
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alternatives together with the Independence elections, mobilized the 
communities. 66 While the interest in political developments remains 
high today, active involvement in lobbying appears low.67 
At this time the loosening of colonial migration controls combined 
with the lack of any significant redistribution of land to the poor and 
landless led after some quiet to a rapid growth of slum populations 
including the one in Mathare Valley. In June 1967 it had reached more 
than 12 000 and August 1969 about 20 000 (ibid. 149). One source of 
supply of new dwellers was the City Council’s burning down of the 
slum in Kaburini, June, 1969 (Etherton, 1971: 10). The main impetus 
was due to an institutional shift in Mathare Valley itself.  
5.3 The building companies of 1969-71 and their 
consequences 
The largest shift in the supply of housing in Mathare Valley took place 
around 1970 where a number of landowning companies were 
established. The population in Mathare increased from 19 463 in 
September 1969 to 53 026 in January 1971 (ibid: 57). The dramatic 
shift at the time may be illustrated by a comparison with Kibera. 
According to estimates by Amis (1988: 241): Kibera’s population in 
1965 was 6 000 while in Mathare Valley it was only 3 000. Already in 
1970 Mathare’s population had shot up to 35 000, while Kibera’s 
population increase was more modest and reached 11 000 in 1970. 
From the mid 1970s the rate of population increase in Kibera became 
steeper than in Mathare, but as late as in 1980 the population in 
Mathare Valley was still twice the number of Kibera ( 120 000 against 
60 000) according to Amis’s estimations. Both the sudden increase as 
well as the subsequent slower increase in the Mathare may be traced to 
the influx of the landowning companies. These organizations were 
modeled on a number of companies buying up agricultural land from 
the European and South African white settlers mainly organized by 
Kikuyus. In the case of companies ‘buying’ land in Mathare it was not 
always clear who they bought it from (the Indian quarry leasers, the 
State or Nairobi City Council?). The coalition was brokered through 
cooperation between Wayaki and the local headman of Village 2, 
Ndururu Kiboro. Since 65% of the land-owning companies’ land was 
held in the then squatters’ housing areas, the companies had to evict a 
large number of the poorest squatters who were unable to participate in 
                                                          
66  Ross (1974: 116) gives a succinct report from the situation: ‘By 1967 when I first 
visited the area, there was a village committee, a locally run and financed nursery 
school, a savings and credit cooperative, a branch of the national political party, a 
youth which served as the village police, a social hall in which nightly dances were 
held to help raise money for community projects and the committee of elders.’  
67  In our questionnaire 112 out of 151 respondents claimed they registered for voting 
regularly, but only 4 of 149 told that they had ‘tried to influence the government to 
improve living conditions’ in their settlement. More than a third of the respondents 
reported that they followed political debates. 
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the companies. The outcome was a long-lasting conflict centered on the 
reelections of Wayaki to the Parliament (Chege, 1981) where the 
squatters and tenants (particularly the non-Kikuyu ones) supported the 
alternatives to Wayaki while the company members and a fraction of 
the Kikuyu tenants supported him. 
The majority of shareholders at the outset apparently lived in 
Mathare (Etherton, 1971: 63) and had been squatters too, but some 
were likely to have moved out of the area and become absentee 
landowners themselves after a while and joined the original group of 
wealthy investors. Not only were rents high and the building costs for 
low quality shacks low, making it possible at the time to recover a 
house investment within six months (Hake, 1977: 159), but the value 
of land would increase to ten times the value of squatters’ land. This 
was capital gains based on a political transaction. According to the 
traditional story many of the company members had been Mau Mau 
fighters and supporters and got rewarded by getting this company 
land. There may be reason to doubt this to be the whole story, since 
most Mau Mau supporters had been deported and suffered 
considerable economic losses and then unlikely to be in the relatively 
wealthy group. It is likely that most members were indeed Kikuyu and 
that the land acquisition was protected by powerful Kikuyu political 
patrons. Wayaki was one of them.  
Nevertheless, it was remarkable that a number of slum dwellers had 
been able to organize a collective action where they had collected 
enough means to buy substantial amounts of land in Mathare and 
straddle into the political bureaucratic sphere and gain sufficient 
support officials for other portions of land to control them. The initial 
impetus to the collective action was based on fears: the Mathare 
squatters believed it likely that all the houses would be demolished in 
the near future (Amis, 1988: 241). These land buying operations were 
impossible to accomplish by any relatively poor slum dweller in 
isolation, but they could do it jointly and then increase the scale with 
considerable external support from richer outsiders. Moreover, this 
collective action could be sustained in classical Olson manner. If 
successful, they could deliver considerable side-payments in terms of 
rents and capital gains. The economic side payments led the motivation 
of the action from the defensive one of community protection to 
offensive economic gains. Being so successful, the danger of complete 
demolition of the slum abated. So the action may at the one hand be 
considered as a successful fight by insiders to control the outer space of 
their slum. On the other hand, their scale was based on outsiders’ 
capital and political- bureaucratic skills and power. Locals lost most of 
the control. Later some companies were able to organize their own de 
facto subdivisions so the ownership of land could be portioned among 
the members. This may also have needed irregular political/ 
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bureaucratic support since it could be legally questioned68 and the 
external investors acquired the lion’s share under the subdivisions. 
Quite abruptly, a dominating role of an absentee house owner class 
was established in Mathare Valley. Since then it plays a dominating 
role in the external interactions of the slum, and the conflicting 
relationship between house owners and tenants shapes many of the 
internal ruling issues and contests of control. 
Together with the increasing weights of the absentee owners, the 
shift in motivation of the collective action towards its lasting economic 
side payments, it was then not so surprising that the companies spent 
none of their political support to lobby for public investment in 
infrastructure during company investment period (mainly 1969 to 
1971). The companies made even less infrastructure investment on 
their own than the squatters had done. In addition, according to 
Etherton, many of the companies in several respects supplied housing 
of even lower standards than the squatters had built. Not many traces 
of altruistic motivation of the collective action were left. A few of the 
local squatter members could subsequently join this group of absentee 
structure owners. The high profitability of the house investment, 
particularly for the early members, made scope for this original capital 
accumulation. While some of the original building plans followed the 
official building rules, in the end all the execution of the plans violated 
them. 
The resulting standards were also illegal and that illegality together 
with the low standard shacks became part of the stock historical legacy 
for large parts of Mathare Valley from the early 1970s. So in the end 
Hake’s (Hake, 1977: 159) observation was very apt: ‘Mathare Valley 
existed in a form of legal twilight; nearly every building and shop and 
organization from one end of the valley to the other was illegal. Legally, 
the city could have required their demolition without compensation.’ In 
those parts where firmer property rights could be established, however, 
high rise buildings have popped up.  
Closely allied with the stock of illegal housing was a corresponding 
flow legacy: Most hawkers and builders dealing in legal goods or 
services in the area operated without legal permission and could be 
                                                          
68  From Etherton’s (1971: 50) observation that rent in 62% of the companies was 
collected by its individual members, we may imply that much of their land was de 
facto distributed individually. From a rent collecting point of view, this would be 
more efficient, but the legality of this redistribution is not clear. Nevertheless, their 
right to land was perceived as more secure and the price of their land was valued to 
ten times the price of the land occupied by squatter houses (ibid.: 62). This made 
both the return and risk of loss on new housing higher on squatter land. 
Presumably, the original company members realized the whole capital gain on land 
but during the land purchasing period the land price increased significantly so late 
comers who must have received lower windfalls. 
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fined or jailed any moment. 69In addition several of the trades 
performed inside the slums dealt in goods and services that in 
themselves were illegal: prostitution, brewing homemade beers, 
distilling and selling changa’a (moonshine) and selling drugs. To a 
large extent this is still the situation. It is an important flow legacy from 
the period up to the early 1970s when most of Mathare Valley was 
shaped, although both moonshine and illegal home-made beer are 
unlikely to play an equally important role today as it did then 
according to Hake (1977: 157), where he claimed that more than half 
of the population relied on these activities economically.70 It is likely 
that these activities are less important for the economy of Mathare 
Valley today, but there are different opinions.71 Its importance in 1969 
was also related to the high female share of the population. While 
distilling was (and is) a male activity the most of the rest, such as illegal 
beer brewing, the selling of changa’a and sex were all mainly female 
activities. An interesting feature of the illegal activities was that at the 
time received open local political support while they now at the most 
would receive tacit acceptance. Hake (1977: 156) tells how the village 
chairmen using village funds weekly went to the court paying fines for 
residents caught in illegal brewing.  
Returning to our main subject, how the state rules or is involved in 
ruling contests in slums, we may note that the lack of infrastructure 
and all regular kinds of public goods and services represents an 
absence of the state in a rather straightforward way where the excuse 
for the absence has often been the illegal character of the settlement, 
most clearly expressed in the 1960s when the authorities explicitly 
refused public services for that reason. A hard state presence will either 
imply slum demolition or investment in infrastructure or both. The 
running of a more or less illegal economy within the confines of the 
slum asks for more complex form of interactions with the controlling 
and force-wielding side of the public apparatuses: At the one hand it is 
the task of that apparatus to wipe out criminal activities including 
illegal market transactions that the missing infrastructure stimulates. 
Hence, missing state activism in form of infrastructure gaps should 
                                                          
69  Hake (1977: 160) refer to a Daily Nation article telling that in one swoop one Friday 
in 1968 Nairobi City Council askaris together with the regular police arrested 1000 
Mathari slum dweller for not paying tax. These askaris are specialized in policing 
public markets, have minimal education and are renowned for unpredictability. 
70  A quickly executed questionnaire revealed that 1 535 lived on illegal brewing and 
distilling, 418 earned wages outside, about 600(?) did some local selling, 81 
tailors, and so on (ibid.).  
71  A local community organization, the Dignitas Project (2008) estimates illegal 
brewing to employ 6% of the local employment, Muunganu support trust (2012: 
20)estimates the share of informal activity to 90% of total, but does not mention 
brewing or distilling at all. Van Stapele (2007: 11) who has done the most intensive 
field work from more recent period, claims that changa’a distilling still is the 
backbone pf Mathare Valley’s economy and connected to other activities such as 
trading charcoal and sex. 
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stimulate the demand for force-wielding state activism, but it does not 
increase the supply. Infrastructure and public goods such as schooling 
may to some degree enhance the state’s ability to control an area 
(Andvig, 2010). If the force apparatus had been successful in 
repressing the illegal components in the economy of Mathare Valley, 
the economy would not be sustainable. In practice the state has been 
drawn into forms of regulating informal activities that demand a 
continuous presence where the state itself will have to behave 
informally, mainly through the chief-headman institution, but also 
through the police who collect bribes from but also to some degree 
regulate the illegal distilleries, informal markets and size of local 
gangs, a regulation where police violence and even corruption will be 
continuously reproduced despite the poverty of the Mathare dwellers 
that limit their ability to offer bribes.  
Moreover, the fact that the illegality of the overall slum space 
remained despite some company land buying, implies that the whole 
settlement has remained exposed to some danger of being demolished 
and all dwellers evicted, particularly with major shifts in political 
forces which in Kenya often will imply shifting tribal and sub-tribe 
alliances or shift in strengths of important individual political patrons. 
In practice the overall security against large demolition processes will 
shift with the overall political situation. Hence, a surprisingly large 
section of the population will show a keen interest in and considerable 
knowledge of the relevant political processes. That noted, from the very 
moment the land holding companies got access to land through 
‘buying’ land, it was clear that their houses had better legal protection, 
were less illegal, than the ones of the pure squatters. Where possible, 
the housing companies or their members tried to evict squatter staying 
on the land bought, but at the time most of them (the long residing 
ones who had received official status in 1965 as residential) had some 
legal protection so pure and illegal forms of force were tried in the 
decentralized and partly illegal forms of eviction and eviction attempts 
(Etherton, 1971: 47). 
  
 6 Property rights, class structure 
and ruling from the outside 
The rise of private land buying companies and their implementation of 
their building projects retained the illegality of the Mathare settlement, 
but it changed the property rights and the class structure. Since then 
the relationship between house owners and tenants has been a key 
determinant regarding both what we have called the ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ 
space of slum governance. In 1970 when the number of dwellers really 
took off, the occupation of land was divided into pure squatter houses 
and company owned housing. The contests between the housing 
companies and squatters were dominant at the time where the tenants 
that rented from the companies played a more passive role.  
As is evident from the population figures and described in Etherton 
(1971) the companies constructed a large number of structures in a 
very short time. After the de facto subdivision of the companies, the 
members become more like individual house- or structure owners, 
however, where some owned a large number of structures. Given the 
profitability of building and renting houses on land not owned by any 
company, and the importance of receiving scarce political protection, a 
concentration of structure ownership took place here too, so after a 
while, it was the relationship between structure owners and tenants 
that became the salient conflicting one. Today a tenant may not even 
know whether the owner of the structure owns the land or not, and 
whether he owns it on his own or as a part owner of a company. 72 
This original period of land accumulation in Mathare where the 
majority of structures became concentrated in the hands of absentee 
owners was in some respects paradigmatic for the development of slum 
governance in Kenya where the shacks are not ‘owned’ by their 
residents, but by outsiders. The other slums in Nairobi are for the most 
part also characterized by a similar distribution of structure ownership 
where most are held by absentee owners, but where no private 
companies triggered the class division. In Kibera, for example, all the 
                                                          
72  For example, among our respondents in 4B, where the land is owned by the 
government (police reserve), 11 of the 17 who responded, believed it was owned by 
the house owner, 25 of 25 did so in Mabatini, although ownership here is disputed, 
and most likely still to be government land (City Council). In Mashimoni 15 of 25 
believe the house owner owns the land, although that too is government land (air 
force). Only 2 of the 139 who responded to the question owned the land they 
resided in. 
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land remains public.73 While the experience of the company owners in 
Mathare may have been inspiring for anyone in a public position that 
could convert its power to some slice of control of land in Nairobi, or for 
that matter anyone with private capital who could ‘buy’ that public 
power,74 formal private ownership of the land was not necessary for 
that purpose.  
In the case of Kibera the procedures for acquiring illegal structures 
became streamlined after 1974 (Amis, 1984: 90) after the local 
administration had gained firmer control of the area, and particularly 
the size of Kikuyu structure holdings expanded rapidly. Kenyatta was 
still president; the City Council was dominated by Kikuyus.75 Whatever 
the cause the fact of streamlining made structure investments safer 
despite their illegality, and a market for their trading arose, increasing 
the liquidity of the investment. As late as 1980 annual capital return of 
structure investment, when a large number of structures were built, 
was still 131% (bribes not included? Amis 1984: 91). With such profit 
rates, and when only a few days were needed for their construction, 
some form of rationing from the political outside had to take place. The 
later development showed that Kibera could be filled up by many more 
housing units and the local chiefs and elders would gain pro rata with 
the construction of units. The nature of this rationing we don’t know, 
but was likely to involve rationing through patronage networks of a 
hierarchical type.  
The poverty of the slum dwellers would certainly limit their access to 
structure ownership, but due to the high profit rates, and low 
investments needed for building a shack to local standards some would 
succeed and thereby improve their relative position. Poverty as such 
could not explain the rise of absentee ownership of illegal slum shacks 
in Nairobi, however; why the slum dwellers have been unable to 
effectively become owner-occupiers? In an important work for World 
Bank, Gulyani et al (2012 have compared the slums in Nairobi and 
                                                          
73  In Kibera the public ownership of land is contested by descendants of a number of 
Sudanese soldiers fighting in former British military units. They had been promised 
land in this area. 
74  Amis (1984: 92) reports from research he did on structure owning in Kibera and 
found that 31% of the large owners (above 20 room units) possessed private, 
formal capital and 38% had public or professional positions. 64% of the landlords 
lived outside the settlement, and their average number of rooms they rented out 
was 12. 
75  Omenya and Lobale (2012: 9) emphasize the role of a new Kikuyu MP and that the 
local Kikuyu was sufficient in number to apply forceful means to wrest control of 
land from the Sudanese. They relate (based on information from focus groups) the 
major expansion of Kibera to 1978 when a Kalenjin was appointed District Officer 
who invited non-Kikuyus to settle and to a claim that the corruption among the 
chiefs intensified.  
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Dakar (and then Johannesburg).76 The most striking difference between 
slum dwelling in Nairobi and Dakar is the dominating role of absentee 
ownership of the slum housing in Nairobi. While only 8.5% of the 
sampled households were owner-occupiers in Nairobi (and 91.2% 
tenants)77, in Dakar 74.5% were owner-occupiers (and only 25.5% 
were tenants).78 But using the same definition of poor vs. non-poor, the 
incidence of poverty was higher in Dakar (82.4%) than in Nairobi 
(72.5%) slums.79 Despite fewer poor in Nairobi the quality of the slum 
housing as well as the public services delivered is dramatically better in 
Dakar. Moreover the percentage of the urban population that lives in 
slums in Senegal is much lower (38.9 % vs. 54.7%) and steadily 
declining while in Kenya, as we noted in the introduction, it stays 
unchanged: in 1990 the proportion of the urban population living in 
slums was 70.6 % in 1990 while in Kenya it was 54.9%.80  
When seeking explanation for the high incidence of absentee 
landowning in Nairobi compared to Senegal a rough explanation may 
be sought in the much higher degree of economic inequality in Kenya, 
but again we find this to be unsatisfactory since when comparing with 
Johannesburg the percent who are tenants there are even lower than 
the one in Dakar (11.3%).81 Somehow absentee landowning of illegal 
structures should be partly explained by a mixture of absolute poverty 
levels, inequality and a number of historical and political factors going 
all the way back to the character of the British colonial rule. Its 
prevalence have obvious negative consequences for the quality of the 
slum housing – as pointed out by Gulanyi et al. inn a number of articles 
– without any clear form of benefits in terms of increased availability of 
urban housing for poor. Good consequences may then not explain the 
dominance of absentee structure owning in Kenya and its persistence. 
We have not found a fully satisfactory explanation, but we like to point 
                                                          
76  The field work in Dakar and Nairobi was performed in 2004 and the different 
aspects of the results have been presented and analyzed from a number of angles. 
It was based on making a representative sample of slum dwelling households from 
the two cities. Here we are only interested in some of the main characteristics and 
we will not go into statistical details. 
77  Our small sample from Mathare shows a similar composition. Only 7 of 151 owned 
their house, that is, more than 95% were tenants. 
78  Gulyani et al (2012: 254). 
79  Gulyani et al (2010: 34). 
80  UN-HABITAT (2013: 148). We should note that most measures of proportion of slum 
dwellers rely on a number of rather arbitrary decisions; and there are a number of 
measures of the proportion for Nairobi in the literature. All should be taken with a 
grain of salt, but the range of serious estimates is from about 70% to 30% (Gulyani 
et al. 2008: 1918). The proportion of slum dwellers in Kenya is not exceptional for 
African countries nor is it exceptional that it is not declining according to the UN-
HABITAT’s estimates. In Zambia, for example the estimated slum population 
constituted 57.0% of the urban population in 1990 and 57.3 % in 2009. 
81  Gulyani et al (2010: 27). 
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to a number of factors we think has not received the degree of attention 
in research as they deserve: 
i) Many ownership rights to structures were mainly derived from 
public decision-making powers in periods of transitions when that 
power was not stabilized or under conditions where the transfer of 
ownership rights has been illegitimate or contestable. Although 
often not consolidated, the state has even then been hierarchically 
organized with much power concentrated at the top. In periods 
when that power may be converted into private assets, the resulting 
private asset distribution tends to be concentrated. This has been 
much in evidence during the economic transition in the former 
Soviet Union where the rise of private-public oligarchs has been a 
dominant feature in the political economy of the resulting countries, 
but we have observed similar developments in Kenya. Here the high 
concentration of rural land ownership that resulted from the private 
land-buying companies that constituted the models for the 
structure-owning companies, has been a striking development that 
dominates much of Kenyan economy and politics. 
ii) While taking place on the largest scale in the near aftermath of 
Independence, similar conversions of public power into private 
landownership have been taking place all the time at individual 
levels, but concentrated during periods of major realignments of 
tribal coalitions. The outcome has been a hotchpotch of fuzzy 
landholding rights. A regularization and clarification may cause 
many to lose them, and the gainers may not knowing in advance, 
since also the legal clarification will take place in a situation of new 
and difficult to predict shifts in public power. The historical layers of 
claims have made most legal clarifications contestable and risky. 
Since the existing fuzzy rights are concentrated in the hands of 
owners with strong connections to or membership in the political 
ruling groups of different persuasions and tribal backgrounds, 
major realignments are extremely risky for them, and may trigger 
major violence, any serious attempt on reform and realignment 
landownership rights, including the one decided on in the new 
constitution, has stalled and is likely to do so in the foreseeable 
future. 
iii) The same argument applies to the ruling group of land-or structure-
owners in Mathare Valley: while some may gain by receiving new 
title deeds, and then start to invest in less flimsy and better housing, 
many will lose their fuzzy ownership to their structures. Hence, it 
will be difficult to initiate major changes. Let us now contemplate a 
large scale slum upgrading under conditions of fuzzy absentee 
ownership, the group that will rule the key external conditions of 
the slum. Given the low quality and costs of the existing shacks, 
upgrading is likely to imply demolition and then the building of 
better housing. Since, the structure owners’ land rights often are 
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tied to the existing structures, they risk to lose their rent income, 
with only risky claims to the new more valuable houses. To regain 
access to land, the latter will rise in value and may keep the less 
wealthy or less well connected ones out as happened during the 
company buying in Mathare we described. Since most owners live 
outside the slum, they don’t gain directly from improved quality, but 
they are the strongest group with economic interest in the slum. 
They, or a sufficiently large group of them, must be compensated in 
terms of capital or interest gains, in order to support slum upgrading 
interventions from either governments or wealthy NGOs. The 
tenants, on the other hand, may gain in terms of quality, if they are 
able to gain access to the new houses, but they will have to bear the 
actual costs of moving out when houses are demolished. Since they 
don’t even possess fuzzy ownership they will not receive any capital 
gain given the prevailing level of poverty, the moving costs make 
their situation even more precarious, and the right to access to 
tenancy of new buildings will be fuzzy, but if secure enough to make 
it marketable, they are likely to sell it. Particularly so, since the rent 
in the improved housing structure is likely to increase. Hence, the 
tenants are unlikely to strongly support slum upgrading, and on the 
whole the political gains by initiating slum grading are likely to be 
small at the tenants too, although the number of slum dwelling 
tenants is large.  
iv) Summing up, we see that a slum ruling equilibrium composed of 
poor tenants and an absentee structure owning class holding only 
fuzzy ownership rights appears quite stable. So unlike a slum 
populated by owner-occupied housing units, the Mathare Valley 
type of slum appears to be rather resistant against both outside and 
inside initiated actions for housing quality improvements. This 
unlucky equilibrium may explain some of the reason why the slum 
population in Kenya as share of the urban population has not 
decreased – unlike the situation in Senegal.  
Overall, when regarded from the external ruling point of view, the 
tenants and structure owners often may have shared interests and will 
seek to counter externally induced changes that involve regularization 
of property rights, demolition of shacks, and so on. 
 7 Chiefs, landlords and tenants – 
the ruling of internal slum space 
This does not imply that no internal changes are taking place in the 
Nairobi slums due to fears of rupturing any existing stock of fuzzy and 
potentially contradictory ownership claims. Private structure owners 
may, for example, claim that they have been granted new title deeds in 
areas formerly belonging to the government and initiate eviction, 
demolition or arson processes to get rid of the tenants living there. In 
this case, naturally, slum dwellers and the absentee owners will have 
antagonistic interests I a demolition process. Regarding Mathare Valley 
a number of contesting claims are on the table at present that may 
trigger evictions, of which some may create structure owner tenant 
antagonisms.82 When coming to evictions at the individual level, and 
rent determination, structure owners and tenants naturally have 
opposite interests in general.  
In the former section we have looked at the role of absentee land-or 
structure owning in slums and its eventual effects on the quality of 
housing, but rather to ascertain how it effects on the governance of 
external slums spaces in like the one in Mathare Valley through 
collective responses to externally initiated processes like demolition or 
regularization of and clarification of land rights in a slum. Looking at 
the inner space, the fact that the tenants are poor with uncertain 
incomes, each household risk to get into low or zero income sequences 
where they then become unable to pay the rent owed to the structure-
owner. Hence, they must always expect to be individually evicted. In 
our sample about thirty percent (44 of 151) had experienced this and at 
at the time we did our questionnaire (November 2012) more than a 
quarter reported that they lived under threat of eviction (40 of 151). 83 
When the external governance environment shifts either due to the 
                                                          
82  In a brief survey of landholding conditions of Mathare Valley Muungano Support 
Trust et al. (2012: 38) potential conflicts between private structure owners and 
private developers or between private developers where conflicts between owners 
and tenants may be triggered may be brewing at least in Mabatini, Village 2 and 
Kiamutisya (part of former Village 1). In ¤A there has been a major effort to improve 
the housing quality and public infrastructure of the village initiated by a German 
NGO that has triggered a complex struggle between former structure owners, the 
NGO, Kenyan public administration that combined eviction and rent paying 
struggles. Since we have done no research in 4A on our own and since an 
exposition of this reform effort will demand lengthy analysis we will leave the effort 
here. 
83  In their much larger sample of households (18797) from Kibera Marx et al. (2013b: 
193), 10 % had experienced an eviction. 
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implementation of a public project or by policy shifts that change the 
external power distribution, collective eviction processes are often 
induced. Seen from an individual’s point of view, they may hit 
approximately as often as the single household evictions, our 
respondents seem to imply.84  
For a number of reasons the rents earned by letting out shacks are 
high compared to their building costs and compared to the tenants’ 
ability to pay.85 When the land is cheap due to conflicting land 
ownership claims or squatting at public land, access to the building of 
new shacks has to be rationed. The rationing within a given internal 
slum space under stable external governance surroundings is 
(November 2012) mainly done by the chief together with the elders. As 
employees of the Provincial Administration they are within limits given 
the right to grant temporary occupation licenses (TOLS). They are likely 
to receive bribes by the prospective land or rather house or structure 
lords. Threats of single house demolition without implementation may 
yield the same. If left at chiefly discretions this kind of slum space will 
tend to move towards increasing density where all public space will be 
occupied. This will naturally give rise to conflicts with the existing 
dwellers. The fact that relationships between structure owners and 
tenants are generally conflictual at the individual level inside the slum 
may be one reason why landowners become absentee owners, and 
particularly so in a shack-based slum where the dwellers get close and 
are little protected against attack at their residences. The structure 
owners often even delegate the actual rent collection to middlemen.  
Those daily interpersonal (and class) conflicts will normally be 
solved by the chief consulting with the local elders. Hence, the chief 
will do important policing tasks (cf. Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2008) and 
be in more daily contact with the population in the slum than the police 
itself. 86 In addition he has a number of other powers such as the right 
to grant (or not grant) permissions to initiate or operate a Local 
                                                          
84  When asked whether your household was the only one evicted 32 answered ‘yes’ 
and 31 ‘no’. Only 44 told that they had once been evicted, so if consistent only 12 
and not 31 should answered ‘no’, but inconsistencies like this abound in many 
questionnaire studies. In any case is our sample too small to become 
representative for experiences of collective eviction processes, but may be OK’ish 
for the individual ones. 
85  The average monthly rent paid in our sample Ksh. 1981 The Marx (2013: Table 1a) 
shows slightly lower average rent was paid in Kibera (Ksh 1715) at about the same 
time. 
86  The chiefs are state (November 2012) appointed officials who like police officers 
are bound to rotate between different locations – in the case of chiefs at annual or 
biannual basis, and the may not be appointed as chief in their home location 
(Joireman, 2011: 141). At least in Nairobi they are in university educated, and being 
I direct line to the president’s office they are wielding considerable power. Their 
future role is to our knowledge still not clarified. In Mathare Valley there is one 
chief and one assistant chief with camps at the opposite ends but inside the slum. 
It may be more than symbolic that there is no police station in Mathare Valley. 
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Community Organizations in a slum or to permit or deny access of 
NGOs or research ventures, like ours, to enter the slum. More 
importantly he is responsible for appointing most of the elders and 
cooperating with them. They are locals and possess much of the local 
knowledge needed for governing the internal slum space that the police 
and the chief are unable due to the rotation policies (Andvig and 
Barasa, 2012,). He is also the main state representative to handle all 
kinds of intertribal conflicts that may easily arise under slum 
conditions where people have to live close and visible to each other. 
We are not aware of any systematic analysis of the effects of the 
Chief’s behavior on the outcome of the conflicts between tenants and 
structure owners in Mathare Valley, but a very ambitious project 
focusing on it has been recently made in Kibera (Marx et al., 2013). 
They have so far studied the effects of the ethnicity matchings between 
chiefs, tenants and landlords in Kibera. Their tentative results indicate 
that the rents are higher (and local investment lower87) when the chief 
and the landlord belong to the same tribe, and the opposite when the 
tenant and chief belong to the same tribe, but only weakly or not 
significantly so. Whether the landlord or the slum dweller belong to the 
same tribe or not had not any significant effect. These effects appear to 
be stronger in areas with more weakly articulated property rights, but 
weaker where a local gang is likely to operate. In the case of Kibera 
where both the leading youth gangs and the majority of tenants are 
dominated by Luo tribe members, the gangs may pressurize rent 
conflicts towards the tenants’ direction. Even so, on average they sided 
more often with landlords than with the tenants in most rent conflicts 
for rather obvious reasons, ability to offer higher bribes, more often 
social equals to the chiefs.88  
Like eviction conflicts rent conflicts may also at times give rise to 
larger collective actions. In Mathare North and Mathare Valley 
particularly virulent ones were taking place in 2003. In Mathare North 
the tenants of a Kikuyu landlord from Kiambu initiated an action to 
reduce their rents with 500 -1000 Ksh (Standard 21 August 2013, and 
did not pay for a couple of months. The landlord then began an 
eviction process renting 100 armed people from local (Kikuyu) gangs 
and his family. Entering the building (it was a high rise building, no 
shacks) the gang was surrounded by locals after reaching the third 
floor. Ten were killed before the police arrived, and three more died. 
This was part of the background that made Mathare North a conflict 
point during the 2007-8 election violence. Some months before a rent 
                                                          
87  The main investment considered was the improving of roofs. This needed approval 
by the chief. 
88  In Marx et al (2014) the econometric analysis is based on the likely exogeneity of 
the chiefs’ rotation which makes empirical identification more plausible. Joireman 
(2011: 139–147) also study cases where the official rent tribunal and NGO’s are 
involved, but find that they are rarely used. 
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dispute had taken place in Mathare Valley. That time it took place 
within shack structure (Weiss, 2004: 35). 
In Kibera a larger share of the structures is built on public land than 
in Mathare, The building on public land gives the chief a larger degree 
of discretionary power than in the case of land which is privately 
owned in some form. In the latter case the chief (and the potential 
structure owner) will have to consult with the land owner before 
permission to the establishment of t a new structure is given. Moreover, 
in the case when the landowner will build a new structure, the chief 
may gain by trying to block or delay the building of the structure. In the 
case of the building on public land, the chief will gain more the more 
structures that are built during his assignment. Hence the tendency 
towards ever tighter packing of shacks under such as system. This is a 
mechanism that in addition to geographical factors and the early 
Mathare expansion may explain why the rate of population increase in 
Kibera has been higher than in Mathare over a longer period. The same 
mechanism may also contribute to the explanation of why so much of 
the expansion inside Mathare Valley has taken place close to the rivers. 
The reasons why so large share of the population in slums are clustered 
fairly close to the rivers are due to a number of political economy 
factors:  
1) Their filthiness and dangers pressurize the land prices and make the 
area more accessible for the very poor, who may accept more 
densely packing than other groups.  
2) The areas when not desirable from a residence point of will tend to 
be more open to squatting at later stages of any village development 
that first will develop sprawling out from the village centers after 
they already have become rather densely packed and this packing 
has become the accepted norm for subsequent constructions. Since 
these are informal settlements, the open areas between houses or 
structures will at first be large and not so scarce. Since each house or 
structure need to have some open space around it, single-standing 
shacks may well be affordable at the outset. As they get scarcer, an 
economizing of open space may stimulate the creation of, or a 
meshing together of single shacks into larger structures. On the 
other hand the actual open spaces will become smaller, so they may 
only be possible to develop may be filled with larger structures. The 
later ‘random’ packing of the settlement will the on average fill 
smaller holes of public space -when not major collective actions in 
the shape of evictions and larger block developments are allowed for 
or forced upon the settlements. It will also cost extra to tear down 
several single shacks belonging to different ‘owners’ and substitute 
them with a multi-shack structure 
3) Since the river is a visible limit for any sprawling, it is clear from the 
outset that any growth here will coming from more densely packed 
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structures. That said, there are still some open spaces along the river 
banks in Mathare Valley, partly due to space needed around 
changa’a brewing factories, partly due to too large difficulties to 
build on the river beds, and partly to an unfinished diffusion of 
shack construction processes. 89 As pointed out by Sobreira and 
Gomez (2001) one effect of informality is that basic housing units 
will vary more in size and that the traffic paths between them (and 
other forms of public space) will not develop symmetrically but 
follow more random processes.90  
4) The main factor giving distinctness to developments close to the 
river beds, however, is the exceptionally high degree of ownership 
uncertainty due to the expectations that all constructions along the 
river beds may be demolished. They are based on political decisions 
that all riparian areas 30 meter from the river shall be cleared, but 
the decisions have so far not been tried implemented. It is also this 
that gives increase scope for chiefly discretions with their strong 
economic interest in increasing the packaging of new structures into 
the area of influence.  
As the development in Mathare Valley did show that in landowner 
tenant dominated economy it is difficult to develop an owner-occupier 
structure without introducing extensive regulatory measures. If a 
former tenant is granted a house below market value, it will be 
profitable to sell it and either take the profit out in consumption, or 
invest it in a cheaper structure or in some other way start a 
development that may make the tenant become an absentee landlord 
while an existing absentee landlord has acquired a valuable new asset. 
 
                                                          
89  The two rivers are not navigable and have not contributed to any general 
industrialization of the area, but have assisted in creating a comparative advantage 
for Mathare Valley in making illegal distillation of local liquor, changa’a – an 
important bone of contention influencing the incentives for spatial control of the 
area as well as the consequences of the fights around it, issues to which we will 
return. The most important policy question in Mathare Valley and many other slums 
in Nairobi at present, is a plan to renovate the city’s river system where thirty 
meters at each side of the rivers may be cleared. A plan for how to minimize the 
resulting pains for the involved slum dwellers is presented in Muunganu Support 
Trust et al. (2012). 
90  In their paper they argue that the frequency of the size of units (the number of units 
in the structures) will follow a hyperbolic distribution with a fat lower tail, i.e. that 
then single shacks will be more frequent than if it had followed a normal 
distribution. In their paper they argue – using evidence from two villages in the 
Mathare Valley as they were around 1970 in Etherthon (1971) – that packaging on 
average would lead to larger structures. We don’t’ find this so convincing stated as 
a general law, but we will return to the issue when we are looking at the economic 
incentives and institutional structures involved in the packaging of the settlements. 
 Part II: Crime control and 
management of inner slum 
space 
 
1. Introduction 
Slums are perceived as dangerous places. Not only are they lacking 
public infrastructure, which combined with their high population 
densities make them dangerous to health. In Kenya the high area 
density of crime and violence adds to the insecurity of their residents. 
In slums dominated by shack architecture, as the ones mostly studied 
in this paper, the flimsiness of their housing combined with high 
poverty rates add to the feeling of vulnerability. The actual household 
experienced rate of crime is likely to be above, but not so much above 
the high Nairobi average, however. Here we seek to explain why.  
To do so we focus on four villages inside Mathare Valley; 3C, 4B, 
Mashimoni and Mabatini (See map at the end of the paper) where a 
seemingly puzzling variety of crime and security provision patterns was 
revealed. A major aim has been to explain this variation and link it to 
basic characteristics of the slum. Since it is possible for some villages 
inside a slum to have fairly low crime rates, we may at the same time 
explain why the average crime rate for a whole slum may not be so 
exceptional. The observation of a puzzling high variation in crime rates 
across areas where citizens are confronted by similar crime-inducing 
circumstances, is not new, however, as pointed out by Glaeser et al. 
(1996: 507), this is an old puzzle in social science and they observe 
that traditional factors believed to influence crime rates such as poverty 
rates, income and education levels are unable to explain cross city 
variation in crime levels in the US as well as cross precinct variation in 
New York. They apply a social interaction perspective91 where one 
actor’s criminal behavior may stimulate his neighbor’s propensity to 
crime and investigate it by formulating and estimating an econometric 
model. This kind of models may generate large variance in aggregate 
outcomes from small variation in individual response propensities. 
A difficulty with their article is that they don’t have direct 
observations of neighborhood interactions and influence and their 
                                                          
91  A general overview of the perspective may be found in Durlauf (2001) and the 
subsequent discussion. 
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effects on the crime variation have to be imputed from the econometric 
model. In our study there is a host of concrete social interactions that 
may generate variance in crime rates across the villages, too much in 
fact; and our data don’t allow any econometric specification.92 We 
outline two of several possible interaction mechanisms we think 
influence crime rates and that are compatible with substantial variation 
in crime rates across the villages, but several other are possible.  
As noted in Fjeldstad and Andvig (2008: 11) policing and crime are 
very spatial activities where the characteristics of the space to be 
policed will have serious impact. There we focused on the effects on 
police corruption. In the following we will study a more specific space 
but within that space go broader and explore how the special 
characteristics of slum spaces based on shack architecture will impact 
their policing and their residents’ crime organizations, crime 
experiences and their organization of crime prevention. In particular, 
we will make plausible that the same spatial characteristic under one 
organizational constellation in one sub space (village) may stimulate 
crime and violence, while under another it may reduce it. 
From the outside point of view of political elites slums in Nairobi are 
sites of potential political instability and have frightening capacities for 
violent collective actions. They contain a large number of poor citizens 
densely packed in the neighborhood of political power centers. Their 
residents have every reason to hold a grudge against political and 
economic elites. In particular, only a minority in a slum owns the shack 
they are living in and have to pay fairly high rents (Gulanyi, et al, 
2008). Most of the shacks are owned by members of the same elites. 
Hence, when the slums are policed as a whole, this policing are closely 
connected to large scale eviction or squatting processes. It is what we 
may call the macro-policing of the slums.  
Many of the spatial mechanisms that may give rise to collective 
violent actions with basis in slums and elite concerns about their 
macro-policing are the same as the ones that influence the inside crime 
issues. Nevertheless, macro-policing has so far proved rather easy: in 
the final analysis it has not been too difficult for the police to contain 
the outwards spread of political instability and violence from the slums 
by the use of force. We briefly try to explain why. That experience is a 
major reason why the regular policing of crime in the slums are treated 
in the same way as the rest of their supply of public infrastructure: it is 
done on the cheap.  
                                                          
92  For one thing, we don’t have any reliable income assessments; which are extremely 
difficult to get in this kind of neighborhood, nor do we have the fraction of single-
parent l households that may vary substantially across the villages and that may 
impact substantial gang formation. The same applies to eventual difference in 
youth unemployment rates. 
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The focus of this part of our paper is not on this macro-policing, 
however, but on the detailed mechanisms of policing, their micro-
policing, and crime-making inside the slums. That has not proved to be 
any easy task where the regular police play only a circumscribed role. 
To analyze it we have to discuss the roles of the state appointed chief, 
assistant chiefs and village chairmen and elders in managing crimes in 
the slum together with eventual voluntary vigilante groups of various 
compositions ( in addition to the three police organizations that are 
involved, the Kenya Police Service, the Administration Police and the 
paramilitary General Service Unit, GSU) 
 .
 2. Some thoughts on the 
distinction between victim and 
non victim crime and their 
history in Mathare Valley 
In part Mathare has had a long lived reputation as a nest of crime and 
violent behaviors. Successful crimes need a modicum of secrecy. 
Looking at the lack of privacy and the extensive poverty we may read 
from typical pictures of overcrowded maze-like slum paths (here 
represented in figure 2) it is not so obvious why the internal crime rates 
in slums like Mathare should be high. Crimes are difficult to keep secret 
and there are few valuables to take. On the other hand most dwellers 
are poor so many more items are potentially valuable to catch than they 
would be for richer residents. Furthermore, the shacks are easy to break 
into and until recently there were few street lights to present visibility 
at night.93 When considering victim forms of crime, it is then not 
obvious whether crime should be more or less frequent than in regular 
urban areas. And questionnaire studies of crime experiences have to 
rely on victim crime. 
An important characteristic of crime, is then whether they hurt a 
victim or not; and their form and degree of visibility. For example, 
Luise White’s (1990) study of prostitution in colonial Nairobi, shows 
how the different kind of visibility and location of hidden home 
prostitution, visible home prostitution and street prostitution 
responded differently to police harassment and were exposed to 
different professional risks which tend the forms to be allocated in 
different parts of the city. While prostitution appears not to be policed 
in Mathare, other forms of victimless crimes do. Here changa’a 
distillation, mostly concentrated along the river beds are impossible to 
hide, while homemade beer brewing may to some extent be hidden 
from external observers, such as the police, but not from neighbors. But 
when accepted in densely neighborhoods both kinds of activities have 
comparative advantages of being located in slums were most of the 
population are involved in partly illegal activities and try to avoid the 
police.  
We have seen that historically this even made local slum governing 
bodies, including the local KANU party, to organize the fine payments 
                                                          
93  The ugly, tall streetlights that recently have been installed covering large areas of 
Mathare Valley, have proved to be a fairly successful. 
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to the police. Both are also labor-demanding activities and created 
many jobs. Changaa selling and distilling was (and is) more lucrative 
and risky. 94 While we are not aware of any systematic historical study 
of the development of the moonshine and home brewed beer 
industries, we expect them to be declining industries mainly due to 
shifts in tastes. Note that females have important roles in both, and 
since both the status and income from prostitution have been in 
decline, the income for females from victimless crime is likely to have 
worsened significantly. Since they from early on had practically all 
responsibility for raising the children in Mathare and avoiding 
marriage (Nelson, 1978) this has affected the economic conditions for 
children too.  
Slum areas with their extensive interlinked sets of illegal economic 
transactions have also comparative advantage as location for drug-
selling. Since most drugs are not produced locally, this could not 
compensate for the job-loss in the traditional forms of victimless crimes 
in Mathare Valley. Moreover most of their selling is considered a male 
task, it could not compensate the women for loss income from bazaar 
and change-making. 
While the daughters have been easier to integrate in their mothers’ 
activities, according to Nelson, the boys were left more to their 
companions and male friends. When combined with high youth 
unemployment rates,95 gangs arise easily and spontaneously in these 
surroundings. Most remain rather unorganized, however. In her master 
thesis van Stapele (2010) portrays the difference between a couple of 
local, disorganized youth gangs and a disciplined one like Mungiki. 
According to the assessment of Hake (ibid. 157) more than half of 
the people were dependent of the brewing of traditional African beer, 
buzaa and distillation of local moonshine, chang’aa. While these 
industries are still important, they are likely to be less so today.96 They 
were an important source of fines and bribes for the police. Up to 140 
could be arrested at the same time. At one occasion also the Council 
police were involved rounding up 1000 (for not paying a council tax. 
Nevertheless, the interactions appear to have been less hostile, or so it 
appears from the way at least some of the fines were paid by the village 
headman (with unpaid, but official status in the Provincial 
                                                          
94  In 1974 the fines for changaa-distilling was 5-10 times the fine for buzaa brewing 
at the same time as the risk of being caught was higher, The distilling of change is 
a male task while its selling (often complementary to prostitution) as well as buzaa 
brewing and selling is traditionally a female task. 
95  Marx et al (2013) use the youth unemployment rate as an indicator of the likelihood 
of gang presence. 
96  In regular questionnaires these activities are likely to be strongly underreported, 
and for that reason we have not included questions about illegal economic 
activities in our questionnaire. One recent study made by an NGO suggests that 6% 
of the local employment is due to changa’aa distillation. 
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Administration) ‘who went to the court on Monday morning to pay the 
fines of members and residents who had been arrested over the 
weekend and fined Sh.20 to Sh.50 each for illegal brewing’ (ibid.: 156).  
As we will see the main difference to the local contest of control of 
the slum space appears to be, if we may trust Hake’s descriptions, the 
withdrawal of the ruling party from local governance. A number of 
single aim local community organizations (LCOs) and external non 
governance organizations (NGOs – international and national) have got 
involved. While local elders still play a role their conflict solving then 
may have been more significant (cf. Ross. 1974)97 than they are today 
while the local chief has become more important due to the importance 
of the conflicts between tenants and structure-owners in the present 
management of the slum space.  
The most striking difference regarding the control of the inner space 
of the slum was that what at present would be the local youth gangs 
appeared to have been under stricter political control as the youth wing 
of the local branch of the ruling KANU party.98 Hence there appear to 
have been less violent confrontation with the police. 
According to the assessment of Hake (ibid. 157) more than half of 
the people were dependent of the brewing of traditional African beer, 
buzaa and distillation of local moonshine, chang’aa. While these 
industries are still important, they are likely to be less so today.99 They 
were an important source of fines and bribes for the police. Up to 140 
could be arrested at the same time. At one occasion also the Council 
police were involved rounding up 1000 (for not paying a council tax. 
Nevertheless, the interactions appear to have been less hostile, or so it 
                                                          
97  Ross studied mainly Village 2 that according to Hake had an exceptional active and 
competent headman. This may have made the elder institution in general also to 
appear exceptionally efficient, but it is also likely to that the rural copying features 
from the original gradually have dwindled in force. 
98  (Hake, 1977: 153). In the brief period where KADU existed, the youth wings of KANU 
and KADU appears to be in conflict. For both organizations there were no difficulties 
in recruiting unemployed youth volunteers, however, who could act as 
‘cheerleaders, strong-arm men, and whippers-up of enthusiasm’(ibid.: 152). The 
KADU youth had been trained in militancy, which could create problem for the KANU 
rule, but soon the arena was left to the KANU youth wing only. In addition to assist 
in arranging meetings they would exist as a red-shirt informal police in the Mathare 
shanty towns. They could even arrest misbehaving off duty police officers. These 
organizations had some of the features of some of the recent gangs that have some 
form of political motivation, such as Mungiki and Taliban, but were under much 
more direct adult control. In addition one had pure bandit gangs then as now. They 
received some payment paid through local charges. 
99  In regular questionnaires these activities are likely to be strongly underreported, 
and for that reason we have not included questions about illegal economic 
activities in our questionnaire. One recent study made by an NGO (Dignitas Project, 
2008) suggests that only 6% of the local employment is related to changa’aa 
distillation. 
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appears from the way at least some of the fines were paid by the village 
headman (with unpaid, but official status in the Provincial 
Administration) ‘who went to the court on Monday morning to pay the 
fines of members and residents who had been arrested over the 
weekend and fined Sh.20 to Sh.50 each for illegal brewing’ (ibid.: 156).  
As we will see the main difference to the local contest of control of 
the slum space appears to be, if we may trust Hake’s descriptions, the 
withdrawal of the ruling party from local governance. A number of 
single aim local community organizations (LCOs) and external non 
governance organizations (NGOs – international and national) have got 
involved. While local elders still play a role their conflict solving then 
may have been more significant (cf. Ross. 1974)100 than they are today 
while the local chief has become more important due to the importance 
of the conflicts between tenants and structure-owners in the present 
management of the slum space. 
                                                          
100  Ross studied mainly Village 2 that according to Hake had an exceptional active 
and competent headman. This may have made the elder institution in general also 
to appear exceptionally efficient, but it is also likely to that the rural copying 
features from the original gradually have dwindled in force. 
 3. Police tasks – the Western 
bundle 
Traditional Western police are assigned (at least) five major tasks that 
are bundled together:  
i) Solving interpersonal conflicts that may cause either violence or 
disrupt smooth operations taking place in public space – such as 
traffic. 
ii) Protect citizens and enterprises against becoming victims to 
crime.101 
iii) Seek to minimize the amount of those public harmful processes or 
goods that are classified as criminal, such as drug dealing or 
moonshine distillation. 
iv) Protect the political elite against violent uprisings and against other 
activities considered harmful to the political and economic order. 
v) Ration the criminal cases that may be brought to courts. This is an 
important task with implications both for citizens’ protection 
against crime and for the vulnerability of elites.102  
The common set of instruments the police need in order to solve these 
tasks which define the police as a public organization, is physical force. 
Weapons, such as firearms, and access to space to confine persons 
against their will are here the key ones. With some exceptions the 
police have acquired a kind of monopoly for solving those tasks partly 
through receiving an overall monopoly of using instruments of force for 
public, civil purposes. 
 
                                                          
101  An important part of that task is of course to investigate and solve crimes already 
committed and bring some to justice.  
102  Even in countries ranking high on any rule of law list, the police in practice are 
making most of the judicial decisions. In Norway all registered decisions 
regarding crimes registered at the police in 1997 were traced and counted by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Norway. The researchers discovered that about 80% 
of the relevant final decisions were made by the police (Stene, 2002). This also 
reflects the amount of rationing performed by the police even after a crime has 
been registered. When corrupt, this ration may yield considerable income for the 
police. 
 4. Policing slums and protecting 
elites 
The task iv) is in many respects the most important one even in 
politically stable societies, although often not visible in them though 
the present scare of terrorists has moved the task more into the public 
foreground also in politically stable countries. To police a few, mostly 
peaceful demonstrations are another aspect of this task. Nevertheless, 
as pointed out in Medina (2007) the shadow of difficult- to- control 
collective actions such as serious political disturbances or the 
imagination of violent rebellions is important for the architecture of the 
state’s violence apparatus even when it is not used for that purpose. In 
a number of countries where instability seems to be a thing of the past, 
they may still keep separate paramilitary police forces specialized in 
handling larger, violent collective actions or larger violent crime 
organizations. 
In Kenya’s case, instability is not a thing of the past, however, and 
its paramilitary force, the GSU, is used quite often in the slums, most 
importantly for macro-policing purposes. The large slums in Nairobi 
are located close to the rulers; a large share of their populations are for 
obvious reasons dissatisfied with their conditions and relatively easy to 
mobilize as can be observed at election times; and they live close to the 
apex of political power. Nevertheless, the police have so far had few 
difficulties to solve the IV) - task of policing the slums, for two major 
reasons: 
a) By being crowded, and unlike rural base areas each slum occupies 
small areas, – under threatening situations they are easy to lock in 
by means of small forces. This was shown by the British during the 
Mau Mau rebellion where they locked in and crushed the slum 
settlements of the time (including the Mathare Valley) in the early 
1950s, by the police in the summer 2007, when they fenced in the 
Kosovo village in Mathare Valley to crush the Mungiki gang’s 
control of that village and surrounding villages. They fenced in the 
major slums again and on a larger scale during the election violence 
in 2007- when both Mathare Valley and the even larger slum of 
Kibera, more rebellious at that moment, was fenced in to prevent 
any large scale movement of slum dwellers towards political 
headquarter. None of these policing tasks proved very difficult in 
2007-2008.  
b) The second reason for the ease of that task is the strong ethnically 
based forms of political collective actions in Kenya. As the slums 
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have grown in size they have by necessity become multi-ethnic, 
which tends to keep much of any mobilization in the slums to turn 
inwards to political enemies inside the slum. This feature created a 
more difficult policing task of containing the intra-slum ethnically 
based violence. 
The displayed incapacity of slum dwellers to constitute any serious 
threat to the public orders outside the slums and the ease of solving the 
iv)-task of policing is an important side of the political economy of the 
Nairobi slums and a reason why the political authorities have felt it 
unnecessary to provide them with much public infrastructure. 
 5. The internal policing of slums 
and the role of their spatial and 
economic characteristics 103 
Slums as sites of political instability as well as their macro police 
control are both related to their economic and social characteristics as 
well as their spatial features. The same set of variable clusters influence 
crime behavior as well as the micro-management of security inside the 
slums, but in different manners. While the macro-policing of slums so 
far has proved easy for the police when ruthless, their detailed inside 
policing has been very difficult, and a ruthless police have proved 
incapable of doing it on their own. The effects of the spatial features as 
well as their economic and social characteristics have on crime 
generation and crime prevention are quite subtle and may switch 
depending on the dominant social organizations inside the particular 
village of which a Nairobi slum is composed. We will first describe 
Mathare Valley and then look at its crime-and police forming spatial 
features from more general points of view.104  
Here maybe about 180 000 people105 are living within less than a 
square kilometer where the houses for the most part is packed too 
closely together to allow access with cars. Sometimes non symmetrical 
paths are leading through the villages and surrounded by shacks and 
structures, but in other cases the path may go straight through a 
structure (a construction where a number of shacks are tied together 
                                                          
103  I will in the following not look closely at the policing of the major property 
relationships of the Mathare slums: the relationship between landownership, the 
house (structure) owners and tenants. The potential for collective actions among 
tenants as well as house owners influences both the external and internal policing 
of the slums. The property relationships are also extremely important for 
explaining the missing infrastructure as well as the extreme low quality of the 
housing in the Kenyan slums (Gulyani, 2012). Since they only once in a while 
manifest themselves as important policing tasks and since they will need more 
extensive elucidation than can be done in this short note in order to be 
understood, I will only briefly touch the policing of class conflicts in the following. 
104  The main reason for choosing to restrict the empirical basis to Mathare Valley is 
that we believe policing to be to a high degree a spatial profession where it is a 
question of controlling many different objects and activities within a given social 
space.  
105  Muungano Support Trust et al. (2012 ). This is according our judgment the best 
estimate of the population size of Mathare Valley, but the estimates vary between 
100 000 and 600 000. The actual level of disagreement may be less, however, 
since exact specification of the area for which the estimate applies, is often 
missing.  
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sharing walls) and may be possibly be blocked or closed by dwellers 
who live in that structure, often at nighttime. Most of the shacks are 
single floored with walls that consist of corrugated iron plates. The 
majority are without windows but with a single door leading into a path 
or to the inside of a structure. When inside a path the feeling of moving 
inside a labyrinth is irresistible. To move around confidently takes time 
to learn. To know it is, of course, a great advantage when policing, 
under eventual conflicts of control or when making a burglary. 
Insiders, however, know their own paths and neighbors rather too 
well. Mutual monitoring is practically impossible to avoid in such 
dense ground level structures. In one of our sampled villages where 
shack structure is dominating, 4B, only 15.8% of the respondents were 
satisfied with their privacy (Diang’a 2011: 218). This structure has also 
other consequences – for contests of the internal space of the slum 
space and for its crime and policing. It is for example obvious that the 
likely effects of the use of firearms may be strongly influenced by 
whether it is performed inside or close to a shack cluster or not.106 If it 
is used, the chance of hitting bystanders is so high that ruthlessness is 
necessary. 
For these and a number of other reasons eventual sites of conflicts 
as well as most economic activities (Dianga, 2011: 226) will tend to 
take place either along the broader paths and the remaining larger 
public spaces internal to or outside the housing clusters. Most men and 
larger children are attracted to those areas outside. Even here it is 
difficult and often impossible to enter unobserved and unnoticed by 
the many local observers. These spatial features have implications for 
the likely crime picture. It is extremely difficult for outsiders to make a 
crime inside the area of narrow paths without any local information. 
Moreover, since most Mathare dwellers are poor, most of the assets 
they possess have little interest except for people equally poor. Locals 
planning a burglary can monitor the local possibilities, knowing when 
people are not at home or about where assets more valuable than 
average are located. Hence, most crimes inside Mathare are likely to be 
performed by locals, former locals or friends of locals. On the other 
hand, the monitoring goes both ways, and it is difficult for insiders not 
to be recognized, so burglaries will be difficult to do singlehanded. The 
last alternative of using an informed friend outside will be helpful, but 
in general it appears difficult to perform burglaries without having 
some form of physical control or permanent instrument of terror to 
threaten the residents in a path. 
                                                          
106  We will later refer to several cases where violent contests between local gangs 
and the police have caused the death of non-involved nearby shack dwellers. 
Whether the intention may be local support or terrorism, may influence the choice 
of weapon used in such contests. 
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Again, this difficulty of outsider access is a feature that simplifies 
the handling of the external (crime) control of the area, but the actual 
solving of any crime demand access to locals. Moreover, these spatial 
features, the mutual monitoring and difficulty in running away act as 
countervailing forces to the expectation of exceptionally high crime 
rates in a slum induced by the local poverty and low degree of house 
protection. 
The outcome is that the rate of victim crimes is quite high in Mathare 
Valley, maybe somewhat above a likely Nairobi average.107 At least 
40% of our respondents reported that they had been victim to at least 
one crime during the last year. While not exceptionally high compared 
to other Nairobi slums and to Nairobi average,108 it indicates that for 
most of the slum dwellers the risks of becoming victim to a crime are 
significant and something to be prepared for. Moreover, the guilty ones 
are likely to reside in the village or cooperating with residents. 
Regarding the question whether shacks are more or less exposed to 
burglary than brick and mortar houses, Stavrou’s investigation (2002: 
29 and 65) indicates a higher exposure for shacks which may be 
connected to his finding that most burglaries in his sample from 
Nairobi are performed by several perpetrators, using violence rather 
than stealth.109  
In addition to victim crimes, slums have some comparative 
advantage as locations of non-victim crimes that may spill over into a 
number of security issues.  
The very density of population and the variety and large number of 
personal and business transaction generate a number of personal and 
business conflicts. Each economic transaction may be small, but when 
poor you can’t afford to lose. A large number of them may not be fully 
legal, which give residents incentives to hide. This density of 
transactions, the crime frequency and all the small and large conflicts 
                                                          
107  A discussion of the likely range of the rate of victim crimes in Kenya is presented 
in Andvig and Barasa (2011). 
108  Ndungu (2010: 104) finds, however, that crime victimization rate in Mathare is 
around average when Mathare is compared to other slums in Nairobi. During the 
past year 44.7% of Mathere respondents had experienced at least one crime 
while 34.1% had done so in Kibera, 47.9% in Mukuru and 58.3% in Korogocho. 
109  Shacks constituted 16% of the respondents’ homes but 26% of the burglaries, 13 
% lived in slums while 19% of the burglaries were committed in slums. 
Interestingly 73% were committed when someone was at home, in 88% of the 
cases the burglars were unknown to the victims. The average size of a burglar 
crew was 5. In 56% of the burglaries violence or threat of violence were used. 
Altogether 28% of the respondents lived in a household that had experienced a 
burglary the last year. Mathare was one of the ten areas most exposed to 
burglary- about 47% had experienced a burglary ‘the last year’ according to 
Stavrou (ibid.: 64). 
Jens C. Andvig and Tiberius Barasa 
 
76 
make the internal space of Mathare Valley difficult to police from the 
outside. Policed from the inside the great mutual visibility between the 
dwellers and their relative lack of privacy cut both ways: it may ease 
the control of the internal public authority persons, but may also to 
some degree enhance their difficulties. If criminal organizations arise, 
the mutual visibility among the residents increases both these 
organizations threat potential and may also in other ways ease their 
potential for control.  
Particularly if the aims of eventual criminal organizations are not to 
live on slum residents, the mutual visibility may contribute in making 
slums having locational advantages as a hiding place for criminals who 
mainly do their work outside. Snitching is easier to discover, the costs 
of the police to enter may be high, and by bringing mainly income into 
the slum rather than victimize the local population, such criminals may 
be treated in the same way as local non-victim crime organizations like 
the local capitalist chang’aa distilleries.  
Moreover, the combination of high densities and mutual visibility 
may give rise or ease the development to a number of strategic 
complementarities we will exploit when trying to explain the village 
variations in crime perpetration and prevention behavior. 
 
 6. The policing system in Mathare 
Valley 
The key public position in the overall policing of Mathare today is not 
any of the nearby police stations, but the ‘Chief’. The chief is supposed 
to act as a general administrator, a kind of prefect (Berman, 1992: 
231), for most of the area; a mixing of the once developed roles of the 
British generalist provincial administrators – the ‘man on the spot’ – 
with the roles of the tribal ‘chiefs’ administering the tribal areas for the 
same colonial administration.110 Being a link in the provincial 
administration a chief is in fact closer to the president power than one 
could expect from his or her rank in the provincial administration and 
is a key link in the power apparatus of the central government.111 He is 
the key person in the state apparatus who is supposed to have control 
of the slum, knowing the main movements inside as well as knowing 
the citizens or foreigners who are entering or departing it. There is only 
one chief for Mathare Valley, but three assistant chiefs.  
The chief’s camps as well as the assistant chiefs’ offices are located 
inside the valley. Unlike a tribal chief, the chief of a slum in Nairobi is 
not attached to the area. He is not supposed to live in the same area as 
the area he is chief for and to leave it after a couple of years. Nairobi 
chiefs are following much the same rotation policy as police officers in 
the Kenya Police Service. To become a chief one must have higher 
grades from completed high school than the one demanded for 
becoming a police officer, sufficient to be allowed university entrance. 
Outside the slum to a chief is not any high status white collar job. 
Unlike the case for the police, there is no specific chief education, only 
on the job training. 
Mathare Valley is divided into about 13 villages (See the appended 
map). For each village the chief appoints a chairman and a group of 
elders after consultation with people from the village in an open 
meeting. The chair (wo)man and the elders live for the most part in 
their village, also at night time, have lived there for long time and 
possess detailed local knowledge. Their administration of the villages is 
                                                          
110  A slum is in several ways ruled differently from the regular urban space, 
reminiscent of how tribal areas were ruled under the British. An analysis of how 
the dual ruling system of colonial powers was continued after independence is 
made in Mamdani (1996), but he did not discuss the specifics of the Kenyan 
experience or the specifics of slum administration. 
111  So far are the chiefs not relocated under county administration that might have 
been logical under the new constitution. 
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multi- stranded and involves most aspects of villagers’ life.112 Although 
they are appointed by the chief and have fairly time-consuming and 
sometimes risky tasks, they receive no formal payment from the 
government, but are in a good position to receive some share in the 
informal payments the chiefs receive from house owners, tenants from 
NGOs and other visitors to their villages. They are the key brokers that 
connect the formal and informal policing and justice systems for the 
villages in Mathare Valley. 
It is through cooperation among the chief and chairman/elders and 
not the police that eventual solutions to most interpersonal conflicts 
that may arise in Mathare, even the ones that become violent. Hence, 
task i) is removed from the police’s responsibilities. While the chiefs are 
not allowed to carry weapons, they have in practice some temporary 
arresting powers. At the head chief’s camp in Mabatini (one of the 
villages in Mathare Valley) there are two smaller units of 
Administration Police that may be allowed to carry firearms with some, 
but with restricted arresting powers.113 In some cases the village 
chairman may be able to mobilize youth groups to make provisional 
informal arrests until the ‘arrested’ person is handed over to the police. 
For the ruling of the area the conflicts between tenants and shack 
owners are particularly pertinent and may drag the chief into detailed 
management of the geographical space of the slum. It also creates 
opportunities for rent extraction.114 The chief (and sometimes also the 
chairmen/elders prospects for rent extraction has over the long haul 
made deep impacts of the architecture of the Nairobi slums and 
contributed to their housing density and their labyrinthine looks. Any 
new structure built may contribute to the income of the chief and 
elders. More importantly, from our point of view that focus on crime, is 
that the chief/chairman decision clusters have a deep administrative 
                                                          
112  It is, for example, impossible for researchers to do any surveys in Mathare Valley 
without permission from the chief and acceptance from the relevant chairperson 
in the involved villages. This is known by the respondents. Hence, it is not 
possible to make a strictly random sampling where respondents’ responses are 
strictly independent. This is likely to affect the results. If the signals emitted by 
the chiefs/elders that accompany the various research efforts differ, so are the 
likely results. 
113  The Administration Police is another carry-over of the British dual administration. 
Its origin was related to the role of tribal chiefs. Administration police officers 
were supposed to be the strongmen of the tribal chiefs’ administration. The 
difference in the set of tasks assigned to the Administration Police and the regular 
Kenya Police Service has declined and plans to fuse them have been made at 
several occasions. At present the Administration Pole are relatively more 
important in Nairobi’s irregular settlements than in the rest of the city. 
114  A large, quantitative investigation into this process emphasizing the effects of 
ethnic matching between chiefs, structure owners and tenants on rent extraction 
in Kibera has been recently been published (Marx et al, 2013). In a companion 
work we will look more closely into this aspect of the chiefs’ and thereby the 
state’s administrative control of slum areas in Kenya. 
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interests in guarding the housing and households conditions and 
watch conflicts closely, an interest that may or may not be reinforced 
by their own private economic interest in the outcomes. In any case 
they will be informed about rent conflicts and attempts of land 
grabbing inside the area. The information accessed through the 
handling of housing conflicts, the coming and leaving of new tenants 
and the myriad of other interpersonal conflicts, is likely to spill over 
when these decision and information clusters (chief/assistant 
chief/chairman/elders) are handling crime. There are likely to be 
increasing returns to scope to the number of different sector 
involvements when ruling or policing these fairly socially closed 
areas.115  
When a resident in Mathare Valley has been a victim to crime, she 
will not and is not supposed to contact the police directly. She will 
contact the chairman or an elder. Then he and the victim may resolve 
the crime in the same way as an interpersonal conflict, or he may call 
the chief or the nearest assistant chief. Again the case may be resolved 
through cooperation between the victim, the chairman and the 
assistant chief, maybe involving neighbors. Or the chief may call the 
police, preferably the Administration Police located at the chief’s camp. 
In more serious cases –like murder – the assistant chief may contact 
the regular police directly. – We see here that the semi-public system of 
the chairman-chief cluster shoulder a large share of police tasks. They 
investigate the crime, locate the guilty, may sometime return the stolen 
asset and ration the cases that eventually are brought to the attention 
of the regular police which have the monopoly of formally registering 
crimes116 and bringing the subset of those further to the courts. Neither 
chiefs nor the Administration Police have such rights nor do they have 
the same formal arresting powers. The chief-chairmen conflict-
resolution clusters may also, as implied, work like an informal 
judiciary.117 
                                                          
115  The importance of returns to scope for the ruling of an area has been analyzed in 
another context by Gambetta (1993) where he showed how the Sicilian Mafia 
supply of private protection could also generate decreased costs and increased 
efficiency and profits as the number of sectors and individuals protected 
increased within a high crime, socially interlinked area. Public policing inside 
high crime, low trust slums are likely to show some of the same features, 
although it may not appropriate any private increasing returns when the public 
officials are non-corrupt.  
116  The police are likely to do severe rationing of actual crimes in their registration 
procedures. If not, a police officer in Kenya would only handle about one criminal 
case a year according to the official crime statistics, as observed in Andvig and 
Barasa (2011). 
117  When we did our 150 respondent questionnaires November 2012 it was only one 
of our four focus villages, Mashimoni, where the police were reported to be the 
‘major security provider’. Checking for an explanation we were told that at that 
time the village chairman insisted that the village dwellers should report real 
crime incidents directly to the police, not go through the chairman- assistant 
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Sometimes the residents resolve the matters on their own, and at 
times violently so through more or less spontaneous vigilante actions 
without any formal involvement of any elder. In this case it is not 
initially brought into the public policing system – neither through the 
chief nor the police except if the suspected thief is killed. Then it will 
definitely become a case for both the chief and the police. When 
information about forms of crime that may inspire such vigilante 
actions and they take place in villages where such forms of action are 
common, the police will seek to act quickly. Vigilante killings are 
delicate and time consuming matters.  
So what are the relationships of the regular police to the policing of 
Mathare? While they do some regular patrolling of the villages – most 
of the times driving in a police car on the couple of roads that are 
(barely) accessible by car in Mathare Valley and mostly at day time, 118 
they otherwise have little contact with the slum dwellers in their living 
quarters. The police do not collect bribes from the households for 
eventually providing protection against crime, but they do so from 
business operations that are located in solid structures, or need to 
operate at late hours or selling illegal goods.119 Here the larger illegal, 
moonshine or chang’aa distilleries are of special interest since they 
both historically and at present play an important role in both the 
economic, crime and policing patterns in the valley.  
Otherwise many police officers may charge minor bribes to respond 
to for victim crimes, but as indicated above this appears to be rare since 
the police are mainly called upon for sorting internal valley crime 
issues when these are of major kinds such as murder or larger arson 
incidents. In addition to the collection from the enterprises, most of the 
bribe income for the police in Mathare Valley (as elsewhere) is through 
extortion connected to its arresting power. This income may become 
considerable although the residents are mostly poor, but the police 
have at times a high propensity to kill in the area partly because of the 
high degree of the perceived danger and hostility shown to the police. 
When the political and social tensions increase in the area, it will also 
make police work more dangerous and make the extortion rates to 
increase.120 
                                                          
chief- link. This was interpreted more as due to laziness than as a principled stand 
on the part of the chairmen. When we returned in March 2014, a new chairman 
had been appointed/elected.  
118  During the last time we visited Mathare Valley we were informed that the nearby 
police stations cooperated in sending night patrols through some of the highest 
crime risk areas due to increased tensions in the 3C village. 
119  We were informed that the standard rate for this service (or bribe) is 100 Ksh per 
day, i.e. about 3 000Ksh per month. The payers may expect to receive faster 
response than when ordinary victim crimes are reported to the police. 
120  We did not do any systematic study of police corruption in Mathare Valley, but in 
Andvig and Barasa (2010) we study the relative role of extortion to explain the 
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The fact that the police only interfere in slums like Mathare when 
major crimes are committed and their lack of incentives for engaging 
households, means that the police have few opportunities for 
cumulating knowledge of the area. The possibilities that the chiefs 
have in gaining increasing returns to scope through daily involving in 
various sectors and forms of conflict are missing It does not help that 
the police officers’ rotation rules do not allow them to stay long in the 
area. Moreover, the responsibility to intervene in case of serious crimes 
is shared among several local police stations. A deeper reason for the 
difficulties the police have when intervening in the Valley, is the 
general distrust of that agency that is ruling among the residents, a 
distrust having long historical roots, but fed by frequent incidences of 
corruption and unnecessary violent behavior among the police, 
confirming the distrust and the wisdom of not providing the police with 
too much information. – Part of that information is collected in the 
chairman-chief clusters, so most of the time the police like all other 
outsiders have to rely on them in order to intervene in the more serious 
crime tasks which remains the monopoly of the armed police.
                                                          
high rate of corruption victimization due to the police in Kenya. When social 
tensions increase such as during the Mungiki killings by the police in 2007, the 
credibility threats of being killed when incarcerated increases and the willingness 
to pay for being released from jail or not being arrested increases considerably. 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2008: 37) reports that during this 
period of police killings an extortion racket at Muthaiga police station – one of the 
police stations active in Mathare Valley was collecting Ksh 400 000 – a week from 
victims in Mathare North, a neighboring slum to Mathare Valley.  
 7. Short description of four 
neighboring villages in Mathare 
Valley121 
Looking from the outside the four villages we choose to study more 
closely, 3C, 4B, Mashimoni and Mabatini, look quite similar. Their 
architecture are dominated by densely packed single-floor shacks, 
mostly composed of corrugated iron plates and sprinkled by a few 
multi-store residential houses, some public buildings and along the 
southern edges, a few solid business plants. The visible difference in 
income levels appears not to be large; most residents in all of them are 
poor.122  
                                                          
121  In the first part of the research which this paper is based on, we first took a fairly 
small representative sample (but large enough for making judgments on Mathare 
Valley only as a whole) of about 150 households from 9 villages) where we asked 
respondents for information about a broad set government supplies of public 
services and infrastructure, including security services. In connection with the 
latter we also asked about their experiences as crime victims. In this 
questionnaire we could not go as much in detail about the kinds of crime their 
induced economic loss and much other crime specific information due to the 
broadness of the issues we had to cover. Analyzing the responses to the different 
security questions we had asked about, we found strikingly different views and 
experiences from four spatially close villages in Mathare Valley where we had at 
least 25 observations for each: 3C, 4B, Mashimoni and Mabatini. This 
questionnaire study was made in November 2012. To explore whether these 
village differences were random or not, we had not resources to replicate the 
study with larger number of respondents so we chose to investigate whether the 
differences were recognized by well-informed people in the villages themselves 
who would know the area much better than it would normally be possible for any 
outsider to do, researchers or not. Accordingly we interviewed 8 knowledgeable 
informants (assistant chiefs, chairmen and elders) about the difference in security 
situations in the four villages in February, March 2014. They were interviewed 
separately and we did not use any focus groups. We used a separate question 
sheets for the chiefs/assistant chiefs who have cross-village responsibilities and 
the chairmen/elders who only have a village responsibility.  
122  The large Muungano Support Trust (2012: 22) survey reports significantly 
different average income levels across these villages, however, but they are 
difficult to trust. For example, while the reported monthly income in 4B was Ksh 
9 282, it was 6 767 in Mabatini. That is, residents in 4B seem to earn 30% more. 
On the other hand the respondents 4B reported to spend Ksh 5 775 on food, while 
in Mabatini they told that they spent Ksh 9 600. That is, people in 4B appear to 
afford only to spend 60% on food of what people in Mabatini could. Given the 
income levels we are considering here, the answers to these questions are 
obviously inconsistent. If we may trust our visual impressions, the housing in 3C 
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4B is located at the north side of the Mathare River with access from 
Thika road over difficult to drive dirt roads. The key part of the village 
slides down through fairly steep paths towards the river. One 
footbridge across Mathare River is connecting 4B to 3C. 3C like the 
other villages are located at the south side of the river with access from 
Juja road that borders the whole settlement from the south side. Close 
to Juja Road they are fairly flat, but slides down –in parts steeply so – 
towards the river. Along Juja road there is located a number of business 
activities and bus stops that connect Mathare Valley to the outside 
world while Thika Road is more like an autostrada with few local 
business and transport activities. 
According to 2009 census Mabatini has only somewhat more than 
1000 residents, while the other three villages have around 5 000. 
These are likely to be underestimates and we may roughly multiply 
each with two to get closer to the real number of residents. 
                                                          
appeared somewhat more solid – on average – so we would expect respondents 
there on average to be slightly better off.  
 8.  Crime and crime control in 
Mathare Valley: victimization 
crimes 
In the case of victimization crimes some citizens are hurt in a direct and 
visible way either corporally or economically or both. Their human or 
property rights or both are violated. Other citizens gain from acquiring 
other people’s property. Prospective victims may seek to protect 
themselves individually or collectively. Collective organization may be 
either based on pure collective actions or may be based on delegation. 
Prospective predators may do likewise: Either seek to take other 
people’s property each on his own or organize themselves into gangs. 
(Delegation appears here more rarely.) In both cases instruments of 
violence may be a precondition for success. For a single individual 
criminal insider it is difficult to apply it, however, without increasing 
the risks of being recognized. Hence, it difficult to perform violent 
crimes successfully for an inhabitant of an area where considerable 
mutual monitoring is taking place – such as in a slum or in the 
countryside. When organized on the other hand, recognition may not 
be so risky, and may even be sought, since a group of criminals may 
become able to control an area precisely through use of violence.  
Protection of private property is one of the major tasks of the state 
not at least in a market economy like Kenya’s. The main institution that 
is entrusted that task in a traditionally organized modern state is the 
police. To be able to achieve it, the police will need instruments of 
violence, and in a traditionally organized state it is entrusted with a 
monopoly of legitimate use of violence (including its eventual 
delegation to non-state agencies) for use against and for the protection 
of the inhabitants of an area under its control. If criminals are 
unorganized, police would not need to be organized in larger groups to 
keep control, and if they only apply light weapons, the police would 
not need their weapons to be heavy either. The standard perception is 
that crime levels in slums in Nairobi are monotonically high in general, 
and in Mathare Valley in particular. Ndungu (2010: 104) finds, 
however, that crime victimization rate in Mathare is around average 
when Mathare is compared to other slums in Nairobi. During the past 
year 44.7% of  Mathere respondents had experienced at least one crime 
while 34.1% had done so in Kibera, 47.9% in Mukuru and 58.3% in 
Korogocho. Moreover this is not an exceptionally high rate when 
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compared with victimization rates for Nairobi as a whole from a 
number studies. 123  
In our own survey from Mathare Valley we found a slightly lower 
rate than Ndungu, 61 out of 151 respondents, that is 40.4%, had been 
a victim of crime, but this was not any larger difference than we would 
expect since we had a rather share of female respondents than Ndungu 
and given the high variation in outcomes for such victimization studies. 
Looking more closely into the intra-settlement variation in reported 
victimization rates in conjunction with information about the crime 
perpetrators and security providers, it is likely that the crime rates are 
influenced by a number of quite localized factors that are missing out 
when crime experiences are aggregated over larger slum areas. The 
outcomes as well as the forms of the various state interventions into the 
different contests between the crime making and crime avoiding slum 
dwellers differ according to how these two sides are organized, which 
appear quite localized and seem to vary between the different villages 
in the Mathare Valley settlement.  
The villages we look into here are 3C, 4B, Mashimoni and Mabatini. 
Some of the demographics and geographical locations have been 
described in the preceding. 3C and 4B are neighboring villages, but 
divided by Mathare River. There is a bridge connecting them though. 
Mashimoni and Mabatini are cut off from 3C by no 10 ( where we have 
no respondents and have done no research) and located about 2-300 
meters to the east of 3 C and 4B, but close to each other. We note that 
the ethnic composition across the villages vary, but that the popular 
image of Mathare Valley as a kikuyu-dominated slum is likely to be 
incorrect. Only in village 3C are they in the majority: 
                                                          
123  This will not directly contradict any popular perception of Mathare as a location 
with an exceptional large fraction of criminals – this study cannot catch eventual 
export of crime acts, that is, criminal acts performed by Mathare residents outside 
Mathare. Seen from a residents’ point of view such acts may be considered in the 
same category as non-victim crimes. The characteristics of Mathare such as 
mutual monitoring may potentially assist such export of crime. Eye-witnesses may 
attest to local fears as well as admiration of successful local criminals robbing 
victims in rich neighborhoods.  
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Table 1 Ethnic sample composition of selected villages124  
 
Tribe/language 3C  4B Mashimoni Mabatini 
Kikuyu/Meru 14 0 1 3 
Luhya  4 5 10 12 
Luo 3 17 7 1 
Kamba 3 2 7 10 
Kuria 1 1 0 0 
 
In our sample the average stay of respondents in 3C is the longest (23.5 
years) and in 4B the shortest (8 years while in Mabatini and Mashimoni 
it is 12 and 15 years).125 We should in particular note the difference in 
composition of the neighboring 3C and 4B. Differences in ethnic 
composition particular with respect to Luos and Kikuyus are likely to 
have consequences for both the ease of cross-village expansion of 
eventual gangs and for cooperation between local village security 
providers. 
The police are the main official security provider with responsibility 
for the whole settlement. The two main police stations with officers that 
most frequently enter Mathare Valley are Pangani police station with 
easiest access from Juja Road and Muthaiga Station that is close to 
Thika road, but apparently no station has sole responsibility for the 
settlement. In addition the police on active duty are rotated and are 
unlikely to possess fine-grained knowledge about the slum and its 
villages. Most patrolling appears to be done by car which implies that 
most of the village areas will be outside their purview since there are 
few streets that are wide enough to allow. According to our 
respondents the police don’t collect bribes systematically among 
residents for supplying security. This may not be surprising 
Table 2. Main perceived crime perpetrator group if any: # Respondents 
 
Crime 
perpetrator 
3C  4B126 Mashimoni Mabatini 
Neighbors 2 2 17 5 
Internal gang 23 11 1 0 
External gang 0 11 3 10 
None 0 0 0 12 
                                                          
124  The visit to Mathare was made in November 2012. The sample size was 25 for 
each village except for Mabatini where we had 26 respondents. Efforts were made 
to avoid having respondents living too close to each other. It was taken at daytime 
so women were overrepresented and the crime rate then to be slightly 
underestimated. Village sizes were around 5 000 except for Mabatini (see Table 
1.). 
125  Note that our results may be biased here since we visited only at daytime. (We 
believe that the bias may on average make us overestimate the length of stay). 
126  One respondent claimed he/she didn´t know. 
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Table 3:# of respondents experienced crime or feeling unsafely 
 
 3C  4B Mashimoni Mabatini 
Experienced  12 13 7 4 
Unsafe 25 12 6 7 
 
Table 4 Perceived main security providers and expressed security satisfaction 
 
Main provider 3C  4B Mashimoni Mabatini 
Police 3 4 10 4 
Chief 2 3 6 4 
Neighbor group 0 2 4 24 
Elder/chairman 1 13 3 2 
None 19 ? 0 0 
unsatisfied 25 14 11 9 
 
The ethnic composition of the villages varies considerably, which may 
have important consequences for their policing, crime patterns and 
ruling. The local beliefs are that 3C is dominated by Kikuyus, 4B by 
Luos while the ethnic composition of the other two villages is more 
evenly mixed. These beliefs were confirmed by our small samples: in 
4B our sample included 17 Luos (out of a sample of 25) and no Kikuyu, 
in 3C we had 14 Kikuyus and 3 Luos while in Mashimoni we had 10 
Luhyas, 7 Kambas and 7 Luos and in Mabatini 12 Luhyas and 10 
Kambas. The once commonly held belief that the Mathare Valley is 
habited by the Kikuyus appears to be wrong, however, belonging to 
history. For our four villages together we had sampled 31 Luhyas, 28 
Luos, 22 Kambas and only 18 Kikuyu/Meru.  
Particularly relevant for the distribution of crime patterns among the 
villages is the difference in the ethnic composition of the neighboring 
3C and 4B. Conflicts here often reach the newspapers and seem to 
reappear when political tensions evolve nationally.127  
                                                          
127  Just before our research group arrived in November 2012, Voice of Mathare 
(October 31, 2012 tells that the night before a ‘raid’ was organized by Mathare 4B 
members hunting for a thief from 3C who had stolen a television in 4B and who 
was believed to be a member of a small gang, called Shantit. The outcome of the 
raid is not described, but after we left the area, a more serious sequence of events 
took place: a man from 4B was stabbed to death when walking through 3C. 
Witnesses from 3C described him as a thug, but it was more likely that he was 
perceived to be a police informer. The aa group of 20 or more from 4B burned 
down 30 shacks that caused one death. Residents from 3C revenged the action 
and stabbed three more from 4B, who again retaliated by burning down 20 shacks 
in 3C. In a raid where one man was burned to death. The raiders had closed the 
doors before they put on the fire. A summary of the story is published in Daily 
Nation (January 10, 2013). 
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The public crime prevention systems were (in November 2012) and 
are (March 2014) the same for all villages with two exceptions. While 
the Muthaiga police station is mainly responsible for 4B, Pangani 
police station is closest to the other villages and is mainly responsible 
for them. The division of responsibilities is not strict, however, so 
police from both stations as well as from Huruma Administration Police 
Post may intervene in the area. Moreover, the Assistant Chief who is 
responsible for 4B is not responsible for the other three villages that 
have a different Assistant Chief. The head chief is shared by all, 
however. His camp is located in Mabatini, at the south-east corner of 
the settlement with access from Juja Road. In his camp are located two 
smaller Administration Police units that are more frequently called 
upon in minor incidences, or when the administrators will need 
protection.
 9. Village variations in crime and 
policing patterns: random 
variation or hidden structures? 
Despite the strong similarity in both architecture – the dominance of 
single floor shacks that facilitate mutual monitoring among residents 
and the shared difficulty in penetrating their narrow paths inside – the 
poverty levels and the formal crime prevention structure; the crime 
patterns as well as the crime prevention behaviors and the dominant 
concerns about crime among the village dwellers vary strongly across 
the villages. Or so our questionnaire data suggest. 
With respect to experiences of victim crimes 3C and 4B were clearly 
the ones most exposed. About 50% of the respondents in 3C (12 of 15) 
and 4B (13 of 25) reported that they had been victim to at least one 
crime during the last year. Mashimoni was in an intermediate position 
where about 30% (7 of 25) with recent crime experiences while 
Mabatini clearly was the least hard hit where about 15% of the 
respondents ( 4 of 26) told that they had been victim to at least one 
crime the last year. Given the small samples these differences could 
have been random.  
The pattern of experienced crime is, however, supported by the 
distribution of the feelings of fears of crime expressed by the 
respondents: While about one of four expressed felt unsafe in Mabatini 
and Mashimoni about half of respondents did so in 4B, everyone (25 of 
25) in 3C expressed fear. When we later asked the knowledgeable 
informants about the ranking of the crime problem across the four 
villages, all ranked it the same way. They all claimed that it was 
something special with 3C. That was the village with serious crime 
problems. And they believed security in Mabatini was the best together 
with the upper part of Mashimoni that borders Mabatini. Lower down 
towards the river the crime issue of Mashimoni was more serious. 
Several of our respondents to the first questionnaire informed us that a 
major reason for moving to Mabatini was the higher degree of security 
of the village.  
An obvious explanation of the low crime rate in Mabatini could be 
that the chief’s camp with its contingents of Administration Police is 
located in that village. This is too simple, however. Looking at what 
respondents in Mabatini reported as their major security provider it was 
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not either the police (4 of 26) or the chief (4), but by a clear majority 
they emphasized the neighborhood groups (24 of 26).128  
The only village that judged the police to be the major security 
provider was Mashimoni (10 of 25), and here the chief was also 
important (6). If we divide the security providers into security provided 
by the state (chief + police) and security provided by the community 
itself (neighborhood groups + chairman/elders) Mashimoni was the 
only village where the respondents considered the state representatives 
to be the most important. 129When we later probed why the police and 
chief were considered as more important as security providers than 
elsewhere, we were explained that the chairman at that time did not 
follow the standard lines of reporting crimes and insisted that the 
Mashimoni residents should report any crime to the police and not 
bother him. Hence the police became important. 
In 4B again, opinions regarding the role of the various potential 
security providers differed. Here it was the chairman/elders who were 
considered the most important (13) while the chief (3) and police (4) 
were set in the backseat. A likely explanation is that the chairman had 
organized a permanent youth group that allowed him to control people 
caught in a criminal act before eventually bringing them to the police 
for arrest.  
The 3C opinions regarding security provisions were somber. The 
large majority (19 of 25) told they had no security providers at all. This 
reinforced grimness expressed when we asked whether people felt safe. 
We remember that in 3C none of the respondents had felt safe. 
Not only varied the villages with respect to rate of crime occurrences 
and beliefs regarding how they were policed. The beliefs regarding who 
were the main crime perpetrators also differed widely. In Mashimoni 
                                                          
128  When asked about what the respondents considered their main security providers 
we listed several alternatives and allowed them to underline more than one 
alternative, although we asked about the major one. –That is we allow more 
reported major security providers than respondents.  
129  The view from our four villages that the police play only a minor role for security 
provision seems to be held more generally. In a World Bank study of two other 
slums in Nairobi: Korogocho and Viwandani (World Bank, 2010: 234) where the 
respondents were asked to name the three groups that are ‘doing the best job in 
reducing crime and violence in the community’, only 4.4% of the respondents in 
Korogocho mentioned Kenya Police and 6.5% the Administration Police while 
70.5% referred to ‘vigilante groups’ as doing the best job. 10.5% mentioned the 
local chief/assistant chief. Viwandani too had vigilante groups as the most 
important security provider, but less so than the respondents in Korogocho. 
Otherwise they held the Administration police in higher esteem as they also did 
the ‘neighborhood organizations’. It is worth noting that the meaning of ‘vigilante 
group’ is not clear. It may embrace security provision made by local gangs, or ad 
hoc or permanent neighborhood groups using violence. 
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most believed that the main perpetrators were ‘dishonest neighbors’ 
(17 of 25). In Mabatini many believed that there were not any crime 
perpetrators worth mentioning at all (12 of 26), but many believed that 
members of an external gang caused much of the crime (10). In 4B the 
opinion was divided between ‘external gang’ (11) and ‘internal gang’ 
(11). In 3C respondents were not in doubt. The main perpetrators 
belonged to internal gang(s) (23 of 25). 
Exploring whether these varied patterns of perceived perpetrators, 
security providers and raters of crime experiences across villages were 
due to chance or reflected patterns that people knowing the area were 
aware of, we asked the local well-informed informants ( March 2014) 
about the different village patterns that seemed to arise from our 
questionnaire data from 2012. It became clear that there had indeed 
existed a somewhat larger gang in 3C by November 2012, but opinions 
about whether any ‘gang’ was operating at present were a little 
divided.130 The gang that operated at that time had considerable 
influence on the chairman of 3C who even had gone so far that he in 
secret recorded meetings between the chairmen and the chiefs in the 
area that dealt with policing of the area and transmitted that 
information to gang members. Hence, they had had no security 
providers at the time. That chairman was then removed by the chief, 
the next one was ’cut’ and made harmless from the gang point of view, 
but the present one appears successful although a kind of gang is still 
present in 3C, having about 30 members. 4B had a strong chairman 
with a youth group he was in control of. Mabatini and Mashimon had 
lower crime rates at the same time as going together with neighborhood 
actions while they shred both chief and police. How to explain this 
variation?
                                                          
130  Here we should note that like a vigilante group, the use of the term gang may vary 
and be more or less strict. For example having a gang like Mungiki in mind, none 
of the present ‘gangs’ could be considered to be a gang. We will in the following 
use less strict criteria in terms of size and organizational capabilities when 
designate a collection of individuals as a ‘gang’. 
 10. The gang(s) in 3C: do they and 
their history explain the 
variation?  
One way to explain the variation in crime experiences is to look at 
village 3C as an epicenter of the crime. Here at least one active gang is 
operating and according to our respondents in 3C is the main 
perpetrator of crimes in that village. All over Mathare Valley 3C is 
considered part of an area (including the neighboring 3A –Bondeni) 
that locates criminals who are perceived to be involved in crime in the 
other villages (and sometimes in crime in Kenya at large).131 The crime 
rates as well as crime worries appear to decline with the distance to 3C. 
If the gang behavior in 3c is explained and is crime stimulating, then 
an important part of the variation may be explained by the distance 
from the epicenter.  
Let us first note that this area has a history of gang formation. One 
important historical legacy was the larger chang’aa distilleries that had 
been located at the 3C side of the river, being an important and old 
source of income. Non-victim crime is normally an important stimulant 
to organized crime since the markets for illegal products and services 
will need some quasi-legal protection which again may demand some 
illegal use of organized force.132 Based on field work from 2005 and 
long stays in Mathare, van Stapele (2007) describes how the Mungiki 
gang moved into the area from the mid-1990s and took partly control 
of it; recruiting also a number of local supporters and members.133 Its 
                                                          
131  One of our informants told us that recently ‘seven boys from 3C’ had been killed 
by the police in Western Kenya, an event that signaled to the informant that a 
Kikuyu-based gang from that village had developed a network in the Luo-
dominated 4B village. 
132  Our informants denied that the owners of distillers employed gang members for 
major tasks at present, except the minor one of keeping honest police officers out 
of the village by stone throwing. Before Mungiki arrived, it appears that the illegal 
protection services for the distillers were mostly supplied corruptly by state 
employees, police officers and sometimes the chief/chairman/elders clusters. 
Given the large number of residents involved in the chang’aa trade, it would have 
been difficult for the latter to repress distillation. Police officers were in a better 
position to squw\eese the owner, since they had a reputation for indiscriminate 
use of violence anyway. 
133 We could also go further back to the early 1970s where the Kanu youth did many of 
the tasks in Mathare (cf. Hake, 1979: 152-153) that Mungiki later did, but was of 
course under more political control and received only small compensation for 
their protection work. Like Mungiki the Kanu youth could switch between 
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ideology was to a large extent based on old Kikuyu religion and 
notions. The links back to the Mau Mau movement were clearly 
articulated. In this context it meant that the gang could expand more 
easily into the Kikuyu dominated parts like 3C. Moreover, having an 
articulated ideology assisted the movement in becoming more 
disciplined and larger than if its single aim had been to generate 
income for its leaders and members. In the villages of Mathare, like 3C, 
where it had at least partial control, it did regular night patrolling, 
provided security against thieves and burglars, tried to contain 
alcoholism, and for this they charged 30Ksh a month from each 
household (ibid.: 91). While van Stapele was not able to get to know in 
any detailed way how the protection fees were collected, but their 
existence presupposed some central administrative control to prevent 
gang members to collect more than once from the same household and 
the protection money somehow had to be brought to a center and then 
redistributed. So the collectors could receive some remuneration for 
their efforts.  
At the very least Mungiki members would also have to be prevented 
from stealing from the households that paid the fees. That is, discipline 
was necessary.134 Stealing also went down according to van Stapele’s 
informants. More or less gradually it increased its local power getting 
involved in a myriad of local conflicts (like the chief/chairmen clusters) 
catching increasing returns to scope. Some of them brought income. 
Members of Mungiki solved non-member debt conflicts at the same 
time as some members lent out money at high interest, which they 
could safely do, being backed up by an organization with so strong 
violence potential. In 2002 Mungiki took control of the public toilet 
from a local multi-tribal gang (ibid.:92), and people either had to pay 
the Mungiki gang 2-5 Ksh per usage or 50Ksh per month. Mungiki took 
also control of local (illegal) electricity supply (250Kah per month) and 
water (100Ksh per month). None of these income sources brought them 
into direct conflicts with the police, however. Protection or extortion 
money from local business did. 
Around 2005 the Mungiki security charges were 50Ksh for small 
businesses per month, 100Ksh for a small chang’aa café, 200 Ksh for a 
larger one. A kiosk at the main road had to pay 1000 Ksh per week.135 
                                                          
supporting the slum dwellers and the structure owners. 3C is not the only village 
of the Kikuyu-dominated part of the Mathare Valley where Mungiki once had 
strong influence, and where present gangs are likely to operate. A famous center 
for drug trade and trade in stolen goods, Nigeria,(Daily Nation , September 11, 
2012) is located in Village 2/3B. The multi-story housing village Mlango Kubwa 
(the former Village 1) is said to be a center for renting firearms (Daily Nation, April 
18, 2013). 
134  Apparently they were also quite successful in a period. The main informant to van 
Stapele told (ibid.89) that Mungiki ‘have reduced robbery and rape to zero’. 
135 The information about the rates charged by Mungiki in Bondeni (and thereby also 
3C) is based on van Stapele (2007: 91). Most of her assessments are pretty close 
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To start a bus route from a Mungiki-controlled bus station, demanded a 
one time fee of 20 000 to 60 000 Ksh, and a daily protection rates of 
200/300 Ksh. Moreover, through its evolving control of the matatu 
industry it could supply some of the local youths paid jobs. But these 
were areas where also the police were also charging extortion fees. 
Serious and violent conflicts arose. 
A local conflict about extortion claims triggered the final, brutally 
imprecise police action where Mungiki’s control of the area was 
broken. 136 In that action the Mungiki controlled villages were fenced in 
by about 500 police officers, mostly the paramilitary GSU. 30 to 80 
residents were killed, mostly by the police; not all were Mungiki 
members. The local economic conflicts between the police force and 
Mungiki were, of course, not the main reason for the police action. 
Mungiki was a national organization that not only threatened the 
state’s control of some slums, but also its control of the roads.  
From our point of view, the main point of interest is that as a 
disciplined gang, coming from the outside , but through recruiting 
some local youths and then systematically policing the area, Mungiki 
could reduce crime levels and transfer some income from property 
owners to asset-poor youths (and to the organization). In order to 
achieve that, it combined extreme forms of violence with local presence 
where it tapped the rich sources of information the informal 
settlements made available to insiders. Again, the ease of mutual 
monitoring made possible by the dense population and the shack 
architecture made privacy so difficult. It was so difficult to hide from 
rulers, when they were like Mungiki present inside. By excessive use of 
terror, Mungiki lost support. 
While Mungiki now has been broken for a while, its former rule is 
likely to have some bearings on present gang formations and crime 
rates. First of all, its extensive use of violent instruments is likely to 
                                                          
to other assessments referred to in different newspaper sources from the period. 
The rates were changing all the time and were adjusted to income needs of the 
organization and its power to fix them. Regarding chang’aa cafes and distilleries 
Mungiki vacillated between wanting to close them down or to tax them, but wisely 
choose to tax them most of the time. van Stapele does not give any rates for the 
charge on the larger, capitalist distilleries along the river. The charge for a kiosk 
at the Juja Road she mentions is higher than in the other sources , but not so far 
from the police extortion rates today (100Ksh per day). 
136  According to the blog Kumekucha (July 24, 2007: 
http://kumekucha1.blogspot.com/2007/07/mathare-killing-fields-untold-story-
of_24.html). June 4, 2007 three policemen new to the area had been going to their 
nightly collection of protection fees inside Mathare Valley. On the trip they 
demanded 500Ksh from the female owner of a chang’aa den the lady had already 
paid 300Ksh to Mungiki and complained to them. The police officers had not been 
told about the agreements with Mungiki, and two of the three police officers were 
immediately killed. 
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have socialized and brought knowledge of the use of violence and its 
potential source of income for new cohorts of ‘criminals’. This 
socialization to violence appears to have been reinforced by persistence 
in police behavior. On the one side police are afraid to enter the 3C and 
the whole .Bondeni area, and try to avoid it in many cases, but when 
they do, they tend to do it violently.137 Teachers in the area, for 
example, have to adjust to the fact that when the police enter the area, 
the police before they enter the village begin by throwing some teargas. 
The school for that reason will be evacuated for about ten times a year. 
(Carr, 2013: 195). When having to intervene the regular police often go 
in with GSU, expecting that firearms will be used, and are ready to 
initiate shooting on their own. 
One reason for the ease of gang formation in the 3C village may be 
the predominance of Kikuyu residents, particularly as they are 
neighbors to 4B with its clear Luo dominance, which both ease the 
creation of gang identity and necessitates the need for performing 
organized violence and some felt need for gang protection against 
residents with the opposite identity by ordinary slum dwellers. 138  
In a number of works dealing with the older history of Mathare – 
and 3C is part of the older structure – a number of investigators such as 
Nelson (1978, 1979), have pointed out how male youth have lost most 
of their economic roles in that community. Moreover Kikuyu families 
may also have less cohesion, being more ‘modern’, who may make 
male youth to bond into multi-purpose groups rather than with the 
family, groups that may turn to criminal activities. 
The 3C gang(s) at present has none of the fixed structure or cohesion 
and discipline of the Mungiki.139 Hence, they have not the capability of 
                                                          
137  While her stock of informants have a clear selection bias it is nevertheless telling 
when van Stapele (2011) finds that one of every forth youth she got to know in 
Kosovo and Bondeni around 2001 was killed by the police before they became 25. 
138  The importance of this conflict today may have declined, since the 2007–2008 
violence, but as late the winter 2012/2013 – after our questionnaire – based 
investigation, the Kenyan newspaper presented following story: a man from 4B 
was killed when passing through 3C as he was suspected by a 3C gang that he 
had snitched to the police. To revenge, a gang, or a vigilante group from 4B 
entered 3C and put fire to a number of 3C shanties (Daily Nation, December 29, 
2012). The police then entered, heavily armed. Earlier another vigilante group 
from 3A had entered 3C claiming that criminals from 3C were terrorizing them and 
they had then lynched one resident from 3C and shack were set on fire in both 
villages (Daily Nation, June 3, 2012). 
139  We don’t know for sure whether there is only one gang in 3C, nor do we possess 
much knowledge about them in terms of their operations and size. That will 
demand an extensive field study like von Stapele’s. (She discovered that there 
was two gangs operating in Bondeni at the same time as the Mungikis were 
operating. At least one gang in 3C has more than 30 members, informants 
believe, and has demonstrated sufficient structure to control the chairman in the 
village in 2012 and to kill the next one. There may be several gangs, however: 
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preventing crime against protection payments, but may on the contrary 
reward ‘members’ by allowing them ‘piece rate pay’: to let them steal 
and let the crime perpetrators keep most of the bounty themselves. To 
become a member of a gang may stimulate crimes even when the crime 
technology itself does not need any extensive cooperation, hence a 
gang; but by the gang providing social support when members are 
about to commit risky crimes.140 Some forms of crimes, such as 
burglaries are difficult and extremely risky to perform on an individual 
basis, so by joining a gang the set of possible crimes to be performed 
expands. Hence, a village which locates low structured gangs that are 
unable to establish a local monopoly of protection, are likely also to 
have higher rates of victim crimes. While the 3C gang(s) is not part of a 
large national movement like Mungiki the members have been able to 
have some networks outside their village that also extend the set of 
crime possibilities not only outside the village, but also registered 
crimes inside the village.141 
Let us return to the question of how to explain the variation in 
experienced rates of crime across our four villages? Here we have done 
it through a focus on 3C and how its peculiar history or structure may 
explain its higher propensity for gang formation and then an argument 
that its present forms of gangs will increase the crime rate. Mungiki-like 
organizations have lost influence, at least for the time being. 
Then it was only a matter of variation in the degree of influence from 
3C that would add to the indigenous crime generation in the other 
villages, an explanation doing the same purpose as a gravity model 
used to explain international trade.142 This may be regarded as a 
plausible explanation up to a point, but somewhat mechanical. How 
may history be so important when the living conditions, the shack 
architecture, population densities and governance system appear so 
similar? Why do not undisciplined gangs increasing rates of victim 
                                                          
Recently a public toilet was put on fire by one gang, probably in hire of a private 
investor. This toilet was also known as a source of gang income that asked for 
support to rebuild the toilet. It is of course possible that it was the same gang hat 
both had the toilet as a source of secure income and that destroyed it for a one 
time gain, but it appears unlikely. It is evident that it is also operating a gang in 
3A – outside our study area so inside her Bondeni we have at least two gangs.  
140  In a novel by Meja Mwangi (1973: 62 – 65) the author describes how one of the 
‘heroes’ in the book, Maina, finally is able to dare to perform his first real crime, a 
pickpocketing act, through social stimulation after joining a gang. Before joining 
he only scavenged half rotten food. To join a gang improved his consumption 
basket. 
141  Several informants mention that ‘criminals’ from one slum may swap areas and 
information from another so that they don’t perform the criminal act in their home 
villages, in order not to spoil names. In case of police crackdowns, it becomes 
easier to avoid being caught if one has base areas outside the home village. 
142  Gravity theory is a well-known set of explanations for the amount of trade 
between two countries considered as a function of their geographical distance. 
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crimes arise in the other villages? A possible, but certainly weak and 
small difference in average strength in family cohesion does not make 
any convincing explanation. Moreover, the explanation does not look 
closely to the activities of the potential crime victims and their eventual 
efforts in preventing crime: why do both the main security providers 
and the forms of security provision vary? 
 11. Crime perpetration and crime 
prevention as two linked 
collective action games143 
Let us imagine that each village is a closed unit with a given number of 
residents. One set of residents, Y [the ‘youth’] possess no assets, the 
other group, A [the ‘adults’ or ‘asset holders’] who do possess some 
assets, although the holders are poor. All assets are possible to steal by 
residents, but they have no interest for outsiders because they are 
difficult to steal from the outside without involving an insider. Many 
assets will also be of so low quality that they are only of interest for 
other poor.  
The only possibility for a Y resident to acquire an asset is to steal it, 
which he may do on his own or by joining a group, become member of 
a gang.144 Let us first imagine a benchmark situation where neither the 
Y- nor A residents are able to establish any form of collective action for 
either perpetrating or preventing crime, and that in this ‘ natural state’ 
the crime level is sufficiently high to make residents consider the 
prospects of organizing around it either by Y-members or A-members or 
both.  
The gang is of the type described in the former section that is it 
loosely structured and allows stealing of various forms. So it may be 
considered simply as a vehicle for collective action by the Y-type of 
residents. As more Y-residents cooperate in gangs the more will 
members be able to steal through social stimulation or sharing 
information, weapons or through the collective unarmed fighting 
power numbers will yield. To fix ideas let us assume that each 
                                                          
143  The following should not be interpreted literally. For one thing, we don’t believe 
economic considerations are so important and ethical considerations as 
unimportant as we portray them here. We make a number of abstractions, but not 
enough to make a logically tight model. Nevertheless, we suggest some links 
between security provision and crime activities that we believe are at work that 
may explain why the situation may differ significantly under seemingly similar 
conditions. Our exposition is inspired by the grabbing models in Mehlum et al. 
(2006). 
144  An obvious objection if interpreted literally is the fact that youth are more 
subjected to crime in Nairobi informal settlements for most crime types except 
arson (World Bank, 2010: 222). On the other hand they are more often 
perpetrators of crime, or at least perceived to be so. In a national crime survey 
about 80 % believed so (Security Research and Information Centre, 2013: 43). Net 
grabbing of assets is likely to go in the direction indicated by the model. 
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collective action involves a burglary with 5 participants. If successful, 
only members of the break-in may get a share or they may have to share 
some of the proceeds with other members If caught, severe punishment 
is likely, so the participants will need to be defended by the whole gang 
that then function as collective insurance made possible by collective 
violent actions. Members of the gang that did not participate in the 
burglary, may then have an incentive to free ride in the ensuing fight 
(collective action) when the gang defends the burglars by force. 
Knowing this, the burglars will only engage in the break-in when they 
believe the gang will be strong enough (for simplicity determined by 
the expected number of gang members) to defend them if caught. The 
non-burglars on the other hand expect that they will participate in 
other break-ins and if free-riding in the protection of the burglars, they 
may not receive support in their break-in. Given the ease of mutual 
monitoring under slum conditions, this effect is likely.145 The larger the 
gang the more valuable it is to be member. 
But if the gang is too small to succeed in its collective protection 
acts, it does not pay to a member. If membership is below a certain 
tipping point the size of the gang will move to zero and only individual 
temporary break-in groups will arise. Looking at the situation for an A-
member: he may either try to protect his property on his own, join a 
vigilante group or employ members of the Y group to do patrolling, two 
alternative security provision technologies. 
Let us first consider the A-residents’ vigilante’ technology: It may 
either be based on ex post discovery of a crime, or ex ante prevention 
through organized patrolling. Under the mutual monitoring, high 
population density properties of slums the latter is likely to be less 
effective due to the high likelihood that prospective criminals will 
discover patrols and thereby refrain from the crime and remain 
undiscovered. Moreover, regarding already committed crimes, patrols 
can only cover small areas in which the already committed crimes are 
discoverable. Any neighbor may however discover crimes like 
burglaries all over the village since neighbors obviously are 
everywhere. Hence, the ex post technology where either the victim or a 
neighbor cries out [or call through mobiles] and a number of A-
                                                          
145  The potential free-riding aspects will be reinforced if some of the proceeds from 
the burglary will have to be shared with non-participating gang members. If we 
regard the members of the break-in as one player and the other members as the 
other player the situation may be outlined as a simple assurance game with two 
Nash equilibria in pure strategies. One where both act as gang members and 
another where not anyone does so, i.e. no break-in induced by gang-pay-off nor 
any non-burglars willing to fight, that is no gang. The location of the mixed 
strategy equilibrium will be determined. To make the situation fit an assurance 
game we may give the gang a little bit more structure, allowing the break-in sub- 
gang to defect by assuming that the break-in possibility was discovered by or 
ordered by the gang. 
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residents congregate, pursue the thief and eventually arrest or kill him 
appears more efficient. 
To understand their operation, it is clear that they are quite local. 
They will only defend the property of locals, but they may attack 
thieves from other villages.146 To increase the preventive effects they 
may make the killings of the suspected thieves quite public. The police 
must in that case cooperate.147 The larger share of A-residents that are 
willing to join ex post vigilante groups, the more successful this 
behavior is likely to become both in bringing a given criminal to 
‘justice’ and overwhelm him physically. To do that by a single 
individual will be extremely risky and unlikely to succeed. Moreover, 
the larger such vigilante groups may become on short notice, the more 
risky and the lower the expected gain from stealing assets from A. 
becomes when stealing as individuals. If an Y member consider to 
initiate a gang creation, but prospective gang members hold the belief 
that joining a gang implies high risks of being killed it becomes difficult 
to recruit sufficient numbers to pass the threshold where one may 
threaten the vigilante groups and make it gainful to join the gang.  
Hence, the Mabatini situation with active neighborhood groups and 
low crime rates may become quite stable. Both with respect to crime 
prevention and crime perpetration we have seen there are strategic 
complementarities involve that may allow multiple equilibrium 
situations. And in both cases the strategic complementarities are linked 
to the dense population and the ease of mutual monitoring that 
characterize shack-dominated slums, although that link is somewhat 
roundabout in crime perpetration. 
Let us on the other hand imagine that we again start from the 
benchmark situation where we have no collective action groups among 
neither the A nor the Y residents, but then somehow the Y’s become 
organized and armed. If then the A’s consider organizing vigilante 
groups and pursuing a resident caught in a burglary, the burglar may 
be expected to be a gang member. Then the risk of participating in a 
collective vigilante action may be expected to be quite high either 
because the criminal may be armed himself, or because his gang 
members may revenge him. Hence, the vigilante group may not become 
established, and the 3C situation with active gangs, high crime rates 
and no neighborhood groups may become equilibrium. Since the crime 
                                                          
146  An informant told us that if anyone stole something from us walking on Juja road 
outside the village they would do noting, not even tell us about it if they 
discovered one pickpocketing unnoticed by us outside. 
147  According to Nairobi News (February 22, 2014) there is a separate open place 
inside the village, called Choma Zone, where suspected thieves are lynched 
(burned). This is indirectly confirmed in Ghetto Radio (February 5, 2014) that 
reports that the youth are tired of this procedure that results in many innocents 
are killed. Nevertheless they are done with the consent of the police that only 
collect the burnt corpses. 
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behavior was in the river neighborhood parts of Mashimoni was close 
to 3C may reflect a 3C equilibrium and the other parts a Mabatini one. 
To analyze 4B along these lines we may note that the A-residents 
may not only use spontaneous vigilante groups, but may also engage Y 
residents for patrolling and making temporary arrests of residents 
caught in making a crime. Such youth groups wielding force on behalf 
of the A-residents may –like the police – keep the size of crime-making 
collective actions below the self-expanding levels both through 
possessing a sustained capability of reacting collective force 
themselves, and by possessing fine-grained knowledge about the Y-
residents may increase their risks of being caught by the police. The 4B 
situation is rather complex and it may not be stable: Both the A and Y 
residents are organized and capable of collective actions, but the Y 
residents’ organizations are split between a crime-making and a crime-
preventing one. 
Somewhat speculatively, one possible partial explanation for the 
difference between 3C and 4B is difference in family norms between 
Kikuyus and Luos.  
An extreme assumption in our model is that assets holders keep all 
assets themselves, and the only possibility for Y-residents to acquire 
them is to steal them from an A-resident. That assumption is closer to 
reality when the family norms emphasize independence, that the youth 
are responsible for their own career, a Kikuyu caricature. When assets 
are shared in the family and shared by their Y and A residents, a Y 
resident get access without stealing and may have interest in defending 
the assets against it being stolen by outsiders. This is closer to the 
caricature of a Luo family.148 
                                                          
148  Iliffe (1987: 181) observes that ‘Luo immigrants to Nairobi in 1968-69 could 
expect much more hospitality than other tribes’. While difference in family 
sharing norms is likely to have lessened, some may persist. 
 12. Policing high and low crime 
rate slum villages when the 
police are and are not corrupt  
The police are rarely going into any of the slum areas by themselves 
and collect information by patrolling or receiving it directly from 
victims or witnesses. They will rather rely on information from the 
chief/chairman cluster to catch the individual criminal. This is likely to 
work without much difference whether the police officer is corrupt or 
not with respect to victim crimes in low- crime–no-gang areas like 
Mabatini. The residents are unlikely to report no-victim crimes like 
chang’aa brewing, however, and they will not give any information 
about vigilante killings except the fact of the killing. If uncorrupt, the 
police are unlikely to be very interested in non-victim crimes, but when 
corrupt, these are very interesting indeed. If corrupt, the police will 
collect bribes from business in the area, but will in general and in 
normal times be careful not to collect too much on its incarceration 
powers. It will in general be worthwhile to keep such villages as easy 
policing areas rather than try to maximize possible bribe collection 
from them. If corrupt, the police will have a monopoly of extortion from 
the A residents in such villages. Gangs are not competitors. 
In villages with strong gangs, however, it may be very risky for the 
chief/chairman cluster to provide correct information about crimes like 
killings or major burglaries. They may risk to be killed themselves, as it 
has happened in 3C. Non corrupt police may try to close major non-
victim crime activities such as chang’aa distilleries while corrupt police 
may be somewhat more lenient and only ask for bribes from them in 
high crime areas.149 In general, since it is both dangerous to move into 
such villages for small police units and difficult to get correct 
information, the police tend either to enter villages like 3 C only in 
large groups, often with a threatening posture. Since they may 
reasonably expect to be met by violent resistance, the police will often 
kill under such operations. Partly in order to prevent later threats by 
gang members against witnesses, it is not so rare that the police may 
                                                          
149  We were told that corrupt police could enter 3C undisturbed, while non corrupt 
would be exposed to stone throwing from youth hired by distillation owners. The 
stimulating effect from non victim crimes on gang formation makes it more 
important to try to reduce their influence. Conflicts about the distribution of 
extortion rates between the police and gangs may however become salient, as we 
saw in the Mungiki case.  
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kill gang members when incarcerated.150 A presence of a killing 
possibility is likely to increase any extortion bribe rate which may have 
some impact on police behavior when corrupt. While the police are said 
to hesitate before entering villages like 3C giving longer response time 
when crime is reported;.on the other hand the distilleries have so large 
bribe collection potential that corrupt officers ‘patrol’ 3C more often 
than the other villages.  
Both corrupt and non-corrupt police officers may either seek to 
restrain the size and influence of the gangs, or let them evolve in piece. 
If the latter, a non-corrupt police will just be lazy and non-committed. 
A lazy corrupt police will simply accept bribes from gangs for not 
disturbing them. When fighting them, a non-corrupt police will seek to 
arrest and link as correctly as possible gang members to the relevant 
crimes, eventually kill members in regular fights. A corrupt police force 
will consider a gang as a rival for rent extraction from the area, seek to 
weaken it in various ways, including use of extra-judicial killings and 
tap some of its income sources. Since the police are not doing so much 
in terms of daily interventions into the slums, it will not be involved so 
much in bribes in connection with individual crimes – this is more a 
potential area for eventual corrupt chief/chairman clusters, but may 
tap this source through the extortion connected to the incarceration 
processes where the police have a monopoly. 
Despite all the weaknesses and injustices connected to both the 
policing of villages like 3C, even a corrupt police are likely to reduce 
the size and criminal impact of gangs in such areas as long as they 
mainly remain police officers and don’t join them as active members, a 
possibility suggested often in Kenyan newspapers. 
                                                          
150  Among the Nairobi police stations Pangani (the neighborhood station to Mathare 
Valley) had the highest number of persons killed, nine, while in custody in 2013. 
 13. Concluding observations to 
part II 
Looking at the broad sweep of the distribution of crime rates and 
murder rates across continents, their wide variation across similarly 
poor areas is striking with Latin America and South Asia at the opposite 
extremes (Andvig and Shrivastava, 2009). Here we have gone into a 
very small area and seen how four close neighborhoods with similar 
poverty levels and architectural and geographical features, may 
generate quite different crime rates and modes of organizing both crime 
perpetration and prevention. 
This variation across similar geographical space does not mean that 
the slum architecture and geography are unimportant for the crime and 
policing patterns. On the contrary, we have intended to show how the 
density of the population as well as the characteristic of mutual 
observation and monitoring, have influenced the various 
organizational permutations we can find in the area, including the 
forms of strategic complementarities that may shape the variation. One 
may wonder why that variation seems to follow village boundaries.  
Here we may note that some of them have different history, but it 
may also be the case that the chairmen/elder institution is significant 
and that follows village boundaries. They may be able to have impact 
on both the gang formation and vigilante organizations in their area of 
responsibility. Moreover, the vigilante mechanism is also clearly 
operating as a defense for village members only.  
We have noted that the policing tasks are distributed differently 
than in the formal Western forms of policing, and in ways that give 
wider scope for civilian participation, partly because the regular police 
are less involved in these particular social and economic spaces. This 
task distribution is not necessarily inefficient, so care must be taken 
before the Western pattern eventually is imposed.  
The large variation in police tasks and difficulty in close 
neighborhoods suggest the importance of being keenly aware of the 
organizational details in the social and economic spaces to be policed. 
It is noteworthy that we unlike what Habyarimana et al.(2009) found 
for voluntary security provision in Kampala, find indications of more 
cooperation in crime prevention in multi-tribal neighborhoods like 
Mabatini and Mashimoni, than in one-tribe dominated neighborhoods 
like 3C. This may be due to the possibility that tribal factors act even 
stronger in gang formation, or it may be easier not to consider the tribal 
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composition when one enters low violence, low crime areas. While 
having some impact, the police activities are not likely to make any 
major changes on crime rates. Nor are changes in police behavior, at 
least not in the short run. Here economic measures are likely to be more 
significant. The reason is simply the following that – as we read the 
situation – the distribution of assets/asset expectations across youth 
and adults drives much of the underlying benchmark crime behavior in 
the villages (crime rates without any collective action on either side of 
the crime fence). The one instrument likely to drive that benchmark 
down is to generate jobs for youths.  
This is not any surprising and by itself any original piece of 
observation. The residents themselves agree on that. But what may not 
be so obvious is that the kind of ‘social multipliers’ we have outlined, 
open up for the possibility that the creation of even a few jobs for 
youth, particularly when addressed to youths in 3C, may reduce crime 
rates in a substantial way. The tentative observation we made that 
vigilante activities, although ethically revolting, may be somewhat 
effective in containing crime may be interesting, but is ethically 
unappealing. Moreover, that institution may have to keep alive for a too 
long time before it may stimulate local investment and generating 
growth through keeping crime rates down. Moreover, the institutional 
conditions may not permit it to be implemented due to gang forces. To 
reduce youth unemployment on the other hand will work at once and 
give development as well as prevent crime. There is also difficult to see 
any social and economic forces inside the villages that will actively 
seek to prevent its economic and political support. But to do it in larger 
scale need active central government support. Given the minimal weigh 
of poor slum dwellers in the ruling political preferences, it is difficult to 
see how that support may be forthcoming. 
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Map 1: Map of Mathere slums 
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Changaa brewing in daylight Mathare 4B 
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